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16 carter of ronquest ~lo11f the Jrn~oartes n?td t l tc  O.r?cr. yct I see 
?lo r e a s o ~ ~  a t preselct to feel nry anxi* alroat ,the advtt~zce towards 
Jlzdin. Asia is l n ~ g e  11m4gh fo r  both of us, n ~ r d  w e  ~ J Z O ~  w e l l  p ~ ~ ~ s n e  
respective ;baths, nlcd frr@l owr ye@ective 7)zisiion.r, withorrt 
jostlizg m jerrlor~sy. Ottr positios, in A f i a  L pzciescemf, w h i l e  hers 
is  progressive. . . . W e  cayL, therefore, well a f o r d  t o  w n i t , f o r b c n ~ i w ~ ,  
Bvt vigilant,  and consrioas that if renl d m ~ g e r  aypr-oncltes n t  a77y 
i ime, auc or-c .rtro?g enozgh to awest nad crzcsh ~Z."- -SIR HENRY 
RAWLINSON's "Notes  on Khiva," 174ureh, 1873. 
PREFACE. 
 TI^ author's best apology for the prescnt b001i 
must be the absence of ally single English work, so 
far, a t  least, as he knows, which professes to give 
a comprehensive account of the land of the Afghans, 
the people, and their history, including all that is 
most important in the past, as well as the more 
immediately interesting subject of the present, re- 
lations of Afghanistan with Great Britain. If the 
following pages in any way carry out the above idea 
of what is required at the present juncture of affairs 
on our Indian frontier, the author's object will have 
been accomplished. I t  .remains to him to acknow- 
ledge the very great obligations under which he lies 
to the authors and publications natned on a subsequent 
page, besides many that have escaped mention. 
One subject of regret the author has had in con- 
nection with this work. H e  had hoped to have 
been able himself to see it through the press; but, 
Prefnce. 
- 
having to return to duty in India rather more 
suddenly than he bad expected, he has had to leave 
the task of revisiilg the proof-sheets to a friencl, 
to whose lrindlless in uildertalcing it the author is 
deeply indebted. 
FRED. I-I. FISHER. 
-.,.* .,.,.,.....,., ~ ..,.....,.,.,.,.. 
i P.S.--It was originally intended to have a niap 
prepared especially for this volume, but the ex- 
cellent map published by Messrs. George Philip 
and Son, of Fleet Street, having since appeared, 
it has been decided by the publishers to  supply 
i t  for the use of the readers of this volume. 
The ollly drawback to  its adoptioil for this purpose 
is that the spelliilg of some of the names of 
places differs somewhat from the author's. The 
orthography used in this volume is that which 
has now obtained almost universal currency, being 
employed by Sir Henry Rawlinson and other 
acknowledged masters of Indian subjects. 1x1 this 
system a few names that have acquired a prcscriptivc 
title to a conventional (although iaaccurate) mode 
of spelling retain the convelltional form, such a s  
Cabul, Candahar, Calcutta, Dclhi, &c. Other names 
Pf,efn~.e, vii 
rather more 
hacl to leave 
to a friend, 
le author is 
are spelt according to Sir William Jones' now well- 
lcnown method of transliteration. T h e  accentuation, 
hoivevel; has been omitted, as it gives a n  awkward 
look t o  names, and is of very little practical use. 
T o  diminish any inconvenieilce that may arise from 
having different modes of spelling in the letterpress 
ancl the map, a list of the more important names that 
are spelt differently in them is appended. 
have a map 
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that which 
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Other names 
P UBLISFIER S ' NOTE. 
P~OI/L severnl passages 7e1hich occlir i?~ the Intier po~tion, 
it will be seelb that this ze~ork 7CMS zoritte?~ prezliouu to the 
recent pz~blirntio7t of the OBcinl Corresjo~tdena 072 /lj$$rhn?t 
A f i i r s .  The foregoing .Prt$nce will exkZni7l 7tthy these hnnle 
re~lnined ns 7~jrittet~. 
SPELT DIFFERENTLY IN MAP 
AND LETTERPRESS. 
, . ,~n,>an,.fiA*An,\ 
JJZ Lrdkq5rt.s~. 
Andkhui 
Bannu 
B ha\valpur 
Cabul 
Candahar 
Ghazni 
z v e  Hari Rud 
Hindu Kush 
Jalalabad 
Kalai-Ghilzai 
Karachi 
Khaibar 
Merv 
Multan 
Nushki 
P eshawar 
Pishni 
Sarakhs 
IJZ &Iaj. 
Andkhooi 
Bunnoo 
Bahawulpore 
Rabool 
ICandallar 
Ghuznee 
Heri Rud 
Hindoo ICoosh 
Jelalabad 
Kelat-i-Ghiljie 
Kurrachee 
Khyber 
Merve 
Mooltan 
Nooshky 
Pesha~vur 
Pisheen 
Serakhs 
Pronot~~zcen', 
~ n d k h h - i  
Biinnoo 
Bahk (or Bhl) 
wulpoor 
Clivbul 
CBndahar 
Ghilznee 
Hhree Rood 
Hindoo ICoosh 
Jelklabad 
Koorlchee 
1Cll$ber 
Merv 
Mooltkn 
Nobshkee . 
Peshhwar 
Pishnee or Pisheen 1 Sed~khs 
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INTRODUCTION. 
A FEW weelrs ago the writer of thcse lines Ioolted 
down from a window near the site of old Temple 
Bar upon a scene of triumph. An English Premier 
was passing in his carriage of state through a 
double row of vociferatilig Londoners of the un- 
tnistaltable Jingo type. His progress was now and 
again .impeded by tlie entiiusiasm of certain of the 
unwashed who insisted upon climbing upon the steps 
of their idol's chariot, and talring a close vicw of 
that idol's noble featul-cs. Over the remaining stone 
buttress of Temple Bar and its shain counterpart on 
tlie opposite side of the way two unicorns were 
conspicuous, and a banner bearing the now familiar 
device, " Peace with Ilonour." The corthge passed 
slowly on ; the Sphinx-like occupant of the first 
coach bowing with undoubted satisfaction to the 
multitude. After the great man's carriage had dis- 
appeared, suddenly, almost as if by pre-arrangement, 
a fire-engine swept past a t  full speed, clearing the 
street, as if by magic, of its terror-striclren foot- 
xx 17ttrodz~ction. 
-- 
passengers. One felt for a moment somewhat of 
~vonder at the coincidence, and all sorts of absurd 
fancies crowded upon the mind. Of what was it the 
omen ? Did the instant intelligence of a conflagra- 
tion that was flashed upon the spectator 
by the appearance of the fire-engine, in immediate 
connectioil tvith the State-ceremony of a Prime 
Minister's triumphal processioll, prefigure a concur- 
rcnce of analogous events in the political world ? All 
inen know now how hollow was the "Peace," and 
hotv doubtful was the " Honour," that were said to 
I have been secured at Berlin. The peace has barely 
survived the summer and autumn, and early winter 
sees us locked in a struggle, which at  the best will 
severely tax our energies and strain our resources- 
for what ? To satisfy that " Honour" which, we were 
told, had been amply vindicated at Berlin. 
Those who least admire Lord Beaconsfield must . 
be constrained, we thiiik, to admit that he possesses, 
in a degree rarely excelled, the faculty of versatility, 
the crab-lilte power of grasping each new situation 
and adapting his own programme, itself by no means 
a fixed one at any time, to whatever novel circum- 
stances present themselves, with such tact as to 
dazzle the multitude into the belief that he had all. 
along foreseen, and with infinite sagacity had pro- 
vided for them. The Secretary-of-State-for-India's 
despatch to the Viceroy, which saw the light in the 
- . /?rtrod?~ctiololz. xxi 
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Tilnes of zrst November, is the latest example of 
feature in the Premier's character. No one 
supposes that the document in question was other 
than a manifesto for the benefit of the English 
p b l i c ,  intended to be a vindication of the policy of 
the present Government, which is quite willillg to 
accept all the credit of what is likely to be approved, 
2nd to shift on to the shoulders of their PI-edecessors 
of the oppositc party the responsibility of all that 
is worthy of condemnation. Thus it is cleverly 
shown that the present difficulty is to be traced 
entirely to the follies of Lord Nortl~broolr's Govern- 
ment, tile blame of which is again ingeniously 
fathered up011 I-Ier Majesty's then Government a t  
home (Mr. Gladstone's). If Lord Northbrook had 
o ~ l l y  guaranteed the Amir's dominion against all 
his foreign euemies-just as Lord Beaconsfield has 
guaranteed Asiatic Turlrey against Russia-all 
would have been well. The Amir would have ac- 
cepted our handsome subsidies, and presents of arms, 
like a good boy, and been all the more prepared in 
consequence to give us battle whenever the blood- 
fcud that has existed for the last forty years or more 
should break out again ! Because Lord Northbrook, 
o r  rather Mr. Gladstone, declined to pledge Ellglalld 
to support Shere Ali in evely case against foreign 
foes-a pledge which, if once given, would have 
encouraged that ruler in ali sorts of aggression upon 
I '  xxii 
his neighbours-the Amir became sullen and re- 
served. From 1874 to the present time it has beell 
the coilstant endeavour of the Premier and his col- 
leagues to break down this reserve and remove this 
sullenness. The promise of protection and active 
countenance which Shere Ali had vainly desired 
from Lord Northbroolr has been offered to hiin- 
coupled with the condition that English Agents 
, '  should be given access to positions in his territories 
I 
other than at Cabul itself. The offer was refused, 
and has been continually refused ever since. 
accepted if made by Lord Northbroolr. MTc ques- 
tion very much if it would have met with any other 
response then than the one given now. Shere Ali 
tvas willing to accept our guarantee, our subsidies, 
and our guns, but whether he would ever have con- 
sented to admit British Agents, and so become re- 
duced-in his own eyes, at least-to much the same 
position as that held by such semi-independent 
Inclian potentates as Scindia, the Nizam, and 
Nepal, is more than doubtf~il. This argument, 
however, suits Lord Beaconsfielcl's purpose aclmir- 
ably, which is to show that the present war has 
been really necessitated by the perverse conduct of 
Mr. Glaclstone's Government. 
In effect it does not seem that the apportionment 
of praise and blame is to bc made so easily. The 
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wisdom that comes after events will aIways be able 
to indicate where a fault has been committed which 
it can be shown has entailed disaster that might 
othcrwise have been averted. I f  we were to venture 
to indicate the weak point in the recent forcigil policy 
of Englatld, we should find it in the exaggerated idca 
of Russia's desigils upon India which some English- 
mcil entertain. That  Power seeins rather to rccluire 
peace to recover herself after the recent devastating 
mar with Turkey than a war which shall ilrgc her 
still further to the verge of banlrruptcy. It  is pre- 
mature now to discuss the morality of the present 
invasioil of Afghanistan. I t  11zc;ly be justifiable, and 
we must hope for the Ilonour of England that ample 
reason will be forthcolnil~g to satisfy both the Eng- 
lish Parliament and the English people that we have 
not violated right in order to obtaiil for ourselves a 
doubtful advantage. 

A F G H A N I S T A N  
AND 
THB CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION. 
A FGHA NISTA N-ITS NA TURA L FEA TURES. 
NaturaI I3ounda~ies-Approxi~nntc Extent of Afghanistnn-Origin of 
Name-Independent Territory-What Afghan Dominions Include- 
Cornparisoil of Afghanistan wit11 Switzerland-Mountain-ranges- 
I-Iindu Icushand its Prolongations-Safed ICoh-Suliman Mountnins- 
Passcs on the Indo-Afglian Frontier-Fort of Ali Musjid-Natural 
Divisions-Rivers-Laltes-Proviuces and Towns. 
A F G H A N I S T A N ,  or, as its name signifies, the land of' 
t h e  Afghans, may be roughly conlpared in area with 
Germany. The north-eastern part, called the CabuL 
valley, from the river of that name which waters it, 
is really the upper dominating section of the Indus. 
bas in  ; and there is some ground, therefore, for the 
statement which has been made that physically, at  
least, Eastern Afghanistan is part and parcel of 
India .  And if all the nationalities of the earth were 
t o  strike for "natural boundaries," India might have 
as good a. right to cIaim the Cabul valley as her own 
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as Spain would have to include Portugal, or Germally 
to take Belgium and Holland. 
What was said just now as to the extent of 
Afgllanistan must be regarded as a mere approxima- 
tion to the truth, for the best maps can 0111~ keep 
pace wit11 sltilled explorers, and these have been few 
and far between in the countries between the Oxus 
and the Indus, so that accurate information is not 
yet to be had on many interesting points collnected 
with their natural features. Enough, however, can 
be gathered for a rough conception of them from 
1 scattered notes of hasty travellers, who passed 
through the country keeping, so to speak, one eye 
on the scenery and the other on their holsters. The 
name, it should be premised, by which the country 
is lcnow~l so extensively outside its own limits, is 
only as old as the short-lived Durani empire of 
Ahmed Shah in the middle of the last century. The 
Afghans rarely use the term, spealting of them- 
selves as Pushtanu (plural of Pushth), and their 
country as Wiliyat. The wlzole Afghan dominions, 
including, in addition to Afghanistan IJroper,+ that 
part of the Oxus basin to which tlie name Afghan 
* Afghanistan Proper is nearly co-extensive with the ancient 
provinces of Aria (Herat), Dra?tginna (Seistan), the region of 
the Pnro$nn~isad~ (Cabul), and Aracltosia (Candahar), with 
Gn?tn'nrilis (Peshawar and the lands of the Yuzufiais). Of the 
latter district part now is the British district of Peshawar, and 
the rest independent. 
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de Portugal, ~ e r r n a ~  Turkestan has been applied, may be regarded as a 
1. quadrilateral plateau, about 600 miles from east to 
+ I I ~  a~tent. of west, and 600 miles from north to south. Excluding 
- - 
:d a mere .,-.nroxima- Afghan Turkestan, the extent of the country from 1 
1- * 
st: can keep north to south must be decreased to 450 miles. 
~f id  these have beell Both in the larger and smaller areas there would be 
tries bet\veetl he Oxus included some territory which is free from Afghan 
~t-ate informatiolt is not control altogether, and other tracts over which the 
:sting points col~nected hold of the Alnir is spasmodic and precarious. 
Enough,  however, can Examples of the former are the valleys north of 
r~~cePtion of them from Peshawar in the possession of the Yuzufzais ; those to 
tlAavellers, who the west and south-west of the same district, occupied 
=; so to speak, olie eY" by the Mohmands, Afridis, Vaziris, and other tribes ; 
on their holsters. and the elevated valleys of Chitral or Kashgar, and 
, by which the country of the independent ICafirs (non-Muhammadans) 
tside its own limits, is  among the higher spurs of tbe Hindu Kush. To  
ved Durani of the semi-independent territories belong the eastern 
f the last cefitury. The districts of Ichost and of Kuram, which are con- 
m, spealting of them- termillous with British territory; the Icakar country 
of Pushth),  and their ' in the extreme south-west ; and part of the mountain 
 ole Afghan dominions, region in the north-west, inhabited by the ~ i m a k s  
@anistan Proper,+ that and Hazaras; to which may probabIy be added 
1ic11 the name Afghan Badakhshan, 
:o-estensive with the ancient 
a7cn (Seistan), the region of 
4 7-ncAosia (Candaliar), with 
; of the Yuzufzais). Of thc 
h district of Peshawar, and 
T h e  boundaries of Afghanistan, roughly stated, and 
subject to correction on account of some independent 
and semi-independent territories included by them, 
may be. thus defined :- 
T h e  Oxus forms the northern boundary line from 
! 
1 
A frrlrn.wiStnf~, 
its source in Pamir to Khoja Salih Ferry in 65" E. 
long. nearly. Thence the Afghan territories become 
. -- he line that divides 
~g south-west, and skirting the Turkoman 
I r.. 9 1 .  
--.- -----a , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - , 
, . . ---- -. 
it bends eastward across Lake I-lamun or Seistan, 
conterminous with those of lchiva, t 
them runnir 
, , 
desert to tile lvlurgllaD rlver, ana passlllg rnence in 
the same direction to a point on the Hari Rud river, 
, 8 a few miles south of Sarakhs, in about lat. 36". 
On the west, the boundary line runs from the last- 
mentioned point, first south-east for a short distance, 
s .  
\ and again turns westward, being continued to the 1 
intersection of lat. 30" with the lake, including, from 
its point of divergence to its termination, a triangular 
tract which forms part of the plain of Seistan. All 
to the west of this line is Persia. 
On the south there is no natural boundary, and it 
can only be roughly given as a line from the Lake of 
Seistan, in lat. 30" to the Helmand river, and thence 
south-east to Nushki, whence it  runs north-east 
through the southern valleys of the Lova, dividing 
the Pishin valley from Quettah, or the Shal territory, 
belonging to the Baluch state of Icelat. Further 
east, the bouildary line has a southern declination, 
and terminates not far from the Indus. 
The eastern boundary from a point a few miles 
distant from Mittan Kot, on the Indus, is formed by 
the eastern spurs of the Suliman Mountains as far 
1. 
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as Peshawar, and thence northward the boundary is 
for a time the Indus, but thereafter lies in almost un- 
known country. 
Except portions of the lower valley of the Cabul 
river, small tracts towards the Indus, and the space 
included in a triangle formed by joining Herat, 
Candahar, and the extreme south-west point of the 
Lake of Seistan, the whole of the quadrilateral 
plateau of Afghanistan has a minimum height of 
4,000 feet above the sea. A tract that would be in- 
dicated by a straight line of zoo miles drawn from 
the Rushan Pass in the Hindu Kush Mountains, 
passing about 35 miles west of Cabul to Rangak, on 
the road between Ghazni and Candahar, is nowhere 
less than 7,000 feet above the sea. The lowest level 
taken-that of a position in the Lalte of Seistan-is 
1,280 feet above the sea, Herat is 2,650, Candahar 
3,490. 
Briefly, then, Afghanistan Proper is an clevated 
table land, having an area of more than 211,500 
square miles, somewhat larger than France, and is 
bounded, on the north by Turlrestan and Khiva, on 
the west by Persia, on the south by Baluchistan, and 
on the east by the Panjab. Westward of the Hindu 
Kush the Koh-i-Baba cuts off Afghanistan Proper 
from the tract known as Afghan Turlrestan, which 
reaches down to the bank of the Oxus, and 
includes the various minor Khanates or  States 
6 afghan id^?^. 
of Kunduz, IChulum, Balkh with Alrcha, and thc 
Chnhar Wilaynt, or " Four Domains " of Sir-i-pul, 
Shibrghan, Andkhui, and Maimana, together with 
such of the Hazara tribes as lie north of the Hindu 
Kusll and its prolongation in the Icoh-i-Baba. 
Besides these the name Afghanistan is sometimes 
made to iilclude also Badalthshan, a poor mountain 
tract between the Hindu Icush and the Oxus, which, 
though nominally it forms part of thc Amir's 
dominions, is of small value to its suzerain, the tri- 
bute annually paid to Cabul being said to amount to 
no more than about EI,SOO. The barren mouiltains 
which, compose Badakhshan can hardly, indeed, be 
said.to belong to Afghanistan by other than a pre- 
carious tenure of suzerainty or protection, since the 
present princes obtained the territory by the aid of 
Shere Ali, from their uncle, who was anxious to 
become the feudatory of the Bokharan ruler. 
I t  has been pointed out that the main features of 
the coast-line of Europe are repeated on a grander 
scale in Asia.. The peninsula of Spain and Por- 
tugal finds its counterpart in Arabia; France in 
Asia Minor and Persia ; Italy in India ; Turltey, 
Greece, and the Grecian Archipelago, in Burmah, 
Siam, and the Eastern Archipelago ; and Russia in 
the Chinese Empire ; while the British Isles on the 
west of the Euro-Asian Continent are placed 
symmetricalIy with Japan on the east. So  striking 
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has the parallelism between Italy and India seemed 
to some writers, that they have not hesitated to state 
that the Hiinalayas are repeated in the Alps ; the 
Rhone and the Po in the Indus and Ganges ; whilc 
Genoa (or IMarseilles) is Karachi ; Venice, Calcutta ; 
Milan, Delhi ; Naples, Bombay ; and Sicily, Ceylon. 
I f  the authors of this compariso~l had carried it a 
little furtl~er inland, they would hardly have failed 
to find a counterpart of Switzerland in Afghanistan. 
Whether or not an ingenious geographer could find 
the representatives of a11 the chief natural features, 
such as mountai~ls, plains, rivers, and lakes, in 
sufficient corresponde~lcc to bear out the comparison, 
it cannot but be evident that in its relations to India 
on the east, Persia on the west, and Asiatic Russia 
on the north, Afghanistan is physically situated 
with regard to them, not dissimilarly from the 
position that Switzerland holds with reference to 
Italy and Austria 011 the east, France on the west> 
and Germany on the north. Baluchistan, however, 
which is thc southern boundary of the Amir's 
dominions, is not yet so completely British-Indian as 
Piedmont and Lombardy are Italian. 
T o  give a detailcd account of the mo~lntain sys- 
tem of Afghanistan would be to transcend the 
modest limits of this work. A rough outline may, 
however, be attempted. I t  has been a common 
error with some journalists of late years to describe 
8 A fghaftzstan. 
Afghanistan as lying beyond the I-Iimalayas. I t  
really lies within the Hindu Kush section of that 
Indian mountain girdle. Or, to be still more cor- 
rect, the Western Himalayas are extended into 
Afghanistan, and forin four mountain regions, which 
are ltnown from east to west by the names Hindu 
I<ush, Paghman Mountains, Koh-i-Baba, and Ghor 
Mountains. The last were ltnown to the  Greeks 
as the Paropamisus, and consist of two parallel 
chains, collectively called b y  Persian historians the 
Ghor Mountains, but distinguished now, the  northern 
as the Safed Koli, or White Mountains, and the 
southern as the Siyah Icoh, or Blaclc Mountains. 
T o  take all the northern mountains in order, we 
And between 34" and 35" W. lat. two vcry lofty j 
mountain-ranges, between which flows the  Indus. I 
T o  both of these the name of Himalaya Mountains i 
i s  applied as far as long. 70°, the eastern being , 
undoubtedly a part of the great Indian northern 
I mountail1 barrier, and the western as certainly a t 
continuation of it. A glance a t  the map will, how- 1 
ever, show that this western range, although it rises a 
i in somc places as high as 20,000 fcet, and runs I 
from east-south-east to west-north-west, does not j L 
form the watershed of the rivers of this region. IS 6 
For the watershed, according to most geographers, I 
we must look farther north to a range called the I 
Icarakoram Mountains, which run almost due east j ( 
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and west, and are clearly a continuation of the 
Icuenlun Mountains, which stretch across Tibet 
into China. This western continuation of the 
Kuenlun is called in Afghanistan the Hindu ICus11, 
or Hindu Icoh (" koh," in Persian, meaning moun- 
tain). I t  will be observed, further, that the Indian 
range of the 13imalayas and the Hindu I<ush do not 
run parallel, but converge and unite in one mountain- 
mass between 70" and 69" east longitude, including 
between them the country known to the Afghans 
as Icafiristan (the land of the infidels, i.e., non- 
Muhammadans). 
Thus it seems to be optional with us to regard the 
Hindu Icush as an extension of either the Icara- 
koram or the Himalaya range of mountains, or, 
better still, as the continuation in a single chain of 
both. 
Only the northern declivity of the Western 
I-Iimalayas is included in Kafiristan, the southern 
belonging to Afghanistan. From the plains these 
mou~ltai~ls  appear to rise in terraces, so that as 
many as four ridges, one overtopping the other, 
may a t  some places be seen. There are wide valleys 
among them, but only a narrow strip of cultivable 
soil along the line of drainage. Betweell the higher 
portion of the ridges, alld the base of the hills, is an 
inclined plane-often very wide-strewed or entirely 
.covered with boulders and shingle, without a particle 
I0 A fghnnistnn. 
of soil. On the declivity of the hills, however, where 
the inclinatioil of the upper strata is less perpen- 
dicular, there is found a rich soil of some depth. 
Advantage is taken of this for cultivation, and, where 
this has not been done, high forest trees occupy the 
ground to an elevation of 10,000 feet above the sea- 
level. Up .to 4,500 feet these consist chiefly of a 
species of oak, called " balut " ; but beyond that 
height they are largely mixed with a kind of olive, 
called " zaitun," up to.6,500 feet, where it gives place 
to the " deodara." These forests are the mos t  
I extensive in Afghanistan. f 
From the point of convergence of the Himalayas 
with the Ilindu Kush, at  about 70" E. long., the 
sides of the mountains are destitute of trees, and are 
devoid of soil, the roclrs protruding in every direction, 
and huge angular d6h.is occupying the intervening 
spaces. Dry and thorny bushes are the only vege- 
tation, as far as 68" E. long., where the Hindu Kush, 
strictly so~called, comes to an encl in a huge snow- 
clad mountain-mass, called by that name, which 
rises to the height of 15,ooo feet above the level 
of the sea. 
The best-known of the many populous valleys in 
this region is the Panjshir valley, which has a total 
length of seventy miles, and an average width of 
about a mile and a-half. There are some seven thou- 
sand families living in the lower part, the upper bcing 
i t s  Nntldml Fenttwes. I I 
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uninhabited, on account of tlle extreme cold in 
winter. Although the soil is naturally very poor, 
i t  is extensively cultivated, orchards and mulberry 
groves constituting most of the wealth of the people 
in these valleys ; the inuIberries, when dried, yielding 
a flour which is their principal food. Through this 
valley passes the high road from Cabul to Kunduz, 
and a t  its upper end it traverses the famous Khawak 
Pass, a t  a height of 13,200 feet above the sea. 
Through another similar valley, f~~r thc r  to the west, 
watered by the Parwan rivcr, passes another roacl 
across the I-Iindu ICush (by the Sar-alang Pass), 
leading to the plain of the Oxus. 
After running south-west, as just described, for 
some 370 miles, the Hindu Rus11 ceases to be locally 
lcnown by that name, although it is.sti11 applied to 
the whole cl~ain of northern mountains. This chain 
is continued in the smaller range of the Paghman 
Mountains, which run nearly due south, and are of 
lower elevation. This range consists of two parallel 
ridges, ~vitll a valley between them of nearly tell 
miles in width, having an elevation that seldom 
sinks below 10,000 feet above the sea, and is, con- 
sequently, unfitted for cultivation. It affords, how- 
ever, a grateful refuge from the summer heats to the 
pastoral tribes in its neigl~bourl~ood. The two 
enclosing ridges are from 12,ooo to I 3,000 feet high, 
and, being free from snow in the summcr, several 
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passes lead over them to the valley of Bamian, which 
lies west of the western range, and is only 8,500 feet 
above the sea. Of these passes the best known are 
the Irak, attaining nearly 13,000 feet ; the I<allu, 
12,480 feet ; and the Hajiyalc, 12,190 feet above j 
the sea. T 
Where the Paghman Mountains end, the ICoh-i- 
Baba rises as a single range, and runs due west. Of C 
these mountains we have very much yet to learn. 1 , 
We know that they commence at their eastern t 
extremity in an immense mass of roclcs about fi 
1 14,000 feet high, with still loftier snow-clad peaks 
above them that attain 15,000 feet a t  least. T o  the 
westward the range is coiltinued in a series of lofty 
peaks, and then breaks up into three parallel ranges, 
enclosing the waters of the Murghab and Hari-rud 
rivers. The northernmost of these finally loses itself 
in the sands of the Turkomal~ desert ; the middle 
one, the Koh-i-Safed, or White Mountains, has a 
westerly and longer course, runt~ing north of and 
past Herat, where it turns northward and also merges 
into the desert; while the southern range, called 
Koh-i-Siyal~, or Black Mountains, follows a course 
pretty nearly parallel with the last-named one, and, 
it is believed, eventually unites with the ranges that 
form the northern boundary of Persia as  far as the 
Caspian. If this theory be proved to be a physical 
fact, there would be shown to exist an  unbrolcen 
Kallu, 
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XI<, 12, r90 fee 
- 
'Y much yet to learn, 
:nCe a t  theif eastern 
mass of rocks abau! 
~ftier sllow+clad peak; 
feet a t  least. To the 
ed in a series of lofty 
1 three parallel rallge;, 
l l ~ r g h a b  Nari-rul 
these finally loses itsell 
111 desert ; the middle 
,lite M o u n t a i ~ ~ s ,  has a 
running north of and 
thward and a l so  merge 
southe~n range, call4 
tains, follows a COurst 
Le last-named one, and, 
s with the ranges that 
3f Persia as far as the 
~rovecl t o  be  a pI~ysicll 
to exist  an unbroken 
Its Nntz~ml Fecttz~ues. 13  
c o ~ l ~ l e c t i o n  between the mountain systems of the 
C ~ L ~ C ~ S L I ~  and the Eastern HimaIayas. Indeed, the 
whole l i n e  of AIpine watershed which we have been 
describi~lg, stretching from the souther11 end o i  
Pamir across  Afghanistan to Mash-had in I<horasau 
was known to AIexander's historian as the Caucasus 
-a fact ~.vhich seems to indicate that tlle probable 
contiiluity of the ranges was even then surmised. 
T h e  southern spurs of the Koh-i-Siyah give rise to  
the  Ichash-rud and I-Iarut-rud rivers and to soine 
feeders of the HeIinand river. 
A recent  writer in the Geogmphicnl Mng~zcine 
gives a solnewhat different statement of the con- 
llectioil of the I-Iindu I<ush proper with its western 
extensiops. H e  regards the Koh-i-Baba as the 
direct corltinuation westward of the Hindu I<ush 
from the point where it changes its direction from 
the  south-west. A saddle connects the Hindu 
I<ush here with the Paghman range, which en- 
closes the I~cad streams of the Helrnand and 
Ghorband rivers, and runs south-west, forming the 
water-parting between the Helmand and Argan- 
dab, a n d  ceasing at  their confluence. According to 
this account  the two Paghman ridges are offshoots 
from the  Hindu Kus11, and not links in the chain, 
A spur from the Paghinan range runs westward, 
enclosing the source of the Argandab, and thence 
extending parallel with the northern chain, bounding 
I throughout its length the table-land of Ghazni and " 
the home of the Ghilzais, and ceasing just north of 
Along the parallel'of 34" runs, due east and west, 
the Safed-ICoh range (not to be confounded with , 
the western range of that name which forms part of / 
the Paropalnisan or Ghor Mountains), which con- I 
stitutes the southern water-shed of the Cabul basin. 
I t  consists of a single range for about seventy-five 
miles, when it splits into two ridges. Its connec- 
tion with the Hindu ICush by means of the Attakoh 
t 
range has been asserted. The main range of the 
Safed-Koh, which preserves a pretty uniform level 
of about 12,500 feet in height, is richly clad with 
pine, almond, and other trees. Its valleys abound 
in orchards, cultivated fields and gardens, and mul- 
berry, pomegranate, and other fruit trees are plentiful. 
I t  is considered by some geographers that a net- 
work of low mountains runs generally south from 
this range, and is merged in the table-land of Kelat 
and the mountainous system of Baluchistan. 
Next in importance to this great northern range 
of the Hindu Kush is the eastern range, known as 
the Sulimall Mountains, which on the map appear to 
form the natural frontier line between the Afghan 
table-land and the plains of the Indus. This is the 
name applied by the best authorities to the range, 
or ranges, running almost due north and south along 
table-land of Ghazni an1 
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the meridian of 70" E. ; from the Gomal Pass to the 
twenty-ninth parallel of latitude, or thereabouts. 
Major Raverty has described it as a mighty moun- 
tain barrier, containing in its northern section two 
ranges which increase in number as they run south- 
wards, till at its southern extremity, wliere the Sari 
river breaks through, there are as many as twelve 
distinct ridges, " like battalions in columns of com- 
panies at  quarter distance," The mouiltaills increase 
in height from east to west, and the highest, called 
Milltar-Suliman, or Iioh-i-S~jall, is snow-capped in 
winter. 
Colonel Macg~egor holds a different view respect- 
ing this range. As one running north and south 
along the meridian of 70°, he does not recognise the 
Suliman at  all. H e  considers that from the Attalcoh 
range, between Cabul and Ghazni, there springs a 
range of mountains which proceeds southward with- 
out a break, throwing out spurs to the east and 
west, and that this is the range which forms the 
system of mountatins of Eastern Afghanistail and 
Baluchistan. The weight of autllority, however, is 
opposed to this view. 
A peculiarity in connection with this range-the 
Suliman-is noticeable in the large number of 
streams that pierce through its sides after draining 
the table-lands to the west. These naturally afford 
access, by means of the passes they form, from 
, 16 A fghn?zistn~z. 
I i 
, the valley of the Indus to the high plateaus of f 
Afghanistan. I I I I 
I 
I $ I  PASSES ON THE INDO-AFGHAN FROKTIER. 
This seems to be the proper place to speak of 
these gaps in the great mountain barrier that 
from the OXUS to the Indian Ocean, by 
commerce penetrates from Central Asia to 
India, and which formerly afforded paths to the 
invading hosts that poured down to obtain tile 
plunder of her rich cities. The four best-known 
passes on the eastern frontier of Afghanistan are the 
IChaibar, Kuram, Gomal, and Bolan. Besides these 
there are innumerable others of every degree of 
practicability, most of which are known only by 
native report. In speaking of these passes, it must 
be remembered that the names thus broadly given, 
locally apply to only a particular part of the wllole 
distance to be traversed before reaching the table- 
land beyond. Thus, what is commonly called the 
IChaibar Pass includes a succession of gorges or 
defiles, each designated by its own special name. 
The Ichaibar Pass may be said, generally speaking 
to commence at Jamrud, ten miles west of Peshawar, 
and.to extend t o  Dhaka, a distance of about thirty- j1 
three miles. The actual entrance to the defile, how- 
ever, is at ICadam, a place three miles out of Jamrud, ii 
which is a small village surrounded by a mud wall. l 
t : 
'tlzll. 
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the high ,plateaus ol This is (or was) the site of an old Silrh fort, which 
was built in 1837, after the Afghan army, under the 
.FGHAN FROSTIER. famous sons of Dost Muhammad, AItbar Khan and 
Afzal I<haii, had talten to flight at  the unexpected 
oper place to speak of 
arrival of Railjit Sinh, whose famous march with 
mo~ultain barricr that 
a relieving army from Guzerat has been seldom 
the Indian Ocean, by 
equalled. Within 1,000 yards of ICadam the gorge 
; from Central Asia t 
narrows to 150 yards, with steep, precipitous cliffs on 
afforded paths to th: 
either hand. Between this and the Afghatl frontier d down to obtairl th fort of Ali Musjid, distant about ten miles, the 
The four best-kno\~n 
mouiltains on either hand are about r,t;oo feet: in 
: of Afghanistan arc the height, slaty, bare, and, to all appearance, inacces- 
d Bolan, Besides these 
sible. The width of the Pass varies in this part from 
ers of every dcgrec o( 290 to 40 feet. The name of this fort figured for a 
ch are known only by few days early in October last, rather conspicuously 
of these passes, it must in the Indian telegrams published in the London 
mes thus broadly given, daily papers. I t  was incorrectly stated that our 
icular part of the tvilalt troops had marched upon it from Jainrud, and 
:fore reachil'g "le captured i t  from the Afghans. I t  \van just below Ali 
is commonly calIcd the  Musjid, too, that Major Cavagnari was in September 
succession of gorge; 01 z ~ s t ,  1878, told by the Afgl~an officer, the Mir Althor 
y its own special namz or Master of the Horse, that the British Mission 
said, gellerally speaking, ' would not be allowed to proceed on its projected 
1 miles west of Pesbatyaf, journey to Cabul, 
distance of about thirt~ 
trance to the defile, hoiy- it was alleged, language of menace was used by the 
hree miles out of Jammdl Afghan officer, the report of which, filtering through 
rounded by a mud the inflamed channels of fiery special correspon- 
1 2 
, 1 dents, roused a section of the English people to a ' 
sense of gross insult received, and for a time induced 
I !  
some of the stroilgest opponents of Lord Beacons- 
field's Government to clamour for immediate redress. , 1 
Of.the exact nature of these proceedings between j 
the Afghan and English officers we shall come t o  I 
, , 
, , 
speak later on. We may mention here that the little 
, , 
8 , ,  
fort of Ali Musjid taltes its name froin the ruins of 1 
I ,' ' I '  a small Muhammadan inosque (" Musjid " being 1 
, , 
( i  Persian for mosque) in its vicinity. I t s  situation is  
; 1  , 1 
! nearly midway between ,Peshawar and Dhaka, about 
4 ,  
- , - .- ..- 
1 ten miles from the eastern end of the Ichaibar Pass, 
- 
\ as abovestated, and twenty-six miles from the western 
end, while it is seventy miles from Jalalabad. It ; 
stands on the south side of the Pass, at  the height of 1 
2,433 feet above the sea, on the summit of beetling 1 
crags, which tower perpendicularly above the road- i 
way. The crests of the hills at this spot are barely I 
I50 yards from each other; and as on the northern i 
slopes a smaller masonry bloclthouse has been con- 1 
strutted, a very effective cross-fire can be poured on 1 
troops advancing through the defile. The  fort itself 
is said to be not more than 150 feet long and 60 feet 1 
wide, and is commanded, fortunately for an invader 1 from the Indian side, by higher positions, both on T j 
tlze south and west. I t  was by attacking it on these i 
faces that Colonel Wade succeeded in talting it in ! 
19. Although, however, lze commenced the attack [ 
u 
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on the 25th of July, and was enabled in a few hours 
to drive the defenders from their ou t~or l i s  by the 
accuracy of his shcll-fire, the Afghans being armed 
only with matcl~loclis, it was not until three days 
later that the place surrendered. Its garrison was 
under 1,000 strong, of whom 500 were irregular 
Jazailchis (matchlock men), the remainder bei~lg 
levies from the Afridi ancl Shii~wari tribes. Wadc's 
loss was over 150' killed and wounded. After its 
capture the fort was placed under a garrison of 
Yusufzai Pathans, with the object of keeping opcn 
free comrnunication between Pesha~var and our 
forces in Jalalabad a11d Cabul. In  November, 1841~ L 
a desperate attack was made on the fort by a body 
of about 2,000 men belonging to the neighbouring 
Afghan tribes. They cut off the water supply, and  
reduced the place to dreadful straits ; but the British 
commandant, Lieuteilailt Mackeson, with his usual 
fertility of resource, bought them off. A force, 
under Colonel Moseley, consisting of 2,500, was 
then sent to hold i t ;  but, owing to iusufficiency of 
provisions, that officer was compclled to retire in 
eight days, wit11 the loss of 180 killed and 
wounded. Sir George Pollock, on his advance 
through the I<haibar with the avenging army in 
1842, left a garrison in Ali Musjid; and on 
evacuating Afghanistail in November of tlie same 
year, he destroyed thc works, but they were 
2-2 
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speedily reconstructed by the orders of Dost 
Muhammad. 
The great drawback to the occupation of this 
advanced fort is its extreme unhealtl~iness. In  1839 
the mortality in  the British detachment llolding it 
under Colonel Wade was something terrible. I n  less 
than eight weelts there were 250 deaths out of a 
strength of a little over 2,400 men. This was mainly 
owing to the water, which is strongly impregnated 
with antimony; and even this supply is only ob- 
tained from the Ichaibar stream below, so that the 
place can easily be forced into capitulation, should 
time be no object with an advancing army. I t  
would ]lave bcen unwise in the present instance to 
have exposed our troops to the siclrness that proved 
so fatal forty years ago, unless an immediate advance 
upon Cabul had been intended. Several roads, 
moreover, are lcnown to us now by which this posi- 
tion of Ali Musjid, the most formidable obstacle 
between Peshaurar and Jalalabad, can be completely 
turned, so that its capture under the circum- 
stances was wisely deferred. Among these roads 
are the Tatara road, which enters the hills about 
nine miles north of Jamrud, and joins tlie maill 
route at  Dhalta. The Icadapa road, and olle 
through the Bara Valley also-both of them avoid 
Ali Musjid-are practicable for lightly-equipped 
columns. 
I ts  Natural Features. 2 I 
------- 
After this digression, which the importance that 
has been attached in some quarters to the early cap- 
ture of the fort of Ali Musjid seemed to warrant, we 
continue the description of the Ichaibar Pass. For 
a distance of two and a-half miles beyond Ali Musjid 
it retains its difficult character. I t  then enters the 
3'3 deaths ,,; I Lala Beg Vallcy, about six miles in length, with an 
n. ?'his xt;.;;n s..,i-'; average breadth of a mile and a-half. The western 
f, the ascent over it being narrow, 
."""Kly imprc.,r-:,! end of the valley finds the road entering a still 
oL'* 
s:b:)~)ly is a:r!;; 2- narrower defile, there being scarcely room in it for 
1 hriov,:, so t;:lt?.: two camels to pass each other. The Landi Khana 
32 
~ . ~ ~ ~ i t ~ t i ; f t i o ~ ~ ,  . Pass-which is by some said to be the highest point 
.fv.kncing ara):;. 1: in the Ichaibar-is distant from this point about a 
I)Pese~~t i ~ l ~ t ~ -  1: ?i mile and a-ha1 
sickiless t11a: r,: j; -! rugged, steep, and generally the most difficult part 
1 isnmecliate2 -.a::.;-:: of the road. Guns could not be drawn here except 
1 .  S C ~ ~ L ' ~ ~ !  i:3J:I by men, and then only after the improvement of the 
i>,v v:ilich 2 .I track. The descent, however, is along a well-made 
iisrmiclnblc o:-145(: road, and is not so difficult. On tllc west side of the 
, can be cgmja:::<i Pass the mountains gradually open out, and lose 
L I P ~ I C J C ' T  the  c : : : - 3  much of their inaccessible nature. Dhalra is distant 
, 1 about eight miles, and here the defile ends. The 
ers tlic hi!!: 2!:-.: main road to Cabul is continued from this point 
, , tl~rough other passes to the toivll and 
[3;5 rt)acI, a!:: c?.: Jalalabad-famous for General Sale's defence ot lt 
J in 1842-passing on the way through the villag " 
,utl1 of tl1c;m ;..; 1.. - - -- . . 
- ,  ] :  ;: Lalpura, Hazar 
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fortress of 
- .. 
;es 01 
nau, Basawal, Batikot, Chardeh, Bari 
,., , ,., ,aghan. From Pesl~awar to J alalabad 
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I 
I I by road is about ninety miles, and thence to Cabul, 1 
1 I 
I through the Jagdallak, Lattaband, Khurd Cabul, and I 
othcr passes, is roo miles. I t  was in these latter I )I 
0 1 defiles, within a few marches of Cabul, that the ( 
I 
'I Cabul massacre" occurred, and not in the Khaibar f I Pass, which none of the unfortunate army ever 1 l 1  
, I?( reached on that occasion. t 
I 
1 Of the passes to the north of the Ichaibar the I 
most important are the Baroghil and Karambar a 
1 I j!/ passes leading from Cashmere, our outlying feudatory I 
I 'I/ principality, to Kholtand, the latest officially an- 1: 
- -  nounced Russian acquisitioll in Central Asia. 7 - 
\ also lead from ICashgar to Cabul and Cashmere b y  11 1 
routes that cross at  Chitral. The  Barogl~il Pass is 
ltnown to us from the reports of the Mullah em- 
ployed by Coloilel Montgomerie, who travelled from 
Chitral into Badakhshan by this route. 
Captain Biddulph, who was attached to Sir Douglas 
Forsyth's mission, visited Sarhad, the town at  the 
northern extremity of the Pass, but it is doubtful if 
ally Englishman has traversed these routes through- 
out. Khokand, or Farghana, is separated fi-om British 
territory by the Pamir Plateau, and although the 
actual distance in a direct line between the Czar's 
territory and ours is not much greater than zoo miles 
at this point, yet the road that conilects them is not 
one which a modern army could follow. Leaving 
Kholtalld (1,540 feet above the sea), it passes through 
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I bllence to Cabu], Marghilan to Uch Kurgail (3,100 feet). These 
U ~ u r d  Cabul, and places are said to have been the scenes of indiscrirni- 
61% in these latter nate slaugl~ter of the Kl~oltandians in the campaign 
Cabul, that tile of January, 1576. Bearing south, the road passes 
rjt in the Khaibar through Isfairam, and over the Little Alai Plateau, 
llnatc army ever which stands 12,000 feet above sea level ; then, 
crossing the Great Alai, at an altitude of 14,000 
the Khaibar the feet, it descends into the valley of Mult SLI, following 
11 and Karambar a south-easterly course to Sirich ; bending round to 
outlying feudatory the west i t  striltes the Oxus at Kila Panjab, the ele- 
oficially an. vation of which is g,ogo feet ; then, ascending the 
n t n l  Asia. Thty stream to Sarhad, which Biddulph determined to be 
and Cashmere hy 
I I~aroghil Pass is 
' tllc Mullah em. 
.ho travelled  ON 
lute. 
~ u d  to Sir Douglas 
the town at the 
t it is doubtful if 
ie routcs through- 
rated from Rri tish 
lnd although the 
c hvcen the Czar's 
cr than zoo miles 
~nccts them is pot 
follow. Leaving 
it passes through 
10,975 feet, the road crosses the Baroghil fifteen 
miles to the southward, the altitude being 12,000 feet. 
From this point a road branches off to Mastoj, and, 
following the course of the Runad stream, passes 
through Cl~itral (7,140 feet), Dir, and Pashat to 
Jalalabad. 
A t  Chitral another road from Sarnarcand, througl~ 
Penjakand, Hissar, IColab, Faizabad, and Zebak, 
joins this route. The road through the Barogl~il 
Pass into Cashmere is a most difficult and moun- 
tainous pathway. I t  touches few villages, the chief 
being Yasin, in Afghan territory (height 7,770 feet), 
and crosses the Maharajah of Cashmere's border at  
Gaon Kuch. I t  then runs through Gilgit (5,270 feet) 
to Bunji on the Indus, and so through Isltardo and 
Dras to Sirinagar. 
The I<arainbar Pass is inerely a subsidiary road to  
that by the Baroghil. Leaving Sarhad, it  follows a 
more easterly course, passing by the Karambar Lalte 
alld joining the main road at Gaon I<uch on the 
These passes, it seems, were recently secured for 
us by the Maharajah of Cashmere's troops, but the 
danger to be apprehended from that side is not very 
great, owing ' t o  the enormous natural difficulties of 
Along the north-western frontier there are in- 
numerable passes, of which at least seventeen are 
well-defined roads, practicable for the movemeilts of 
lightly-equipped columns, and thcre are certainly 
four up which guns could be talten. Of these, the 
Ichaibar, already described, and the Bolan are the 
best Itnown, the Kuram and Gomal being the other 
two chief ones. The  great drambaclc to the two 
latter being utilised in the event of war is the fact 
that our means of communication within our own 
border are of a very imperfect Itind, so that some 
military authorities are of opinion that the difficulties 
a force would encounter before it could reach the 
eastern end of the Icuram or ~omal 'Passes ,  would be  
almost as great as those to be met with in the moun- 
tains themselves. 
The Icuram Pass is so called froin the rivcr of that 
name, which debouches through it and flows south- 
- .. -. 
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west through Thal and Bannu to the Indus, receiving 
as tributaries the ShamiI, Tochi, Gambela,, and other 
streams. The road through the ICuratn Valley, 
which was traversed by Sir H. Lumsden's Mission in 
1857, leads from Thal to Ghazni and Cabul, the route 
to the latter city branching off near the Shutargardan 
(Camel's Neck) Pass, north-west of the Paiwar. By 
this route, Cabul is distant from Tllal not more than 
150 miles. There is a longer road, available a t  
seasons when the Shutargardan is not so, which fol- 
lows the  Ghazni road as far as IChushi. I t  is described 
as a fairly good road, but the turbulent conduct of 
the Jajis involved Lumsden's party in great difficulties. I 
These tribes being hardly restrained by the Amir's 
troops from massacring the mission-a fact which 
will scarcely warrant our regarding them as very 
friendly to us. The climate of the ICuram Valley is 
described as being magnificent: for about six weeks 
the winter is severe, but during the spring and autumn 
i t  is most  charming. I t  is very fertile, filled with 
orchards, and exceedingly well cultivated. 
The Gomal Pass is the next in importance, and is 
similarly formed by a river, from which i t  is named. 
General Chamberlain in 1860 led a force against the 
Mahsuds up the Zam Valley from Tank, to the north 
of the  Gomal River. Kaniguram, the capital, was 
taken, and considerable chastisement inflicted on the 
marauding tribe. From the facts collected during 
26 ALuha;ttixta;rz. 
this expedition is derived most of our lcnowledge of 
the Gomal Pass, which leads direct to Ghazni, and is 
credited with being the route by which hlahmud of 
Gl~aziii made most of his invasions of India. 
Besides the Drapall Pass, from Dera IslnaiI IChan, 
and others north and south of it, Major Ravertg gives 
details of no less than thirty-four passes (exclusive of 
small ones) between the ICaura and the Sari. These 
are too distant from the Indus to be of much use for 
military purposes'. T h e  priilcipal are the ICaura, 
Vihowa, Barltoi, Wrug, Trundi, Saunra, Szri, and 
- Vador Passes, the last of which leads from Dera 
Ghazi IChan. 
I The Bola11 Pass leads direct to Quettah, which is I 
a t  present our most advanced post wcstward, being 
beyond the G7th degree of longitude, while Cabul 
itsclf is to the east of the 69th degree. Sir John 
Kaye speaks of the Bolan as commcilcing a t  Dadur, 
but it is, perhaps, more correct to say that  i t  begins 
about five miles to the north-west of tha t  place, 
From Shikarpur in Siildh to Dadur is I ~ G  miles, and 
this distance was traversed by the Bengal column in 
February and March, 1839, in sixteen painful 
marches. Water and forage were so scarce that the 
cattle suffered terribly oil the way, the camcls falling 
dead by scores on  the descrt. The  Uolan Pass is 
60 miles in length, and the passage was accomplished 
by the coiumn just spolten of in s ix days. It is 
from 70 feet to So feet broad, with steep cliffs on each 
side-can be easily forced by a British column. Its 
suminit is stated to be 5,800 feet above sea-level, and "'jar 
its average ascent go feet to the mile. ~t sir-i- [ P w   exclusive^ 
'nd the Sari, ~h~ Bolan (the head of the Pass) a mountain-torrent 
of much us sometimes bars the way during the height of the 
rainy season. On emerging from the Bolan Pass the PI arc the Kaurq traveller enters the beautiful valley of Shal, " a 1 hunn, Sno, fli,d favoured spot in a country of little favour." The 
clear, crisp climate is one ~eculiarly suited to the 
European constitution, and over the wide plain, 
bounded by noble mountain-ranges, intersected by 
many sparl~ling streams, and dotted with orchards 
and vineyards, the eye ranges wit11 delight. Quettal~ 
itself, which is ten miles oft; is described by Hough 
as "a most miserable mud town, with a small castle 
on a mound, on which. there was a small gun on a 
rickety carriage." 
There are other passes besides the Bolan though 
the Brahu range, of which the principal are the Mula, 
Nagau, and Bhor Passes. The Mula, otherwise 
ltnown as the Gandava, follows the willdings of the 
Mula river, which has to be crossed repeatedly, and 
is considerably to the south of the Bolan. I t  leads 
through Nard to Kelat, a cross-road leading through 
Gaz to  Khozdar, a Balucl~ town of some importance. 
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Anjira, a village at  the top of the Pass, is at an 
elevation of 5,250 feet, but the inclination is, on an  
average, only 45 feet to the mile for the whole dis- 
tance-roz miles. This greater length, and the fact 
.that it only leads to Icelat-which is IOO miles south 
of Quettah-render the Bolan, altl~ough a more diffi- 
cult road, the preferable one for an advance upon 
Candahar. 
NATURAL DIVISIONS O F  AFGHANISTAN. 
Having talten a rapid survey of the mountain 
systems of Afghanistan, and the rneails by which 
access is to be had to her chief cities from the one 
side of Russia11 Turkestan and British India, we 
pass on to consider the natural divisions of the 
country. These we shall find it coilvenient to classify 
as follows :- 
(I.) The Valley or Basin of the Cabul River. 
(11.) The Central Tablc-land, on which stand 
Ghazni and KalAt-i-Ghilzai, embracing thc upper 
valleys of ancient A ruchosin. 
(111.) The Upper Helmand Basin. 
(IV.) The Lower Helmand Basin, embracing 
Giriskh, and the Afghan portion of Seistan. 
(V.) The Basin of the Herat River; and 
(VI.) The Eastern Portion of the Table-land, drain- 
ing by streams, which are cliiefly occasional torrents, 
towards the Indus. 
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T o  these some add- 
(VII.) The northern mountain regions ; and, 
(VIII.) The  Southern Table-land, lying between 
the Iihoja Amram range and the Muri and Bugti 
mountains, and descending to the west, where it 
terminates in the desert of Baluchistan, just short 
(I.) The Vnllq) of the Cnbul Xiuer.--This has its 
~ ~ o r t l ~ e s n  limit in the range of the Hindu Kush, 
beginning on the west at  the foot of the Paghman 
Mountains, and stretching eastward to the banlts of 
ar by g.~& thc Indus, a clistance of about zoo miles, in a 1 
botit he one 
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straight line. In the extreme west the valley is 
~o ,ooo  feet above the sea ; but at its eastern 
end, near the Indus, it is not more than 750 
feet above sca level. The southern boundary of 
the valley is formed by, an uninterrupted chain of 
heights of varying deviation, which is separated from 
the Paghtnan range by the narrow plain, called the 
Valley of Maidan, which is 7,747 feet above the sea 
and is well cultivated. 
The road from Cabul to Ghazni and Candahar 
passes through this plain. To the east of this 
road coinmellces the chain just spoken of, which 
consists at  first of isolated hills of moderate eleva- 
tion. They are described as low, with little grass, 
bad water, and treeless, their dismal appearance 
corresponding with that of other mountain regions 
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that have bee11 found to contain great metallic 
riches. While the English occupation existed inany 
beds of very rich copper ore were discovered in 
several places, but the natives work them only to a 
small extent. 
At Tazin, twenty miles from Maidan, these hills 
change their aspect, rising higher and becoming 
clothed with trees. They merge into the Safedkoh 
range, of which, indeed, they may be considcred the 
western extension, this elevated rocky mass occu- 
pying a distance of some thirty to forty miles from 
west to east, and from fifteen to twenty miles from 
north to south. 
The highest summits of the Safed Roll reach to  
16,000 feet above the sea, and the sides are covered 
to thc height of ~o,ooo feet, with forests, chiefly of 
deodara, while orchards, cultivated fields, and pasture- 
grounds sltirt the base. The peaks are snow-capped 
all the year round, and from the snow risc many 
streams, that flow uninterruptedly through the 
summer. 
The high mountains of the Safed Koh terminate 
at about 70" E. long., and the Tira or Khaibar hills, 
that succeed them to the cast, are of lower elcva- 
tion, declining steadily in height as they approach 
the Indus. 
The northern slopes of the Ichaibar hills arc 
steep, and generally bare, or clothed with scanty 
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grass, except aftcr the autumnal rains. There are 
plateaus of some extent, however, on thesc high Ili]ls, 
which have a deep soil, and f~lrnish good crops where 
irrigation is possible. 
The  Cabul river (the Cophat of Alexander) rises in 
t l ~ e  Unai  Fass, about thirty-seven miles west of Cabul, 
in the near neighbourl~ood of the source of its rival, 
t h e  Helmand. I t  drains thc Maidan valley, and below 
Cabul is joined by the Logar river, which flows north 
. cIz5; OiCd. 
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t h e  left and the northern watershed of the Safed 
R o h  on the right, and falls into the Indus at  Attok, 
I t s  tributaries on the right are numerous, but, 
exceptiilg the Logar, are insignificant in volume, 
owing t o  the nearness of the watershed, On tile 
north o r  left bank the Cabul river receives the large 
streams of the Panjshir, Alishang, IC~lnar, and 
Landai Sin. Of thcse the Kunar or Chitral river is 
the  longest, and, indeed, as regards length, might 
count as the main stream. Higher up in its course 
it is called the river of Kashgay and the Bnilnm, and 
has  been identified with the Chonspes and RfaLa- 
ninntz~s of the ancients. I t  rises in a small lake 
near t he  borders of Pamir, and flows in a south-west 
direction through the length of ICashgar, its whole 
length to its junction with the Cabul river being not 
less than 250 miles. . Tlie Cabul river, in part of its 
course, betweell Cabul and Jalalabad, descends 4,000 
feet in fifty miles, and its banlts and bed consist of 
hLge rocks. Tlie lowest ford (a dry season one) is 
near Jalalabad, before the junction of the river with 
the Icunar. From this point a safe and rapid 
descent is made by means of rafts on inflated skins, 
and boats of 50 tons can be floated from Jalalabad 
downwards. During the floods the distance between 
Jalalabad and Peshawar (not less than IOO miles) 
can be traversed in this way in twelve hours. The  
'", 
river is lowest in the winter, and is at  its greatest 
height in August, when the upper snows beg-in to 
descend. ' 
At  a point sixty miles from the Icunar confluence, 
the Cabul rivcr issues from the mountains, by which 
it has been hitherto hemmed in, and enters the plain 
of Peshawar. I t  soon after receives the Landai Sin, 
which is the name given to the joint streams of the 
Swat and Panj ICora, wliich drain the great valleys 
of the Yuzufzais ; Lafzdai Sift, or Little River, being 
applied to it by way of distinguishing it from the 
Abba Silt, or Indus. Both rivers, on entering the 
plain, form deltas, which are increased by artificial 
canals made for irrigation. 
The valley of the Cabul river is naturally divided, 
by the mountain-ranges of the Lataband on the 
west and the Khaibar on the east, into three basins, 
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called, from the principal towns in them, the Cabul, 
Jalalabad, and Peshawar basins. 
The basin of Cabul includes a tract about 
thirty-six miles from east to west, and from eight 
to sixteen miles from north to south. This tract 
is again divided by two ridges of hills into three 
plains. The western plain, called Chahar-deh (or 
"Four villages ") is about eight miles wide and 
twelve long. The town of Cabul stands a t  the 
base of a ridge of hills (called the Talt-i-shat) 1, 
running from south to north, through which the 
Cabul river flows in a deep gorge. The Chahar-deh 
plain, which is t o  the west of this ridge, is very 
fertile, and abounds in fruit trees. 
The eastern portion of the basin is wider, and is 
called I<ohistan. On the west it is hemmed in by 
the Pagl~man Mountains, and on the north and east 
by the Hindu Kush. Its length is thirty miles, and 
average width seven miles. The western side of the 
plain of Icohistan is much higher than the eastern, 
along which flows the drainage of the opposite 
mountain. I t  is the favourite country residence of 
the Cabul inhabitants, and is thicltly-studded with 
their strongly-built dwellings and well-cultivated 
gardens. 
The plain of Logar is the third of the plains that 
are included in the upper basin of the Cabul river. 
, It is about twenty miles wide from east to west, and 
3 
about half 'that distance i n  length from north to  
south. Much of it is a swamp during part of the 
yeal; and it is surmised that the whole was a t  one 
time a lalre. I t  is chiefly valuable as s grazing 
ground for the cattle, and especially the horses, of 
the Cabulese, but it also contains orchards and 
vineyards. 
The Lataband Pass leads from the Cabul to  the 
Jalalabad division of the valley. This mountainous 
region extends for about thirty miles, and numerous 
offsets reach it from the Safecl Koh, leaving narrow 
valleys intervening. .A series of steep ascents and 
descellts is here met with, the ridges sometimes 
rising r,mo or 1,500 feet above the valley, which are 
overhung with frowning boulders. T o  the south of 
this barren region is the Khurd Cabul Pass, through 
which runs the road from Cabul to Tazin and  Jag- 
clallalc. At Jagdallalc this road is joined b y  the  road 
from Cabul through the Lataband Pass, whicla 
thenqe proceeds eastward through Gandainalr to  
Jalalal~ad and Peshawar. 
A marked change in the character of the valley of 
the Cabul river occurs at Gandamak, where the 
Jalalabad divisioil of i t  may be said to begin. This 
extends from west to east about forty miles, and is 
on an average about ten iniles wide. It is reached 
from Gandamak by a sudden descent from a n  eleva- 
tion of 5,000 feet to one of z,ooo. The descriptiot~ 
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of the change given by the Emperor Baber has been 
quite another world. The timber is different; its 
grains are of another sort;  its animals are of a 
different species ; and the manners and customs of 
its inhabitants are of a different kind.'' I t  is possible 
to leave the wheat harvest in progress at Jalalabad, 
r@m the Cabul to fie and to find a t  Gandamak, only twenty-five miles 
b. This mountainw distant, that it is but a few inches above thc ground. 
p mils, and numerous " Here," exclaims one writer, " nature has planted 
:rS Xoh, laving nanN the gates of India. The  valleys of the upper basin, is 
r uhep axents ad though still in the height of summer affected by a 
he ridges esometi~ 
j*ilc th dI9, \vhi~h@ 
"2m. To thc south d 
.vrB Cab\ Pass, thrwj 
sun of fierce power, recall the climate and products. 
of the finest part of temperate Europe; the region 
below is a chain of narrow, low, and hot plains, with 
climate and vegetation of an Indian character." 
A narrow tract along the Cabul river is richly. 
cultivated ; beyond that on either side are barren 
wastes up to the foot of the hills, where village life 
and cultivation again appcar. I n  April and May 
this region is visited by the same fierce hot winds 
that a t  this season prevail in the plains of India. 
The  Ichaibar Pass leads from this central division 
of the Cabul basin to its most eastcrn portion, 
the plain of Peshawar, now British territory, but 
formerly, along with ~ i n d h ,  an integral part of the 
Afghan dominions. I t  has been 'conjectured that 
down to a coinparatively late date in the tertiary 
3-2 
period a great inland lake filled up the deep basin of 
Peshawar, and even rose to a considerable height 
along the sides of the neighbouring hills, being fed 
by the Cabul and Swat rivers. I t  is supposed that 
in course of time the outlet by which the lake 
emptied its surplus stores into the Indus created a 
deep gorge through the rocky barrier that hemmed 
it in, and, step by step, the waters subsided to lower 
and yet lower levels, until a t  length the whole valley 
was drained of its overflowing flood, and became a 
!IF 
, mere circular glen, traversed by the united stream of 
the Cabul and the Swat, which had formerly filled its 
whole expanse. Yet even to the present day many 
signs of this primeval condition remain stamped 
indelibly upon the face of the Peshawar basin. I ts  
bottom consists of a thick alluvial deposit, the relic 
of its ancient lacustrine state ; and through the 
yielding soil the rivers cut their way in numerous 
divergcnt channels, which still recall the memory of 
the almost forgotten lake. Especially in the rich 
wedge of land known as the Doab (i.e., the tract 
between two rivers) do these numberless minor water- 
courses carry off and distribute the swollen current 
of the great mountain streams, thus preventing the 
possibility of inundation, and parcelling out the 
fertilising waters to the green fields around. I n  this 
way the Peshawar valley is freed from the danger of 
those two ever-present and alternative Indian curses, 
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with such appalling rapidity during the 
seasons respectively. 
The fertilitv of the vallev is so famous 
of Bara, grown along the banks of a stream beari.., 
the same name, has the reputation throughout India 
of being food fit for princes. 
The plain of Peshawar falls short of the Indus. 
Its elevation is 5,000 fect lower than the plain of 
Cabul, Peshawar itself being only 1,165 feet above 
the sea. 
(11.) The Ce~ztral Table-h~zd is hardly more than 
twenty miles wide at its northern extremity, where 1 
it meets the plains of Maidan and the Logar river, \ 
which lies between it and the basin of Cabul. I t  
widens in its length from N,E. to S.W., till a t  
Ghazni it is nearly one hundred miles across, and 
this width is continued to its southern extremity, 
near Candahar. Its greatest elevation is reached at 
the Sher-i-dana Pass, north of Ghazni, and it slopcs 
down on the northern side from g,ooo feet, near 
Gl~azni, to less than 8,000 feet in the Maidan plain, 
and in the south it sinks towards Candahar as low 
as 3,500 feet. The variations of temperature expe- 
rienced in this tract are, consequently, very great, 
ranging from a cold climate in the north to a com- 
paratively hot one in the south. Thus Ghazni is 
very cold, and has a winter that lasts four or five' 
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lnollths, during which hard frosts are experienced, 
the ice ill the pools attaining a thickness of several 
feet even in a mild season. Candahar has, however, 
a temperate climate, with only slight frosts, and 
great heat in the summer, while the thermometer 
often varies as much as 40" between sunrise and 
three p.m. The rainfall here is small, and recourse 
has to be had to irrigation, for which ingenious 
methods are adopted. In the northern part good 
crops of barley and wheat are obtained by  these 
means. The fruit of this region is considered in- 
ferior to that of Cabul. In the middle and southern 
tracts, occupied by the Ghilzais, a nolnadic tribe, 
there is little cultivation, and that only near the 
large rivers, but pasture-grounds are numerous. 
Near Candahar, on the banks of the Argandab, 
wheat, rice, barley, and Indian corn are cultivatecl, 
and orchards are plentiful. 
(111.) The Upper Helmawd Basin is the tract t o  
the north-west of the Central Table-land, and is the 
least-known tract of Afghanistan. The  Helmand 
rivcr (the classical Etynznndev) has its highest sources 
in the ICoh-i-Baba and Paghlnan Mountains, betwcen 
Cabul and Bamian. I t  exceeds the Cabul river in 
length, and probably also in volume. I t s  upper 
course is through the Hazarah countiy, and it is 
believed that for a course of nearly 300 miles this 
river has not beul seen by a European. This un- 
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ltnown part of the river ends at Girishk, xvllere the 
principal route from Candahar to Ilerat crosses it. 
From native sources of information it is gathered 
that the I-Ielmand, until about forty miles above 
Girishlc, has all the characteristics of a mountain 
stream. I t  receives its chief tributary, the Argandab 
(supposed to be the ancient Amchotz~s), about forty 
miles below Girishlt, and here becoincs a consider- 
able stream, 300 yards wide and g feet deep. I t  
coiltinues fordable, howevel; to within IOO miles of 
its mouth. In  its lower course the left banl; is 
within a mile or so of the desert with its moving 
sands, but the vegetation on the banks is luxuriant. I 
I 
Cultivation seems to have fallell off froin what it was \ 
r$*& art nurnerour, 
d the Aqand~i 
are cdtivatd, 
in former times, the lower outlet appearing to have 
been the seat at some more or less remote period of 
a flourishing population. 
Following generally a south-west course from its 
source till it enters Seistan, the Hclrnand there 
turns nearly nortl~tvards from a point situated a 
little to the north of 30" north latitude, and con- 
tinues to flow in that direction to its outfall by 
several mouths in the laltc of Seistan or Harnun 
(the ancicnt Aria Palus). The whole length is 
about 700 miles. 
(IV.) The Lower Helvzaad Basin extends from 
the road leading from Girishk to Farrah on the 
,north to the desert of Balucl~istan on the soutll and 
south-east. On the west the plain of Seistan is i ts  
boundary, part of this plain being now included i n  t 
* , I  1 
I (V.) The Bnsiyz of  t/te Heyat River lies between 
I I '  the I-Iazarah country on the east, and the Ghurian 
i i 
' ,  
hills in Persian territory on the west. The Hari-rud 
i i I or Herat river rises in the lofty Hazareh country, not far from the source of the Ballrh river. For 
I 1 more than IOO miles its course is westward, a t  a f I 
I i height of many thousand feet above the sea. It 
' 1 :  ; ,- 
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then descends rapidly in the same direction to Aoba, 
\ where it begins to be used for irrigation. About: 
sixty miles beyond this place it flows past Herat, 
at a distance of three iniles south of the city. T h e  
Candahar road crosses the river near Herat by a 
masonry bridge of twenty-six arches. Numerous 
deep canals are here drawn off. The river turns 
north-west below I-Ierat, and rapidly decreases in 
volume, owing to the immense stores taken from it 
for irrigation. I t  flows past Sarakhs, having pre- 
viously received the Tejend or Mash-had stream, 
but accurate information of its further course is  
wanting. In  a recent map the Tejend-rud (or Tejend 
river) is given as the main stream, into which t h e  
Hari-rud falls at Agha Derbend, fifty miles south of 
Sarakhs. Beyond that town a conjectural north- 
west course is indicated for the point of stream of 
at least 250 miles, and i t  is made to end in a lake 
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called ~ a l i e  Tejend, about fifty miles south of the 
ancient bed of the OXUS, on the borders of the 
Turltoman desert. 
The  of Herat is of considerable extent, and 
is .covered with fortified villages, orchards, gardens, 
and cornfields. The heat is excessive for 
two months, but the winter is cold, and snow fa11s 
iIl great  quantities. South of Herat is the plain of 
Sabzawar, thirty lniles long and twenty wide, alld 
partly cultivated. This plain and the AnanClara t o  
tile south of it are watered by tlie Harut-rud, alld 
tile canals drawn from it. This river, besides 
receiving a considerable affluent, the I<hushltalq or 
- 
Khushrudak,  forms a truc delta with fifteen branches. 
T h e  Harut- rud has a coussc of about 250 miles to  
its outfall in the Lake of Seistan. I t  has been 
confounded with the Hari-rud, or river of Herat, 
which has led, perhaps, to the long-prevalent mis- 
take that the latter flowed south into the Seistan 
Lake. 
(VI,) The Emtern Portiorz of the Table-lami is very 
little known,  as it has been rarely visited by Euro- 
peans. It is believed to be little cultivated, and to 
be occupied b y  nomadic tribes, of whom the GhiI- 
zais in the north, the I<altars in the south, and the 
Vaziris i n  the  east, are the principal. The Gomai 
river d r a i n s  the northern part, but rarely reaches the 
Indus e x c e p t  in times of flood. This region may be 
said to extend from .the Suliman Mountains to the  
watershed between the tributaries of the Indus o n  
the east and the Helmand on the west respectively, 
This watershed is a ridge about 1,000 feet above the  
table-land, and is lcnown by several names, such as  
the Jadran Mountains in t l~e  north, and the Icohnak, 
'J<and, and I<apar Mountains in the centre and south. 
(VII.) The N o ~ t h e ~ ~ z  Ilowztnilt regioons ay t/te 
Hmrah mzd Ei~nn6 occupy, together tvitl~, the ICoh- 
i-Baba, the whole country between 34" and 36" N. late, 
1, 1 1 ,  I I .  I and between 6 
- 
8" and 63" E. long., covering an area  
of about 50,ooo square miles. The climate of the  I I' I 
nortfiern part is very severe on account of its high 
elevation, and tbe Hazarahs are obliged to cut great  
quantities of grass for their sheep, which, during 
three months of the winter, are generally housed 
under the same roof with their owners. The country 
of the I-Iazarahs has an averagc elevation of ~ o , o o o  
feet. In the Eimak country the elcvation of tile 
mountains is less, and the general level is also I,owcr. 
During the heats of summer pastures are sought here 
by the Durani tribes, who come up from the plains 
below, where all the grass is completely burnt u p  
in that season. 
(VIII.) Tlze Saz~the~~tz TnBle-lnnd is the tract bc- 
tween the Khoja Amran range and the Mari and 
Bagti Mountains, and consists of the valley of t he  
rivkr Lora, and the country of Thal. This river 
tc. 
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from the Pishni valley westward is unlrnown, and, 
although it is usually considered to belong to the Hel- 
mand basin, it has not been ascertained that its waters 
ever reach that river. I t  rises -near the Icand and 
Joba pealrs in an offset of the Suliman Mountains, 
and flows westward, The greater part of the Khoja 
Amran range is unlcno~vn, as, indeed, are the upper 
courses of the Arghasan and Icadani streams, ~vhich 
join the Dori, a coilfluent of the Argandab, 
Besides these main natural divisions of Afghailistan 
Proper, the IChanates of Afghan Turlcestan and 
Badakhshan are included in the Afghan dominions, t 
as the former are subject, atld the latter tributary, 
--. to the Amir of Cabul. Afghan Turlcestan includes 
the IChanates of ICunduz, Ichulm, Balkh, with 
Alrcha ; the western Khanates of Sir-i-pull Shibrghan, 
Andlrhui, and Maima~la, which are lcnown as the 
" Four Domains " {Chiliar Wilayat) ; and such of the 
Hazarah tribes as lie to the north of the Hindu I<ush 
and the Paropamisan chain. This tract includes the 
whole southern half of the Oxus basin, from the 
ICokcha to the Murghab river. 
Between the district of Swat and the dependencies 
of Badalchshan and Icunduz, and in the heart of the 
hill-country beyond the India11 frontier, lies the in- 
teresting tract called Icafiristan, or the land of the 
Kafirs (the term used by Muhammadans for all who 
have not embraced Islam). Roughly speaking, it 
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may be defined as the country that lies on the eastern 
slopes of the Hindu Kush, from the Valley of 
Panjkir, near Cabul, and as far north as Mastoj and 
Chitral, or Kashlcar. 
RIVERS. 
The chief are the Cabul, Helmand, I-Iarut, Hari- 
rud, Gomal, and Lora, with their tributaries, which 
have, perhaps, been sufficiently described in the pre- 
ceding pages. 
The  Kuram river rises in the Safed ICo11 Moun- 
tains, and drains the southern slopes of the Salt 
Range. The upper part of its valley is known as the 
Bangash-i-bala, or Upper Bangash, and the lower 
part descends gradually to the Indus, forming the 
plain of Bannu. Tbis plain, as well as the tract 
called Danian, which lies south of Bannu and to the 
east of the Suliman Mountains as far as Mittan-Icot, 
is included in British territory. 
The rivers of Afghan Turkestan and Badakhshan 
are mostly tributaries of the Oxus, which forms the 
boundary of these provinces as far as IChoja Salih 
ferry. The  Icolxha, or river of Badakhshan, is 
famous for the mines of lapis lazuli in its neighbour- 
hood. The Kunduz river has its chief source in the 
Bamian stream, and just where the latter receives a: 
confluent from the Hajihalc Pass, extensive ruins 
are found, the name of which, Zohak, connects 
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Plvftiik, connects 
them with the most ancient legends of Persian 
history. 
The  Khulm, Balkh, and Murghab are the other 
chief rivers of this part of the Afghan dominions ; 
and they have numerous tributaries. Tlie last is 
l<nown to reach Merv, and is then lost in the desert. 
Besides the Lora Hamun, the name given to the 
lalcc in which the Lora river is supposed to end, a 
small part of the Lake of Seistan or Zarall is 
included in Afghanistan ; and there is also a salt 
I 
lake called the Ab-i-istada (standing water) on the 1 
Gl~ilzai plateau. This last is about forty miles in 
circuit, and very shallow, nowhere, perhaps, exceed- 
ing twelve feet in depth. The chief feeder is the 
Ghazni river, but the waters of the lake itself are so 
salt and bitter, that fish entering them sicken and 
die. The dreary and barren aspect of the shores of 
this lake is said to rival that of the shores of the 
Dead Sea. 
PROVINCES AND TOWNS. 
The present political divisions of Afghanistan are 
not known with accuracy, but they probably consist 
of Cabul, Herat, Ghazni, Candahar, Jalalabad, 
Afghan Turkestan, and the Hazarah division. 
Besides Cabul, I-Ierat, Ghazni, Candahar, and 
Jalalabad, there are few places of such importance as 
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to deserve the name of towns. Istalif, Charilcar, 
I(alaJt-i-Ghilzai, and Girishk, are all places connected 
with our former occupation of Afghanistan, at  some 
of which British troops were stationed. 
Farrah and Sabzawar, in the west, are places of 
some irnportal~ce, from a military point of view. 
Zarni, to the east of Herat, is noted for the ruins in 
its neighbourhood, supposed to be those of tile 
ancient capital of Ghor, the seat of a inonarchy 
which supplanted t11c Ghaznavites, and obtained 
extensive domillion in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. The rule of the Ghori Icings extended 
at one time over Ichorasan, Afghanistan, Sindh, and 
1 Lahore. 8 
Icunduz, the capital of an old Khanate, is a 
mere collection of mud huts. Ballch; the ancient 
Bactra (of which no certain trace remains), is now 
entirely deserted for another site, Talctapul, eight 
miles east of the old city. Altcha, the capital of a 
recently-conquered Uzbelc Khanate, is a fortified 
town, with a citadel. 
The  chief towns in the "Four Domains " are 
Shibrghan (12,ooo inhabitants), Andlthui, Maimana, 
and Sir-i-pul. 
Ilaving now completed our rapid survey of the 
'natural features of Afghanistan, we pass on to con- 
sider the climate, productions, and commerce of the 
country, which form the subject of tlie next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 11. 
A FGNANISTAN-ITS C L I M A  T '  AND 
PRODUCTIONS. 
Variations in Climate-Mineral Wealth-Vegetable I<ingdom-Agriculture 
-lrrigation-Animal 1cingdom-Domestic A~limals-Industry and 
~omrnerce-Trade Routes-Povindahs. 
CLIMATE. 
. _.-. ?;:-*j, i j  nor 
. ..-*  
- 5 '  : 5 . f  ,;;j;lj, ,=if8b 1 -.-...-a. 
-, :I:c cspitalofa 
.:.... i.5 3 fortified 
. :. 9 j .-;:::%ins " art 
* -  . .1  T: -.r S. 3Iaimana, 
- * 
. ..  - . J ~ Y G Y  d thi 
r ,:.; &-!n to con., 
-r .* r : ; : r t rc~ OF the 
:'.: ::.;st chaptit 
THE diversity of climate found in Afghanistan, of 
which frequent mention has been made in the pre- 
ceding pages, is due to difference of elevation rather 
than . of latitude. So severe are the winters at 
Gliazni (7,730 feet) that the people stay in their 
houses nearly all the winter. Indeed, if tradition is 
to be credited, the entire population has perished in 
former times from severe snow-storms. On the 
other liand, the summer Izeat, except in the very 
elevated par t s  of the Hindu ICush and other high 
mountains, is everywhere very great. The soutli- 
\vesten-11 portion of the country is exposed during the 
summer  t o  a deadly hot wind, which renders the 
~ v l ~ o l e  country a sandy and aImost uninhabited 
desert. Ferrier says that at  Herat the wind blows 
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constantly from May to September from the north- 
west, and its violence is equal to prostrating houses, 
uprooting trees, and other similar devastation. The 
summer heat in the provillce of Candahar is intense, 
in Seistan almost unbearable. The rains of the 
south-west Inonsoon reach the eastern border of the 
Afghan table-land, but owing to the distance from the 
sea they are scanty, and last only for a month, from 
the middle of July to the middle of August. They 
do not extend beyond Jalalabad in the valley of the 
Cabul river, but they fall at the head of the ICuram 
1 valley. They are not experienced to the west of the 
Suliman range. 
In the higher regions the summer is dry, rain 
not falling from May to September or October, 
and being rare in November. 
The winter rains are the most considerable, and 
are accompanied with falls of snow, while sleet falls 
with the spring rains in the valley of the Cabul river. 
Herat is credited with a milder climate, the most 
agreeable, it is said, in Asia. , The temperature, says 
Ferrier, rarcly exceeds 91" to 93" (Fahr.), and was 
never more than 98" while he was there. The  
winter, too, is so mild tltat only in one year out of 
four is there enough ice to enable it to be stored. 
The Emperor Baber, speaking of the extent to 
which change of climate can be obtained near Cabul 
by change of place, says that at one day's journey 
from that city you may find a place where snow 
never falls, and, a t  two hours' journey, a place where 
snow never melts ! 
Some local clitnates are much lauded by the 
Afghans for healthiness and comfort, such as the 
Toba hills and some valleys of the Safed Koh range 
of mountains. 
PRODUCTIONS. 8 
The llcnowledge we have of the geology of Afghan- 
istan is meagre; but there seems reason to believe 
tllat the mineral wealth of the country is great, ( 
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although little utilised. Dr. Lord, who was with the 
army of occupation in I 839, remarks that antimony, 
iron, and lead are found in the Gllorband valley, 
and marble quarries in the hills near Maidan. 
According to a Russian authority, the hills south- 
west of Cabul and the Hazarah districts are the 
richest in mineral wealth. 
Gold (on the same authority) is found in the 
rivulets of Paghman, in the rivers Cabul, Kunar, 
and their tributaries. The principal places where 
gold is washed down on the CabuI river are said to 
be Jalalabad and Michni ; on the Kunal; Chachar- 
Bag, Peshat, and Kirch. I t  is believed that all the 
rivers coming from the western side of the Hindu 
I(us11 are auriferous. Silver, formerly milled in large 
quantities in Kohistan, is now only gathered in the 
4 
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valley of Ghorband; Lead occurs. in. the I-Iazarah 
district .north of Canddhal; and in the Ghorband 
valley. Of copper, there are large quantities in the 
Gal I<oh hills, in the teri-itory of the Jaguri tribe of 
the. Hazarah. Here there is also antimony, which is 
also met with north of Candahar, and in the Khaibar 
hills. Sulphur, saltpetre, and salammoniac may be 
dug out of the Ghorband and Jaguri territories. 
Iron is abundant along the western slopes of the 
Hindu Kush. There are mines in the valley of the 
Panjlrora, and in the hills west of Bunnu, whence the 
article i s .  exported to India. Iron worlrs also exist 
1 in Badakhshan, near Faizabad, and in Soutl~crn 
Cabul, near Kaniguram. The iron, being entirely 
smelted with charcoal, is highly valued in the 
adjoining countries. 
Coal is said to be found in places between the 
Upper I<uram and the Gomal valleys. Nitre is 
.abundant in the soil, all over the south-west of 
Afghanistan, and affects the water of the subter- 
ranean canals, called " Karez," which are made for 
purposes of irrigation. Salt is found in ample 
quantities in the Salt Range, a chain of low hills, 
that do not rise more than 2,000 feet above the level 
of the Indus, and extend from its western banlr 
W.N.W. to the Suliman Mountains, which they 
touch a few miles south of the Safed I<oh. The 
chief worltiilgs of this rock-salt are a t  Kalabagh, 011 
I t s  Clzinnte nlzd Prodz~ctions. 5 1 
the Indus, whence it is exported to different parts of 
Upper India. 
VEGETABLE KINGDOM. 
From Dr. Bellew's interesting Journal, and other 
worlts, an exhaustive account of the distribution of 
vegetation on the mountains of Afghanistan can be 
obtained. Vegetation is almost entirely absent from 
the distant and terininal prolollgation of t l ~ e  great 
mountain chaiils ; but there is abundant growth of 
forest trees, and, indeed, every form of vegetation on 
the main ranges and their larger off-shoots. 
On the Safed ICol1 and its immediate branches, we 
have abundant growth of large forest-trees, at a 
hcight of 6,000 to 10,000 feet, among which are 1 , 
e 
is 
oi 
:r- 
J 
lor ; 
cn umerated Ced~z~s deodnru, A bits exceIsa, Pilzz~s 
Zo7olzgz~oliu, P. Pilznster, the edible pine, and the larch. 
The yew, hazel, juniper, walnut, wild peach, and 
almond are also found. Under these grow the rose, 
lloneysucltle, gooseberry, currant, hawtl~orn, rhodo- 
dendron, and a greensward of the richest kind. The 
lemon and wild-vine are commoner on the northern 
mountains. 
Down to 3,000 feet the wild-olive, rock-rose, wild- 
privet, acacias, and mimosas, barberry, and zizyjhz~s 
are met with. T o  the eastward CPzn7~~~1?~qs, Big-
nolzin, shis/lnm, Salvndorn persim, vsrbntn, and 
ncn7~thus are found. The  scanty vegetation on the 
4-2 
I ' ( 1  i '  terminal ridges is mostly herbal, with rare and 
j I' stunted shrubs ; but many of them are naked rocks. 
I (r 
I '  
, 1, Ferns and mosses are confined to the lofty ranges. 
' ! I  The rue and wormwood found among the low 
' j  1) brushwood of the dreary plains south of Ilerat are 
1 used as domestic medicines, the former for rheu- / I '  
matism and neuralgia, the latter in fever, debility, I l l ,  and dyspepsia, as well as for a vermifuge. The  rue, 
I I /  jl 
owing to its nauseous odour, is believed to  drive away I ;dl1 evil spirits. 
--1_4__- 
- 1  Planted by the hand of man are such trees as the  
mulberry, willow, poplar, ash, and plane, found only 
in cultivated districts. The gum-resin of Western 
Afghanistan (Candahar and Herat) is a valuable 
article of commerce, being used in India as a con- 
diment. Edible rhubarb is mentioned as a great 
luxury. I t  grows wild in the hills, and is eaten both 
raw,and cooked. Salzjit and sale$ are names of a n  
edible fruit and root exported to India. T h e  
pistachio-nut is found in the extreme north. Mush- 
rooms and similar fungi are largely consumed. 
There are two lcinds of manna sold ; one, tz~~n;lz~'bi7z, 
is talten from the camel-thorn and dwarf tamarisk ; 
the other, say-haslzt, from a tree called " black-wood " 
(siyah chob) by the natives. 
The fruit of the mulberry-tree, of which there are 
as many as twelve varieties, is ground into a flour, 
and forms an important article of food in the country 
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near the I-Iindu Kush. Some individuals possess as ' 
many as 10,ooo trees. A tree of the best Icind will 
so~netimes bear 800 lbs. of mulberries, and talcing a 
third of this as the average produce, a larger popu- 
Iation could be supported by it than by tillage. Sillr 
is not produced to any great extent, ancl only in a 
few places. 
AGRICULTURE. 
So  far as is known, the land belongs to local chief- 
tains, who, while letting it to vassals, themselves have 
to  pay a tribute to their suzerains. Only on the , 
well-watered banks of rivers and canals, where agri- 1 
culture attains to some degree of perfection, is the ? 
land owned or rented by individuals. Pastures are 
always the common property of the clans, steppes 
being considered nobody's property. Like all other 
rights and personal possessions, title-deeds are worth 
but littIe in Afghanistan. Everybody's hand being 
against everybody, landcd proprietors are frequently 
expelled, or else expelling others, to transfer them- 
selves t o  fresh sccncs. Some emigrate to  neighbour- 
ing Khanates, and by dint of the strong arm manage 
t o  cstablisll themselves on ground belonging to 
another clan. 
Speaking generally, there are in Afghanistan, as 
in India, two harvests, the spring (606araX.') sowll in 
October and reaped in April, consisting of wheat, 
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barley, and lentils ; and the autumnal (ti~~fzni), SOW12 
in April or May and reaped in September, of which 
rice, millet and vorghum, maize (Phnseolus M T L I Z ~ O ) ,  
tobacco, beet, and turnips are the chief crops. T h e  
higller districts have, however, but one harvest. 
In consequence of the difference of climate in 
various parts of the country, agriculture is by no  
means the same thing in the north as in the south,. 
I n  Cabul the land is well-watered by canals, and very 
fertile. In the valley 'of the river Cabul, from the 
Ichaibar hills to the capital, there is no barren, 
unproductive soil. Arable land in those parts is so 
.extrernely~.valuable that-a rare thing i n  Afghanistan 
-it is amply provided with roads. There are here 
plenty of arilts or open canals, not to speak of the 
underground rills,' artificially laid down in soine 
These water-courses are coilstructed by the  
Government or village authorities, or by charitable 
individuals wishing to confer a benefit upon their 
neighbours. In  the case of Government waterworks, 
a tax has to be paid for their use ; whercas, village 
canals are frequently the joint of the  
. The kind o f  subterranean canal called " Rare%" 
whiche~lables the water of a hill or rising ground 
to  be brought out at its foot in a rivulet, so as to be 
disposed of at the pleasure of the cultivator, is 
common in 'the tracts to the south of Ghazni, where 
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the i-ainfall is small, and the rivers of small volume. 
The mode of their construction is thus described :- 
At the spot where it is wished that the water shall 
issue, a well is dug; and above it, ill the acclivity, 
another is made at  the distance of five to twenty 
yards. Other wells are made above at  similar 
distances from each other, the highest being made 
the deepest, so that its bottom may be slightly 
above the level of that of the one below, and so on. 
When as many wells have been thus made as the 
farmer can afford, or thinlts necessary, a subterranean 
passage is burrowed from the lowest, joining the 
, 
bottom of each well, and the water rushes fort11 in 11 
such fArce sometimes as to be able to turn a mill. 
Some of these Kavezts extend to two or more. 
miles-a celebrated one near Ghazni, ascribed to. 
Sultan Malimud, being said to be thirty miles long,. 
including offsets. 
In  tlie Icafiristan Mountains agriculture ascends. 
to a considerable height, wherever an arable plot is 
to be found. I n  otlier parts, where corn cannot be 
sown, the hills are planted with fruit trees in terraces. 
The harvest in tliesc parts principally depends upon 
the amount of rainfall. 
South of the Safed Koli I~ills, in the district of 
Kuram, agriculture js confined to the valley of the 
Kuram, which in some parts is twenty-two miles 
wide. In  this valley, as in all other valleys of East: 
.Cabul, are well cultivated, and supply corn to the 
whole Principality. 
In Candahar, from the source of the river 'Tarnak 
(a tributaiy of the Argandab), to the capital, the 
country offers but scanty opportunity for agriculture. 
Fields, as a rule, follow the river-bank in narrow 
strips, or sometimes cluster round water-courses, 
mostly subterranean in those parts ; nor is the lower 
valley of the Tarnalc much more productive. A 
more cheerful aspect is offered by the Helmand 
valley, having fields and gardens to about a mile 
and a-half to two miles on either bank, as far as the 
Seistan Lake. South of the Helmand, the desert 
appears rather unexpectedly. North of the river, 
however, stretching away to the hills, it is here and 
tliere studded with villages surrounded by oases wit11 
artificial irrigation. 
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Herat, possessing a good soil traversed by several 
rivers, is considered the most fertile part of the 
plateau of Afghanistan. Here the harvests are 
uniformly good, yielding forty-fold. The district of 
Ghorband is the storehouse of the country ; and such 
is the superabulldance of land, that where corn might 
be grown cattle are frequently pastured. Every 
now and then the country is the scene of Persian 
warfare, which prevents the development of agri- 
culture. 
Seistan, the ;basin of Lake Hamun, and of the 
deltas of surrounding rivers, is a plain intersected 
by low ridges. Two-thirds of the surface is sand, 
the remaining third being alIuvial soil, capable of 
high cultivation, but mostly occupied by tamarind 
trees. The  delta of the Helmand, with its many I 
paraIlel water-courses, is very fertile, and wholly 
under the plough. The fields are here separated by 
quick-set hedges ; the harvests are abundant, and 
much is exported. 
Of the Turkestan Khanates under Afghan control 
Ballch is the most productive, thanks to its extensive 
system of irrigation. Notwithstanding political 
troubles, and the consequent decrease of the popu- 
lation, Balkh still yields enough to supply some of 
the neighbouring Principalities. The valley of 
Icunduz, though fertile, is swampy, and has an 
unhealthy climate, compelling people to live in the 
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hill districts. All attempts at agriculture have failed, 
colonists invariably succumbing to malaria. 
There is a deal of arable, well-ilArigated ground in 
the other Khanates; but they are too frequently 
'exposed to war and robbery to permit of the labour 
of the husbandman. I n  all these parts plenty of 
good land lies fallow. 
The agricultural produce of Afghanistan is very 
various. Wheat, maize, barley, and millet form the 
principal food of the population. Rice requiring 
- 
 i__L_I- , much water is only planted in the valleys of the 
tributaries of the Indus, in I<uncluz, Ballth, and some 
localities of Herat. Every variety of fruit Itnow11 
in Europe grows well, the rhubarb being especially 
fine, Indeed, fruit is one of the great staples of food 
in the country, and a principal article of exportation. 
The Cabul valley gardens are famous for peaches, 
apricots, oherries, apples, pears, pomegranates, figs, 
and quince; the Jalalabad valley has also lemons 
and dates. The white mulberry-tree is found every- 
where ; the other species with red fruit is also 
there. I t  has been mentioned already that the mul- 
berries themselves tare -dried, ground into flour, and 
made illto caltes, either with or without corn-flour, 
Pistachio-nuts are grown in such quantities in the 
neighbourhood of Maimana that they are exported 
in caravans to Persia and Bagdad. I t  is a pecu- 
liarity oflthe climate that -all these excellent comes- 
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tibles get ripe a t  a considerable altitude. Pome- 
grai~ates flourish at 4,500 feet above the sea, while 
apricots ascend to 8,000 feet, and mulberries to 9,000 
feet. Grapes are plentiful, and the malting of wine. 
is a chief branch of industry, especially in Kafiristan. 
Considerable quantities of grapes are dried and 
eaten as raisins. Somc sorts are gathered before 
they are ripe, and exported to Bombay, and other 
parts of India. In  Herat a special tax is imposed 
upoil the manufacture of wine, which can oilly be 
carried on by Goverilment licence. Tobacco is 
much grown and used. The  three most approved 
growths in East Afghanistan are the Candahar, 
Balkh, and Mansurabad, of which the last is the 
best. I n  Herat tliere :are two tobacco harvests in 1' I 
the year, the first being accounted the best. ,There 
is little cotton produced in the country, except in 
the Bangash district, near the Indian frontier; but 
this, too, is indifferent in quality and quantity. Of 
other plants we may mention the madder, in Can- 
dahar and Ghazni, much employed for dyeing 
woolleil cloth, and also exported ; Indian hemp used 
in brewing a narcotic beverage; a species of rhu- 
barb, producing oil for lamps; assafcetida, a shrub 
encountered everywhere, but more especially in the 
south, from whicli pitch is extracted. This pitch, 
used in Afghanistan for medical purposes only, is 
frequently exported to India. A decoction made 
1 1 ' 1  1 1  from the young leaves is drunlc by the Afghans and 
Baluchis in Seistan. 
'1 ANIMAL KINGDOM. 
The tiger is found in the north-eastern hill 
country. The leopard, panther, hyzna, the wolf 
(said sometimes to attack single horsemen in the 
wilder tracts), wild dog, and small Indian fox are 
more or less common. Bears of two Himalayan 
species are met with. Wild sheep, Indian deer, 
especially the bara si~zgha, the wild hog, and the 
wild ass, are found. No elephant or rhinoceros 
has been traced witbin many hundred miles of 
Afghanistan; but they formerly existed in the 
Peshawar plain. Only one species of bird is known 
to be peculiar to the country; but vast numbers 
of birds of Indian and desert forms flock to 
it in the breeding season. Among reptiles a 
tortoise peculiar to Afghanistan has been dis- 
covered. Our knowledge of the zoology of the 
country is confessedly fragmentary and imperfect 
in the extreme, 
Of domestic animals the most important are the 
sheep, of which there are two kinds, both having the 
broad, fat tail, which in some parts of thc Eimalc 
Mountains is said to be of such a size that a small 
cart is put under the tail. They are the chief pro- 
perty of the Hazarah and Eimak tribes, who Iive 
- , .. . . . . .. . . 
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chiefly by selling wool and woollen stuffs. The 
sheep on the mountains give two fleeces, the spring 
one being coarser than the autumn one. Mutton is 
the principal animal food of the people. The goats, 
generally of a black variety, seem to be of an 
itlferior breed, except in the higher ranges of the 
Koh-i-Baba and Paropainisan Mountains. 
Cattle-breeding here, as in the steppes and hills 
of Russian Asia, requires in this climate a frequent 
change of pasture. Thus the Ghilzae, Afridi, and 
other clans pass the summer in the Safed I<oh hills, 
descending for the winter to the plain of Candahar 
and the Indus valley, and sometimes crossing the 
frontier into Rritish territory. The  Baluchis noma- f 
dise in summer near the river Helmand ; but in 
autumn, with the first frost, may be seen wandering 
to the southern steppes, where water is found only at 
that season. Excepting in the Cabul valley, cattle 
breeding is carried on in all parts of Afghanistan by 
a nomad population, living side by side with the 
sedentary and agricultural inhabitants. The nomads 
rarely apply themselves to agricultural pursuits. Of 
the domestic animals, camcls, dromedaries, and a 
cross between the two, are used for riding and 
draught, as well as for the inillc and butter they 
yield ; their flesh is only eaten by the very poorest. 
The clan Gesarai, living in the hills where camels are 
of little use, value them, however, for their wool. 
Cabul has few camels, and only a cart-horse sort of 
horse. The species of horse called yabu is em- 
ployed for draught in the hills. Afiner breed is seen 
'among the Hazarahs, in the Khanate of Maimana. 
I n  the south, the breeding and sale of horses are 
' 
almost exclusively in the hands of the Baluchis ; 
but a peculiarly valuable kind introduced by Nadir 
Shah from Persia is only met with among the Afghan 
The cows of Candahar and Seistan are said to give 
\ very large quantities of milk. 
Dog-breeding is pursued with advantage, owing 
to the favourable climate. 
The so-called " Persian " cats in reality chiefly come 
from Afghanistan. 
INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE. 
The industrial products of Afghanistan are con- 
fined to a little silk, chiefly used in clomestic manu- 
facture ; carpets from Herat, some of whicli are soit, 
brilliant, and durable, and pass in India for "Persian" 
carpets ; felts and woven goods made from the wool 
of the sheep, goats, and Bactriali camel ; sheep- 
skins ; and rosaries made from chrysolite. 
The  manufactures of Afghanistan include a list of 
the simplest trades of semi-civilised life, such as 
jewellers, gold ancl silver smiths, sellers of armour, 
sellers of bows ancl arrows, sellers of glass ornaments 
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for women, confectioners, tobacconists, embroiderers, 
and such like. To these are added a few boolcsellers 
and bookbinders. The inhabitants of the Eimalc and 
Hazarah Mountains clo not export their tvool, but 
manufacture it illto carpets, grain-bags, rugs, &c. As 
there are few, if any, navigable rivers in Afghanistan, 
nor any wheeled carriage, the mode of conveyance of 
goods is by beasts of burden, chiefly camcls, though 
mules and asses are largely used in the mountainous 
I districts. The principal trade of India with Western 
! 
6 Asia and Europe has from time immemorial bee11 by 
i 
I sea ; yet large and valuable caravans at  one time i carried Indian products into Persia, Turkestan, and , 
Cllina by the four lines of communication that pass 
through or near Afglran territoiy. The most northern 
leads from Lc11 in Ladakh to Yarlcand in Chinese Tur- 
kestan, and is the most difficult and dangerous. The 
second passes through Lahore, Peshawar, the Ichaibar 
Pass, to Cabul, where it divides into two roads, one 
passing over the Bainian and other passes into 
Afghan Turkestan, and the other running through 
Gllazni to Canclahar, where it meets the two southern 
lines. These last are divergent portioils of the 
third linc wlzich passes through the Gomal Pass 
from Dera Ismail Khan, and divides on the table- 
land into two roads, one running to Cabul and the 
other to Ghazni and Candahar. The fourth road 
begins a t  Icarachi, iollotvs the Indus to Shikar- 
I ' 1 1  
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pur, diverges thence to the north-west, and passes 
through the Bolan Pass into the valley of Shal. I t  
continues through Quettah to Candahar. From Can- 
dal~ar the joint road passes westward across the 
Helmand, through Farrah, Sabzawar, and Herat, t o  
Mash-had in Persia, and thence to Teheran, the 
capital. From Herat to Merv and Bokhara is allother 
trade route. The  Syads of Herat, who are large 
horsedealers, used to carry on a considerable trade in 
slaves, getting their chief victims from the Hazarahs, 
- whom they sold to the Turkomans. A large traffic 
in wool has of late years sprung up from the regions 
west of the Indus, some millions of pounds being 
annually shipped from Karachi, the port of Sindh. 
The Povindaks, a class of merchants that are the 
representatives of the oldest Asiatic traders, carry 
on traffic between India, Khorasan, and Bokhara, 
by means of long strings of camels and ponies 
banded in large, armed caravans. They battle their 
way twice a-year between Bokhara and the Indus, 
bullying, fighting, evading, or bribing the hostile 
and marauding foes in their path. I t  is interesting 
to observe how these ancient traders accommodate 
themselves to modern conditions of commerce, 
They cannot pass armed through British territory, 
so they quietly deposit their weapons a t  the Indus. 
Leaving their camels and families in the plains of 
the Panjab, they take their goods by rail to the 
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great cities of Hindustan, and even penetrate as far 
as Boinbay and Rangoon. In March they return to 
their fainilies, and back. again to the Ghilzai Table- 
land, whellce they despatch caravans again to Cabul 
Bolrhara, and other cities in Western Asia, 
C H A P T E R  111. 
THE PEOPLE, LA.&-G I7A GE, LITERA TUR E, AND 
ANTIQUITIES O F  AFGHA ATISTAN. 
T h e  Afghans, Pathans, or Pnshtanahs-Division into Tril~es-Non-Afghan 
Population- Estimated Population - Rus51nn ilccount -Supposed 
--- 
Jewish Origin-I<afirs--Sir John Rnye's Descr~ption of the Afg+ans 
-Language and 1,iterature-J~ldicial Institutions-hl~litary Systern- / Russian Account of the Afghan Anny-Antiqulties. 
ALTHOUGH the country derives its name from the 
Afghans, these people are but  a portion-barely 
half, it is conjectured-of the  total inhabitants. 
According to some authorities, thc name Afghan is 
not applied to any tribe by its own members; bu t  
the better opinion seems to be that the  Afghans, o r  
Pathans, or Pushtanahs, as tliey are variously called, 
include a large number of tribes, of which the most  
important are the following :- 
(I.) Dura7zi or Abdali, to svhich Ahmad S h a h  
belonged. They dwell in the south and south-west. 
(2). Ghilzni, the strongest and bravest, said t o  be 
iclentical with the  Khiliji dynasty of Delhi kings of 
the tenth and eleventh centuries. 
(3.) Yus7f~ai, a turbulent race, dwelling partly in 
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t h e  Rritisll district of Peshawar, and partly as an 
independent tribe it1 the hill country north of thc 
Ichaibar. 
(4.) Knknrs, chiefly independent, it1 the south-east 
of Afghatiistan, near Baluchistan. 
. T h e  non-Afghan population consists of numerous 
tribes, among whicb the T@is and lr'nclbns/lis 
include thc most industrious of all the inhabitants of 
Afghanistan. The  Hazn~whs are supposed to be of 
Mongol or Mz~ghnl origin, and pay tribute to the 
Afghans only when compelled. These people are 
said to be notorious for loose domestic morals, like 
tlre ancient Massngcta who occupied thcir mountains. b 
T h e y  are found all over Afghanistan as menial scr- 
vants, and are, or  were, often sold as slaves. Ekuzat 
is t he  name given to  a nomadic tribe dwclling near 
t h e  Hnsnms. Hilzdki.~, or ~ e o p l e  of Hindu descent, 
Jrtts, and Rnlnchis, are names of other tribes. Colonel 
Macgregor makes the following estimate of the 
population :- 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  Afghan Tnskestan 642,000 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  Cl~itralis and Kafirs 1 5 0 , ~  
. . . . . . . . .  Ernialcs and Hazarahs 400,000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Tajiks 500,000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Rnzlbashis 150,000 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  Hindkis and Jats 500,000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Rohistnnis ",OW 
Afghans ancl IJatlians (including 400,000 
. . . . . .  independent Yusufzais, Bic.) 2,359,000 
4,901,000 
The  Russian Military Department sets down the 
total population of Afghanistall a t  ~,OOO,OOO, oc- 
cupying an area of 10,000 geographical square miles. 
The sparsity of the population on this estimate inay 
be concluded from the fact that Germany on the 
same area supports over 40,000,000 people. A n  
attempt has also been made by the Russian Military 
Department to estimate the population of each pro- 
vince and district, but as these figures are admittedly 
conjectural to the last degree, we will not burden our 
pages by quoting them. 
The  very elaborate account of the races and tribes 
\ which has been published by the same department 
I 
, deserves more attention. I t  states the number of 
distinct races to be nine-Afghans, Tajiks, I<azlbashis, 
Hazaris, 'Usbelts, Hindus, Jats, lcafirs, and Arabs. 
The Afghans are said to number about 3,000,000, 
and to be divided into five tribes, and these again to 
be subdivided into 405 clans (Ithail), each of which 
includes numerous families. Of the 405 clans, 277 
call themselves Afghans, and the remaining 128 pre- 
fer the patronymic of Pathan. All boast of deriving 
their descent from the Ten Tribes of Israel, their own 
chroniclers calling the Afghans BafziLi-Israel (Arabic 
for Sons of Israel). They claim to be the offspring 
of King Saul, through a son whom they ascribe to 
him named Jeremiah, who again had a soil named 
Afghana. The desceilda~~ts of Afghana were, accord- 
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ing to the legend, removed by Nebuchadnezzar, and 
found their way to the mountains north of Herat. 
They embraced the faith. of Muhammad, by their 
own showing, nine years after the prophet's announce- 
ment of his mission. The earliest written statement 
of this sto1.y dates from the sixteenth century. We 
cannot enter at any length into t l ~ c  arguments which 
have bee11 advanced in favourof the Jewish origin of the 
Afghans. The most weighty appears to be the facial 
resemblance they bear to the Jews ; but this is shared 
by the inhabitants of Cashmere, the Tajiks, and other 1 
Asiatics. 
Though spread over the whole country, the bull< of 
the Afghan population live in the eastern and south- 
eastern provinces, being inveterate mountaineers, and 
preferring the lofty hills on the Indian frontier to  any 
more profitable and convenient residence. Of those 
living in the adjoining valleys some are in the 
habit of nomadising on British territory part of the 
year. 
The principal clans in the north-east are the 
Sllifzvnri, north of Cabul, almost independent ; the 
Tarknl~zf~ni, in the south-western basin of the 
Panjkora, capable of sending 10,000 men into the 
field ; tlic Yfisrfl:ni, divider1 into two branches, 
having separate lchntls and about 70,000 fighting 
men, whose country has already been indicated ; the 
Utllzntt lL"/reZs on the left bank of the Cabul river, 
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who muster 10,000 fighting men ; and the Upper 
Momunds. 
South of the Cabul river in Cabulistan and t h e  
Panjab hills, lining the Iildus valley, the Tarnokhi 
muster 6,000 fighting men. The  Africli, the most 
numerous of the border tribes, spending the greater 
part of the year on the Cabul hills, and descending 
only in suminer into the Iildus valley, glory in t he  
possessioil of r 5,ooo armed men. To  them belong 
the Ichaibar and Shinvari people, famous for their 
martial and savage characteristics. Protected by the  
1 Ichaibar hills, they are entirely independent, and 
receive from. ~o ,ooo to zo,ooo rupees a year from 
the Cabul Governineilt as a co~isideration for allow- 
ing caravans to pass. Some thirty years ago therc 
were counted some zo,ooo armed men in and near 
the Ichaibar Pass. The Ichaibar men are divided 
into many sections, each of them having a scparate 
Khan and refusing to ackiiowledgc any superior 
authority. Among the more promillent branclics of 
the Afridi, the Jawaki, the Zaka-Ichel, the Galli, and  
the Adain Ichail deserve to be mentioned. T h c  
Lower Momund (~z ,ooo  armed men) occupy the  
south-western corner of the district of Peshawar. 
The strip of land separating the British districts of 
Peshawar and Kohat takes its name from the 
Khattak, who, notwithstanding their rg,ooo warriors, 
lead a pacific agricultural life. The  Orakzai inhabit 
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the Gauga valley south-west of ICohat, and the 
Tiralc valley. West of them there are the Bangash, 
in the valley of the Miranzai and part of the ICuram 
valley, within the bou~ldaries of Cabul. South of the 
ICurnm valley, between the districts of Bannu and 
Tanlc, the country is infested by the robber tribes of 
the Uatani (5,000 fighting-men), living partly 011 
English, partly on Cabul territory. The  Sulirnan 
hills (Takhti Suliman, A~zglicL' the Throne of 
Solon~on), in the south-eastern extremity of Af- 
ghanistan, harbours the three martial brotherhoods 
of the Shirani, Ushterani, and ICazmni. Thc 
Shirani, IO,OOO armed men, make coilstant inroads 
into the valleys, and up to the pacification of the 
country by the English were the terror of the whole 
region. They live in the direction of Dera Ismail 
IChan. The  Icazmni have about 5,000 rifles and are 
less warlike. 
\Vest of thcse, and still includcd in the C~tbul 
frontiers, therc is the extensive district of Daur, 
reaching from thc river Gomal to the river ICuram, 
and inhabited by the Vezir people, divided into the 
three branches of the Makhsud, the Vezir in the 
south, the Dcrveshkl~cl in the centre, and the 
I(abulkhe1 in the north. Thc Vczir are n powerful 
and indcpcndcnt race, mostly tlomads, leading n 
pastoral life, staying in thc hills in sulniner ; the 
winter cuticcs them down to the Indus valley. 
A fghn?ziskan. 
Their principal centres are the towns of Icaniguram 
and Makin. The upper valley of the Icuram is in- 
habited by the Turj and Jaji, of the Pathan division 
of the people. .Further down the valley we meet 
with a portion of the Zaimakht, whose principal 
mass reside south-west. The mountainous district of 
I<host, soutl~ of the Icurarn, is the property of small 
hill tribes-the Driplara, the Drikuti, Mattun, Gurbus, 
Torzai, and others. 
The powerful clan of the Ghilzai or Ghilji, with 
numerous sub-divisions, are the owners of the I<ilat- 
i-Ghilzai region, Their southern frontier is formed 
by the Durani country, ~vhich extends to Candahar. 
In the environs of Candahar and Ghazni there are 
also the Ashalcsai and Nurzai, and others whose 
territories are less clcarly divided. 
Of the branches of the Afghan people living in 
the western parts of the l<ingdom we lcnow but little. 
The most numerous are the Berduran. The Baralc- 
zai to whom belongs the Khan, have 60,ow families, 
and accordingly are one of the s t ro~ges t  Afghan 
tribes. 
Next to the Afghans, the Tajilcs are the most 
numerous race in the country. They are the 
aboriginal elcment in the Western Yrovinces, and, 
being a sedentary pcople, arc called Tajik-;.a,, 
peasants, in contradistinction to the Turlc or warrior. 
They are now divided into a sedentary portion call- 
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ing themselves Parsivail or Parsi Zubail (that is, 
Persian speaking), and nomads lriloivn as Eimaks. 
The latter wander about in the hills surroundil~g the 
upper basin of the I-Iari-rud, and are mixed up wit11 
the Turkish tribes who immigrated under Jengis and 
Timur. Of these mixed tribes we lrnow the Char 
Eiinak, the Jamshedi, the Firoz Icuzi, Taimuni or 
Tegmuni, and the Zuri. Cognate to them are the 
Timurs, formed by Timur Shah out of the heteroge- 
neous mob of his camp toivards the end of the last 
cei~tury. Tlle Taimuns are settled in the three 
districts of Teivere, Darya Dere, and Devaza, each 
I 
having a separate Ichan. Up  to 1844, when the 
ruler of I-Ierat transplanted 45,000 to the country 
adjoiniilg his capital, they were estimated a t  ~o,ooo 
souls. The  Taimun territory is situated on the 
southern declivity of the Sakh ICug llills, and was 
anciently called Gur. T h e  Zuri is an insignificant 
clan. The  Firoz ICuzi formerly lived further west in 
Persian Kllorasan, but were trailsferred by Tiin~ir to 
their present settlement in I-Ierat. They are now 
divided into five branches wit11 five chiefs living in 
the forts of ICades, Darzi, ICuche, Chicharan, and 
Daulat Yar, situated in the upper valleys of the Hari- 
rud and Murghab. Icades was subjugated in 1 8 4 b y  
tlie Hazarah, but tlie other branches remained inde- 
pendent. The  Zuri and Jamshedi, forlncrly potent 
and respected, now occupy the small tcrr i tor~ in the 
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Murgliab, to which they emigrated in the heroic period 
of Persian history. Their Khan resides a t  Uala 
Murghab, whence many raids are undertaken into 
neighbouring lands. The  sedentaiy portion of thc  
Tajilts are numerously represented only in C a b ~ ~ l  
Icohistan, in the valleys of Ghorband, Panjshir, and  
Nijaur, tvherc they amounted to 40,000 families a t  
the beginning of this century. Thcy are warlike, 
almost entirely independent, and divided into small 
fraternities under the direction of special IChans. 
The Tajilr branch in Logar, 8,000 families strong, is 
distinguished for its bravery. I n  the other parts of 
Afghanistan the Tajilts are more or less mixed u p  
with the Afghans, living sometimes in Afghan 
villages, sometimes in separate colonies, under the 
direction of Icetlthuds or Elders. I n  these parts 
they have no landed property, but rent land from the 
Afghans, and altogether occupy a very inferior posi- 
tion. In  the towns they are a gentle, l~ard tvork in~ 
race, and take to trades which the Afglians despise ; 
in the villagcs they are justly famous for the excel- 
lence of their husbandry. Many of these Cabul 
Tajiks serve in the Anglo-Indian forces, where thcy 
are called Turks, and enjoy a good character. T h e  
Tajiks also form the original populatioil of the 
Badalrhshan region, where they are divided into tlie 
three groups of Raman, Shagnan, and Vashan. John 
Wood regarded the Chitral and Icafir people also as 
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Tajiks ; but these being undoubtedly of different 
extraction, the Persian origin of thc Badalcshan 
Tajilcs must appear very problcmatic. 
The  third race are the ICazlbashi, transferred by 
Nadir Shah from Persia to Cabul in 1737. They are 
a mcclley of lJersians and Turks, of the Jevanshir, 
Afshar, and Muradshahi tribes, who speak Persian, 
and, indeed, arc Persian in every respect. They have 
an  influe~ltinl colony a t  Cabul, and are accounted the 
best-instructetl part of the populatio~~. 
The  I-Iazarah, accordiilg to some, are Mongols, 
introduced by Jeilgis IChan ; according to others, 
Turkish Usbelcs of the Uerlas tribe, fortnerly noma- 
dising ncar Shazhrisab. T i ~ n u r  in the year 799 of 
the I-Iijra despatched a thousand familics of this 
tribe to the vallcy of Badgis, on the Upper Murghab, 
whcre they were called Hazarah, or " Tl~ousanders." 
Thencc thcy extc~ldcd as far as Cabul on the east, 
and I-Icrat on the west. Their division into tribes and 
clans is very complcx, and they arc most of them 
nomads and indcpcndent. The Eastcrn sections of 
the racc OLLT allegiance to Cabul. Their clans have 
separate Khans, and are in pcrpctual feud with each 
other. 
The  Usbcks, of the Kutagan tribc, are the de- 
scendants of the Turlioman coilqucrors of Afghan- 
istan, and thc ruling elemcnt i r ~  thc IChanates north 
of the IIindu I<ush. 
The Hindus belong to the Kshatra or warrior 
caste, are 300,000 strong, and live chiefly in the 
The Jat, also about 300,000 strong, of unknowil 
origiil, are probably aborigines. They are scattered 
over the whole country. 
The Kafirs, or Siyahposh, about I~O,OOO, live on 
the slopes of the Hindu Kush, north of Cabul. Of, 
Caucasian type, their origin remains to be explained. 
Thcy are divided into eighteen clans. The  Swat, 
Chitrals, and Safi belonging to the aboriginals border 
up011 the Icafirs. They are said to numbcr no less 
than 500,000 souls. 
The Arabs, known as Syads, or descendants of the 
Prophet, form a compact mass in the district of 
ICunal; in Northern Cabulistan. They are also found 
dispersed over the other districts, lilce Armenians 
and Jews. 
The Afghan tribes frequently intermingle, and 
increase or decrease in consequence of families 
leaving their old associatio~ls to form new ties. 
Wars and feuds frequently result in the forcible 
transfer of tribes, or parts of tribes, to new localities, 
when embodiment with otllcr tribes usually ensues. 
The tribes are least distinct in the towns. In  some 
of them only one-fifth of the population are Afghans, 
four-fifths consisting of Tajilcs, I-Iindus, Jews, Per- 
sians, kc. 
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T h e  most densely-inhabited parts of the country 
are the valleys of the Cabul and Kuram, with their 
tributaries. In thc wastes that occupy a consider- 
able portion of the souther~l provinces, people crowd 
roulld the rivcrs, leaving the rest of the coui~try 
empty. The regions bordering on Baluchistan are 
the  least inhabited. The inhabitants live mostly in 
villages, isolated tenements being rendered impos- 
siblc by the irequent wars. The villages, always 
large and surrounded by walls, frequently-espe- 
cially in Northen1 Cnbul-have up to 3,000 houses. 
T h c  inhabitants arc allnost exclusiveIy Sunnis, the 
Hazarah and Kazlbashi alone being Shial~s. The 
slnall number of Armenians in the country profess 
Christianity. 
The Kafirs follow a nondescript religion, having 
some affinity to Hinduism, but none whatever, as  
some have supposcd, to Christianity. Their proper 
name is Siyahposh (the " bIack-legged," from their 
wearing leggings of goat-skins), and they are men- 
tioned by Strabo uilder the name of &&- 
Ethnologically thcy are a most iilterestirig race, 
having a considerable rcscmblance to Europeans, 
and some havc supposed them to represent the 
original Aryan inhabitants of Afghanistan and the 
regions of the I-Iindu I<ush. Thc Kafir women are 
said to bc as beautiful as tllc inen are handsome; but 
before a young man is allowcd to marry he 
-is required to furnish proof of having slain a 
Mussulman. 
The Kafirs, however, seem well clisposed to the 
English, and a recent writer says : " The Kafirs look 
to us as Itinsmen and natural allies ; but the moun- 
tainous tracts of Buner, Swat, and Bajour forbid 1 
intercourse, and in the far valleys of Kashgar and j 
of the Icunar river there yet rages the blood feud 
caused by past wrongs inflicted and received between 
the idolatrous Icafir and the fanatical Mussulman." 
Sir John Kaye has left an eloquent description of 
'I the Afghans as they were at the beginning of the 
century, and they have probably altered very little 
in character since that time. " The people," lie tells 
US, '' were a race-or a group of races-of hardy, 
vigorous mountaineers. Thc  physical character of 
the country had stamped itself on the moral con- 
formation of its inhabitants. Brave, independent, 
but of a turbulent, vindictive character, their very 
existence seemed to clepend upon a constant succes- 
sion of internal feuds. The wisest of them would 
probably have shalcen their heads in negation of the 
adage-'Happy is the country whose annals are a 
blank.' They knew no happiness in anything but 
strife. It was their delight to live i n  a state of 
chronic warfare." I t  has been said that every 
Afghan is more or less a soldier or a bandit. The  
very shepherds carry their matchlocks ready for an 
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af iay  or a robbery a t  any moment. I t  inay seem 
st,-nnge tha t  pastoral and predatory habits could 
thus  bc blended : but, so it is, " the  tented canton- 
inents of t h e  sheep-drivers often bristle into camps 
Of xvar.I1 
~ t :  is but  fair to say thcre is a brighter side t o  the 
picture. Outwardly grave, they are of a cheerful, 
lively disI)osition, and this, notwithstanding their 
long beards and sober garments. Tlley are fond of 
chilcll-ei~, and delight in listening to the longest 
stories, however improbab\e or romantic. Their 
generosity and llospitality have bcen often described, 
T h e y  will entcrtain s t r an~c r s  without grudging, 
and their dendlicst encmy is secure if hc comes 
beneath their  roof. The  simplicity of their courtesy 
is rcfreshillg xvhell contrasted with the polislled 
insinccrily of the I'crsian, or the fercc arrogance of 
the Indian I'ntl~an. Their respect for truth and 
llollesty would not be great i f  judged by a 
Clll-istian standard, but is striking as compared 
some of thcir Asiatic neighbours. They treat 
their depcndcnts with kindncss and consideration, 
arc rcwardcd by fidelity and zeal i n  service. 
Thcre  is l i t t le of the tyranny scen in othcr Easter11 
countries towards the ininatcs of the Zanana and 
domcstic slnvcs. They  care less for learning than 
for manly cscrcises, and siinplici ty talccs with thetn 
the place of ivit and eloquence. 
I 
Sumining up his description of Afghan politics in I 
the time of Zemaull Shah (x8oo), Sir John I<aye 
says--" The history of the Afghan monarchy is a 
llistory of a long series of revolutions. Seldoin has 
the countly rested from strife; seldom has the sword 
reposed in the scabbard. The temper of the people 
has never been attuned to peace. They are impa- 
tient of the restraints of a settled government, and 
are continually panting after change. I-Ialf a cen- 
tury of turbulence and anarchy has witnessed but 
little variation in the national character, and the 
Afghan of the present day is the same strange 
mixture of impetuosity and cunning, of boldness 
and treachery, of generosity and selfishness, of kind- 
ness and cruelty, as he was when Zemaun Shah 
haunted the Coullcil Chamber of Calcutta with a 
phantom of invasion; and the visioii was all the 
more terrible because ' the shape thereof' no one 
could d iscer i~ .~~ 
  he vernacular of a large part of the non-Afghan 
population is Persian, and this is familiar to all 
educated Afghans. But the proper language of 
the Afghans is Pzrslztz~ or Pz~hhtz~, an Aryan or 
Indo-Persian (not Semitic) dialect. T11e oldest 
known work in Pushtu is a " Ilistory of the 
Conqucst of Swat," by  Shailth Mali, chief of 
the Yuzufzais, and leader in the coilquest (A.D. 
1413-24). Their literature is rich in poetry, Abdur- 
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1-ahman (seventeenth century) being the best known 
poet. 
Major Raverty has made us acquainted with 
some specimens of Afghan poetry, which convey 
the idea of deep feeling. Most of it is of the 
mystical lrind so familiar in Persian literature, by 
which spiritual meaning is hidden in vely worldly 
similes. I n  the hills to the north, among the Icafirs 
and other independent arid semi-independent tribes, 
dialects more approaching the Sanskrit type are 
found. 
The  judicial institutions of the Afghans are 
rude in the extreme. The functions of judges in 
criminal cases are discharged by the popular 
assemblies of the tribes, assisted by Mullahs or 
Muhammadan priests. Minor offences arc punished 
by the village elders. The Muhammadan law has 
of course general authority, but there is a special 
code of peculiar Afghan usages, knolvil as Pushtun- 
Wali, which has the force of law. I n  towns we 
find the courts of the Muhammadan judges called 
Kncis, aided by the Muftis. The  Amir-i-Mah- 
kama is a kind of chief clcrlc and treasurer, and 
the Darogha superintends the whole proceedings. 
Justice, however, is a commodity to be bought 
very largely here, as in other Muhammadan 
countries. 
W e  have heard a good deal lately of the large 
6 
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standing army of Shere Ali, the present Amir. 
According to some authorities, he has 60,ooo inen in 
the field. This is not improbable, seeing that it was 
believed that Zaman Shah, at the beginning of the 
century, could collect 200,ooo mcn round his stan- 
dard for any national object. Of the constitution of 
the Afghan army our information is necessarily im- 
perfect, but a part of it, at any rate, is modelled on 
the Europeau system, as far as drill, dress, and 
- _.--- 
I equipments are concerned. Of their arms we have good reason to lcnow 
- 
something, as the best of them are probably the 
rifles, Enfield and Snider, supplied to the Amir by 
former Viceroys of India, to the number of 20,000, 
with ammunition, as well as a field-battery of 
guns. The chief difficulty the Afghans have had 
in using European weapons has been, i t  is said, 
from their inability to ma~lufacture percussion-caps 
for them, and their importation through British 
India has been prevented by the Indian Govern- 
ment. Native arms are the formidable " jnzail," 
or long-rifled matchloclc, with which an Afghan 
can hit a mark at Soo yards, the sword or knife, and 
shield. 
The followiilg more detailed account of the military 
strength of Afghanistan, extracted from the records 
of the Russian Central Staff Office at St.' Peters- 
burg, was supplied to the Times by its Berlin corre- 
:jc"' h i r ,  s p o n d e ~ ~ t  in October, and seems to deserve quoting at 53 I 
&' ' ~ C I I  in I ' 71 length :- f 
, dnt it It,s "Afghanistan is portioned out alnollg many semi- 'I '1 
;dnninl the independent tribes, each of which has a separate ruler 
Fd his stan. and a standing army. 
,&ution ,f " Cabul and Candahar have a considerable regular 
i 
I 8 I I I cccssarilp im- force, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. fl~dellcd ,,, Tbe greater part of these troops is distributed over I 
11, dres% and rural garrisons, and undcr the control of the local 
govcrnors. Tbe regular Cabul force, which does 
I [ 
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i l r  ileriin carre- 
Infantly (Jazailclii), 2,500 nlcn ; regular cavalry, 
3,000 ; irregular cavalry, 10,ooo ; artillery, 45 guns. 
Bcsides these, there were, in times of peace, one 
regiment of infantry at Candahar, one regiment at 
Ghuznee, one regiment and five guns at 1Cala-i- 
Ghilzai, one regiment of infantry, one of rifles, and 
five guns a t  ICuram, and a force of full 10,000 men, 
with three batteries, at Ballrh. The regular troops 
are maintained and reinforced by conscription, irre- 
gulars being called in as time and circuinstances 
require. In  Cabul, the troops receive pay and pro- 
visions, a practice which can hardly be said to obtain 
with any degree of regularity in  the provinces. The 
infantry are armed partly with matchlocks, partly 
with excelletlt modern rifles, the gift of the British 
Government. They also carry swords and daggers. 
6-2 
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The Jazailchis, or rifles, are armed with long solid 
while the cavalry boast a large variety of weapons. 
The infantry are, many of them, arrayed in cast-off 
English uniforms, bought up by special agents of the 
Cabul Government at Peshawar and Sindh. Some 
regiments wear uniforms of European cut, made of 
Afghan cloth-the coats are brown, the trousers 
white. The troops quartered in country towns 
- . ." 
f generally live upon the people. All the Afghan 
troops endeavour to imitatc the Anglo-Indian forces 
in their tactics, drill, and colnmissariat service ; but 
in this respect the success of the Cabul military 
is small in comparison with that of the Herat 
men. 
" The E-Ierat regular force was originally organised 
by Sultan Jan, and consists of five regiments of 
infantry of 500 men each, five detachments of 
~avalry, one in each district, of 450 men each, and 
eight guns. The whole forms a total of about 5,000. 
Young men of the peasant class are liable to con- 
scription at an age when they may almost be regarded 
as children. The cavalry being thc more national 
force, its recruits are supplied by the district 
authorities. There is a Commander-in-Clef subject 
to the personal comlnallds of the Sovcreign. The 
artillery is under the direction of a special commander, 
the Topchi Bashi. The regiments arc divided into 
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.companies. Officers' titles are taken from the Englisll 
a r~ t iy  ; tlie Jarnal, ICoronel, and kIidjar aiiswering 
respectively to the General, Colonel, and Major. 
The  Sovereig~l has a special adjutant called Adjutant 
Uashi, a post occupied in the days of Sultan Jatl by a 
Russia11 ensign, Prince Vatcbnadse. Discipline is 
exceedingly strict. Comma~iders have irnlimited 
power, atid may Lill subordinates witli impunity. 
The  soldiers live in special houses with tlieir families, 
and receive pay, rood, uniforms, and arms from the 
Government. The cavalry, too, get pay from the 
Government, but have to find their own arms ancl 
horses. T h e  inrantry are provided with flintlocks, 
modern rifles, the crooked Afghan sword and daggers, 
rrom I Tt, to  r:Tt. long. The uniform is of light 
sky-blue eotton, alter the English pattern, witli ample 
rolds, statid-ltp collar, anlld metal buttons. The 
trousers are of white cotton, very tiglit and short. 
They wear a sort of slipper on their nalzed feet, black 
Persian liats when on  duty, and red flat hats in un- 
dress. I n  the case of recruits these hats are yellow. 
All the' different regiments wear thc same unilorm. 
The  cavalry are distinguished by the national Afglian 
dress, and armed with pikes, matchlocks, daggers, 
and croolced swords. Drill, as a rule, is entrusted to 
Anglo-India11 dese~.ters, and carried on in accordance 
with English rules. There is a great deal or regi- 
mental service going on, with a fair degree or success 
Af~hzoistn7t. 
i n  tactics and ~nanceuvring capacity. T h e  word of 
co~nmand is given in English. 
"The  small Usbek Khanates in Northern Cabu- 
listan also have stancling armies, the strength of 
which some time ago may be seen from the following 
Artillery. 
Mcn. FIorscs. Guns. 
Maimana . . . . . .  IW ... I , ~ W  ... - 
... ... . . . . . .  Shibrgan 1,500 2,000 - 
Aktcha . . . . . .  - ... 2w ... - 
... ... ... ... Bilk11 ' ' 1 0 , ~ ~  2 , s ~  - 
IChulm . . . . . . .  - ... ... - I0 
... ... ... ICundwz ,.. - - 6 
Cabulistan- 
. . . . . .  ... ... I ,I Navasai <w ZW - 
... Lendni Sind ~ . .  - ... - 1 3  
... . . . . . .  Uyar 4w 50 ,.. - 
... . . . . . .  I3abosi gw ?w ... - 
All these troops are liable to take the fielcl a t  the 
summons of tlic A ~ n i r  of Cabul, their feudal lord and 
sovereign. In  addition to these regulars there is a 
militia-a numerous force in a country, every male 
inhabitant of which is ready to take up a y s  a t  a 
~noment's notice. As  was provccl in 1839, onc-eighth 
of tlie cntirc population may be assembled, fully 
cquippecl, a ~ i d  sent out with tlie utmost dcspatcli. 
By tlie side of tlie general levy tliere is a special 
militia, callcd Defteri, whose ~i ie~nbers  have their 
names rcgistered in time of peace, and are in receipt 
of a small salary, or a certain quantity of corn, or  
.-.. -- 
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else enjoy the free use of canal water. The strength 
and division of the militia is the subject of the 
follo~ving tahle :- 
Ilorrc. lnlnntry. 
. . . . . .  ...... Cabul zr,mo zo,wx, 
. . . . . .  ...... Candahar I Z ; ~  G,mo 
Hcrat . . . . . .  8,000 ...... 10,om 
. . .  ...... Lash (Siesta") gw 5 , ~ w  
. . . . . .  ...... I<hulm 8,mo 3,ow 
Ualkh . . . . . .  2,503 ...... l ,mo 
. . . . . .  ...... Sir-i-pul 2,- ?,M1 
I<unduz . . . . . . .  2,- ...... - 
Aktcha . . . . . .  zoo ...... - 
...... . . . . . .  Andhkui 1,803 
Shibrgan . . . . . .  z , m  ...... 5 0 0  
Mnimana . . . . . .  1,500 ...... 1,- 
Gesaraiz-- 
Seici~lat . . . . . .  4,000 ...... - 
Pusht I<ag . . . . . .  5,000 ...... 3,ow 
. . . . . .  ...... Yekikholin r,m 3-3 
...... Dcsansji . . . . . .  4co 1,200 
Sur Jingeli . . . . . .  5co ...... 800 
...... . . . . . .  Firuz ICugi 3,750 6 4 - 3  
I<iptehak . . . . . .  - ...... 4-3 
...... . . . . . . .  Taimun r,zm 10,ow 
-
Total ... 77,350 ...... 61,200 
. 
138,550 
"Almost every town and village in Aighanistan is 
surrounded by a brick wall, and may be easily con- 
verted into a defensive position. There is also a 
large number of stnall towers distributed over the 
country, for the protectiotl . of passes, ravines, and 
village grolrnds. Some oi . these towers, tlratllcs to  
Ajghlmnislnn. 
their advantageous situation, are formidable enough 
to check the march of European troops, though none 
could llold out against a regular siege. 
"The most important fortress in the western parts 
is Herat, enclosed \vithin a square wall, each side 
4,200 feet in length. The wall is of brick, thirty-five 
feet high, and stands on ground artificially raised. 
I t  is protected by a tnoat, and on two sides by a 
glacis, constructed by the English in 1838. Six  
gates, defended by brick towers, lead to the city. 
There is also a citadel, Chagar Bagh, in  the south- 
) eastcrn corner of the city, likewise built of brick. 
The town is provided with water by the Hari-rud 
river. Farrali, another fortress near the Persian 
frontier, is built on the same plan as Herat, but only 
half the size. The walls of this place are of a very 
solid sort of brick. Farrali protccts the road from 
southern Persia to Afghanista~i. 
"Northern Afghanistan is defe~ided by the fort of 
Maimana, situated on a small river, in a mountainous 
region. Its wall is five feet thick and 12 feet high. 
The moat is shallow. 
"On the eastern frontier there is Jalnlabad, a place 
of respectable strength, but now abandoned. T h e  
citadel of Cabul is likewise a strong place, and acces- 
sible only by a winding path. The citadcl can hold 
out against a prolonged siegc, and comn~ancls the 
town, which has no walls. 
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" In  the interior olArgl~auistan tlic most important 
fort is Gliazni, thc citadcl of ~vhicli was accountccl 
l~nconquerable before its capturc by tlie English. 
Candahar is a large but weak fortress, beitig com- 
manded by adjaccnt heights. The place has no 
glacis and an insiguificant moat. I t  is easy to cut 
off the water supply. The citadel occupies the 
northern part of thc town. 
"All the important roads of Afgllanistan lead from 
east to west, and are merely tracks, without t l ~ c  
slightest attempt at assisting naturc. I n  tlic more 
open parts, howcver, they are serviceable for vcliicles 
and field artillery. Taking Hcrat as a starting point, 
we liave a whole network of roads leading respec- 
tively to Mash-llad, Merv, Maimana, Candaliar, and 
Siestan." 
ANTIQUITIES. 
Under this hcad we have ot~ly room for a bricf 
notice of two or three of thc more celebrated "relics 
of tlic past." 
The first of these are the caves of Uaniian. Up to 
the present day wc liave no complete description of 
them, nor, as far as we know, ally careful drawings 
of tlie objects; but when they have been properly 
described and photograplied tlicse remains at Bamian 
will probably rank as  wonders in celebrity with the 
Roek-cut Temples of India, or the Pyramids of 
Egypt. There arc some slight accounts of the place 
in more than one writer, from which wc may gather 
nnrnr ; d m  of the archzeolocl-icnl remains a t  this . -. . . - . - .. . - 
spot. I t  is about eighty miles in a straight linc to 
tlie north-west of Cabul, and is on the direct road 
I ,h~ twren  that  town and Balkll, and in onc of the - - . , - -. . - . . -. - - 
principal passes leading to the valley of tlie Oxus. 
Tllc high road from Bactria to India went tlirough 
this Pass, and it was on the line of conquest in the 
time of Alexander. In the Pass there is a high 
cliff of rock, extending for somc distance, and the 
ivholc facc of the roclc is perforated wit11 n multitude 
of caves. These are all excavated, and have 
gallel-ies of communication and stairs, also cxca- 
.. 
vated, so that the rock resetnbics a piece of sponge, 
and Iiave been compared with the City of Cavelns 
at Inlrermann. In addition to the caves there are 
two ~iiches liollon~ed out in the {ace of thc scarp, and 
i n  these niches the rock has Lee11 ca~.vecl into two 
enormous figures about loo feet high. There is a 
third and smaller figure which has no  niche ; some 
projecting mass of rock has been cut away, and the 
figure left standing out into the valley. A s  rue have 
110 exact date to go upon, it cannot be said as yet 
\vhetller thcse figures existcd or not whcn Alexalider 
with his Macedonian hosts went past. Certainly 
these figures must havc looked down on many con- 
querors as they went on to!vards the Indus. I n  our 
own period a battle was fought in the valley under 
, > 
, ~, People, Lnrrg~~np, and Ar~liqrtiiics. 
./- 
,. 
tllese Bgores, bctween Dost Muliamlnad a t ~ d  lirigadicr 
Uennie, on tlie 18th September, 1840. Latcr still 
anotl~cr battle toolc place between the sons of  Dost 
Muhammad, a l i e~ l  they were fightillg Tor tllc tbronc 
alter his dcatli. 
The  Grecks who went rvitli Alexandcr rcportcd 
.that tiicy llad seen tlie Cave or  Prornetlieus i n  thc 
I-';lrofiarnisus, or the Indian Caucasus, and solnc 
. , ., s : , . : ~  is 2 EL\ writers conclude, as thc geographical positio~k suits 
. : . .:;.;sz.rd C: tlie theory, that this report must have been fou~ldecl 
.: ; ;.: 3 r.::bt:b:t on the caves at Uamiat~, and that they csistcd a t  
. , : <..; 5. >:,; k1y: ; t h a t  time. The Hindaos ascribe them to thc "I 'a~ich i 
Pandir 1Ce Bhai," or the Five Pando Brothers, ~ v h o  
are something lilce t h e  Cyclops or  the Grcclis or 
giants of tile Northern nations, and gct thc credit of  
all &antic works. There is a long ridge o i  rock 
like a petrified scrpetit, thc origin of which is thus 
described :-Acco~.ding to the Ninclulegcnd, Arjunn, 
one of the five brothers, went out walking, and whcn 
labout four miles away he found on his pat11 a s~ialic 
of 1111ge dimensions and o i  dreadrul shape. It 
attempted to s~vallow 1113 Arjunn, but lie struclc it 
dead a t  tlie first blow, cutting it into two halves. 
The stony monster is still to be seen, and still re- 
scmbles a scrpcnt, wit11 water flowi~ig tl~rouglr it. 
Tliis is, no doubt, some old aqueduct coonccted 
with tliewater supply of the place, to wliich the story 
has been racked on. Tlkc hluhamrnadans call tlic 
Afghnzslfl~i. 
two principal figures Lat  and Manat, and identiry 
tliem wit11 two idols, which have similar names, men- 
tioncd in thc fifty-third chapter of the Koran. 
Thcse are only a few of the traditions which, as  
might bc expected, such a very remarkable place as 
this has given birth to. The general impression is 
that thc ruins belong to the Buddhist period. 
According to this theory, the caves were the cells of 
a vast monastery of Buddhist monks. A t  Ajtlrlta, 
near Bombay, as well as at other places, there are 
I numerous caves of this description. Such places 
are called Viharas, and every mo~ilc had his separate 
cell ; while some of the larger caves were callecl 
cl;aityas, and in tliem they met as a congregation 
for worship. From one or two slight slcetches or  
the colossal figures which liave been brought ho~ne, 
it is thought that a resemblance can be traced to 
the style of the Buddliist figures found in the Pes- 
hawar district, which seems to bear evidence of 
Greelc influence. If this theory of these caves and 
figures being Buddhist should turn out to bc the 
true one, then, as Buddhism is not supposed to have 
progressed so far north at the date of Alexander's 
march upon India, the conclusion will be that they 
did not exist a t  his time. Religious ascetics who 
lived in the woods and in caves most probably 
existed long before Buddhism, and it is quitc pos- 
sible that there may have been caves a t  Bamian at 
Peopb, Lnrig~~nge, nlmrt! Al~liqr~ilies. 
a very early period, and they might ]lave originated 
the story of tlie Cavc of Protnetheus. If we suppose 
that the place had acquired a celebrity for holy 
tnen, it would -be exactly sucl~ a placc \vliicl~ tlie 
Buddhist monlcs would adopt for their Viltaras ; and, 
if they did this, they may have extel~ded the caves 
and produced the largc figures, which, so far as ~ v c  
cat1 a t  present judge, seem to be figi~rcs of Duddha. 
A Few accurate plans of the cavcs n~ld  a carefill 
sketch or two of thc figures would soou put this 
I point beyond disputc. 1, 
The foHo\ving relic belo~igs to a lntcr pcriod of 
Afghan history. T l ~ c  tomb of IVIalimud slill exists, 
and tlie two celebrated minars of red brick arc still 
. , 
erect, but the mosques to which they belonged ]lave 
long since passed away. 
The "Gates of Somnath " were supposed to have 
been removed by Mallmud of Gbaeai, along w ~ t h  
the otl~er treasure of tlre temple, which 11e plntidcred 
in the course or his last invasiou of India. These 
gates were of sandalwood, and were said to have 
been placed on llis tomb. This piece of liistory, 
although dating as far back as tlie end of thc tcnth 
ce~~tury ,  was so well known over India that on our 
troops having retrieved tlie reputation ~v11icl1 was 
supposed to have bee11 lost in tlie Cabul disasters, 
tlle gates on iNahmud's tomb were brought back by 
1 the conquering army, aud Lord Ellenborougli's pro- 
A f$Irnfiistnf~ 
clamation pointed out to ,  the Hindoos that these. 
gates of their temple, which had been carried o f  a s '  
trophies by Mahmud, we had again borne hrck a s  
trophies, and as visible evidence to the people of 
1,ldia that our arms had triumphed, and that our  
power was supreme. S o  celebrated was this event 
at the time that Lord Ellenborough was represented 
ill caricatures as a new Samsoll carrying off the 
gates of Gaza. The  military autllorities who 
brought these relics away had assumed that the. 
I wooden nates on the tomb of Mahmud must neces- - 
sarily be the sandalwood gates of Somnatli, but if 
they had had only avery  slight knowledge of Indian 
art, these gates would most probably lievcr have 
been heard of. I t  was ollly w11e11 the political fuss 
was ended and tlie gatcs were resting in peace, 
that those who Icnew somethi~ig of I~ id ian  ornamcnt 
began to inspect them, and declared, i l l  spite even 
of the Governor-General's proclamation, that they 
could not possibly be the gates of Somnatli. Those 
who neither knew nor cared for art refused t o  acccpt 
this judgment, but a microscope demonstrated that 
the wood of which they were made was deodar pine, 
and not sandalwood. Tha t  they are not the gates 
of thc old Hindu shrinc is now an accepted point. 
If tlie sandalwood gates ever rcally welit to Gl~azni  
and ornamented the tomb of Mahmud, they must 
have been destroyed at some time or other, and nc\v 
I'enplt, Ln>r~i~ogc ,  n~id A*rtiqliitics. 95 
- 
olles had been made of deodar, a wood wl~ich grows 
plcntirillly on the Salcd ICoh and the Hindu ICush. 
The ortiamcnt upon them is .SO distinctly Mullam- 
rnadali tiiat thc wonder is 110 one with the avcnging 
army was able to discern the truth and point out 
itlevitable conclusio~l. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
ALEXANDER THE GREAT'S J4A RCH THROUGJI 
AFGHANISTAN ON INDIA. 
Alexander's Army-Pursuit o l  Dnriur hficr llno Dntllo ol  Arbcln-Con. 
qocel pi Parthin and Ayrennia-Founding 01 ~Iornt-Conql~est ol  
Norlh-Easlenl Alghnnirtan-Cnmpnign in naelrin-Alexander an 
Oriental Potenlrzte-Mnrringe with Rornna-Crosses the Hindu ICusll 
- 
into India-Campnigln in  India-Voyngc ol Ncnrcl>us l ~ a m  the Indur  
lo Lilt Eophnlcr-Aleril~~der's Marell .4crois thc Dcrcrl ol Dniachistnn 
I 
1 - Greek 1nRuencc on lile Oxus. j 
THE first invasion of India from the \Vcst in histori- 
cal times deserves more than a passing notice, as  
exhibiting the vast difference i n  tlte conditions of 
conquest which the inventions of modern times have 
imported into the art of war. From the day 
when Alexander, son of Philip, a youth not yet 
twenty-two years of age, but generalissimo of the 
armies of Greece, marched from Pella in Macedonia 
to the conqiiest of Asia, his small, but highly dis- 
ciplined army reccived no check in its steady coursc 
of victory, till its own mutinous refusal to go  further 
made the great conqueror turn back froin the banks 
of the Satlaj. The  army with which Alexander 
set out, in April 334 Il.C., numbered 30,000 infantry 
and 4,509 cavalry. The historian tells 11s that the 
smallness of this force must not be. viewed as a 
matter of vague wonder, seeing that. 'one of. the 
three modes by wliicli an invader mSy atternpt 
the conquest of a coulitry is by "the . m ~ v s b l ~ .  
colurnn, which tl~laws itself into the heart of j n  
enemy's country, trusting to rapid success for 
safety." 
When we remember what tllis " movable colutn~l "
did, l~ow for eleven years it marched over tlie greater 
part of Asia west of tlie Indus-reinforced, it is 
true, by fresh levies from Macedon, and absorbing 
into its ranks many of the Greelc mercenaries that 
were found in Asia Minor-how, besides fighting 
great battles against incalculable odds, it traversed 
trackless deserts, crossed lofty mou~ltains and mighty 
rivcrs, and, moreover, founded cities which remain 
t o  this day, it may be safely remarl~ecl that it did 
what no movable column ever did before, has done 
since, or is likely to do to the cnd of the world's 
history. 
The  countries through which this army passed 
from Macedonia to Babylon were, doubtless, not 
unwilli~lg to see in the you t l~ f~~ l  conqueror a deliverer 
fi.om the hated Persian yolce, and the terrible 
examples which he set at Tyre and Gaza may have 
had much to do with "securing his rear!' The 
moral effect of tlie battles of the Granicus a id  of 
7 
the Issus was enormous, so that distant cities scnt 
to annoonce their submission. 
I t  is, however, with Alexander's most wonderful 
marches that me havc to do now, which he made 
after thc Battlc of Arbela, in pursuit of the Persian 
Monarch, whose last hope was thus brolcen ; and 
afterwards in the conquest of his most outlying 
provinces, thosc of Aria (I-lcmt), Dratlgia~la (Scistnn), 
Arachosia (Ca~zdd~ar), Bactria (Bnlih), Sogdiana 
(Snfi~nrcnt~d), to the confines of Scythia, bcyond the 
Jaxartes (Syr Dniya), on tlle north, and of the 
Gandaridae, beyond the Hyphasis (Sat&) on the 
east. After the conqueror hacl come up with the 
fugitive Icing, Darius, only to find him dead in his 
chariot, trnnsfixcd by the spears of his satraps, who 
wished to deprive the victorious invader of any 
advantage he might have derived from the possession 
of the Monarch's person as a prisoner, Alexander 
rejoined his main army, and set before it the task of 
subjugating the northern and eastern provinces, 
beginning with Parthia and Hyrcania, to the east of 
the Caspian. Thence he quicldy passed into Aria, 
and here he founded the city of Alexandria ~ r i o r u m ,  
the modern H m l .  Reserving Bactria for his last 
attack, he turned southwards into Drangiana 
(Seisin?), on the banks of the river Erymandus 
(Helmand). His stay at the capital Prophtl~asia mas 
rendered but too me~norable by the fate of Philotas 
-'-. 
dtie ant 
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and his fathcr Parmcnio, whosc dcath for alleged 
treason followed upon the reports of somc self- 
laudatory spcecl~es displeasing to their master which 
they were said to have made. 
Having spcnt the winter in completing the con- 
quest of tlie proviiices which occupy the north- 
castern part of the table-land of what is now 
Afglianistan-during which time hc Founded two 
inore cities, Alcxandria in Aracliosia (probably 
Car~n'nlm?~), a i d  Alexandria ad Caucasum, about 
fifty miles north-west of Cabul-he crosscd the 
Hi~iclu I<ush, while the passcs were still covered with 
snow. His soldiers, whose imagination had been 
fed wit11 the traditions of the Greek poets rcspectlng 
Mount Caucasus, to pass which they deen~ed the 
highest achievement of foreign ndventurc, either 
co~~ceivecl this range to  be a continuntion of that 
chain, or flattered their cltief into the belief that i t  
was so by applying to it the title of tlie "Indian 
Caucasus." 
Alexander ivas nonr in Bactria, having crosscd, ip 
all probability, b y  the Bamian, the oi~ly one of the 
four principal passes over the Hindu I<ush practic- 
able in winter. Bessus, the last of t l ~ e  satraps to  
yield, had crossed from Bactria, his own province, 
wvhicli hc was too weak to defend, into Sogdiana, on 
tlie other side of the O x ~ l s  (Amv). Alexander 
on through the ,sandy deserts, amidst great 
7-2 
A fghnnistaa. 
sufferings, to the most dificult river h e  had ye t  
crossed, and transported his army on their tent-skins, 
filled with air and straw-a mode of transport which 
is represented on the old Assyrian sculptures. After 
the capture of Bessus and his punishment for thc 
murder of Darius had been decreed, Alexander gave 
a proof of the growth of Oriental vices in his 
character by the massacre of the Greek colony of the 
Rranchidz, i n  Sogdiana-the descendants of the 
guardians of the temple of Apollo, near Miletus, 
i who had surrendered its treasures to Xerxes, bv 
. .
~vliom they were removed to Sogdiana, out of reach 
of the vengeance of the Greeks. Ilaving talcen 
Maracanda (Sn~rznvcntzd), the capital of Sogdiana, 
Alexander advanced to the Jaxartes (Syv Dnryn). 
On its banlcs 11e foui~ded the most distant of the 
cities that bore his name, Alexandrescliata (probably 
on the site of ICh+1rtE), near that which marked 
the limits of the Empire of Cyrus, who had failed 
in that attempt to subdue thc Scythianq which 
Alexander proposed soon to renew. 
Returning for the winter (LC. 339) to Bactria, or 
Zariasp6 (the modern L'nlkh), he was recalled to 
Sogdiana in the followi~~g year, to put down a for- 
midable revolt headed by the late Satrap Spita- 
menes. I t  was after this successful campaign and 
on his return to Maraca~~da,  that the fatal banquet 
was held at \vIiich the great conqueror, in a fit of  
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drr~nke~l passion, slew his boso~n friend, Clitus. 
The only relief !vhich he could find froin the pangs 
of remorse at this act was in renewed actio~i. For 
a wlrole year the Sogdians, assisted by the Scythians, 
1 ,  carried on a desultory warfare with Alexander's in- 
vincible army, during which it penetrated their 1, deserts and mountains, and subdued their fortresses, 
until Spita~nenes was slain by his Sogdian allies, and 1 ,  
I his head sent to Alexander. I t  was at the famous 
sto?ming of the impregnable " Sogdian rock " that 
the beautiful Roxana, the daughter of a Bactrian 
chief, who afterwards became the first Asiatic wife I' 
of Alcxandel; fell into his 11ands as a captive. The 
marriage was celebrated with great ponrp at Bactria, 
and Alexander sho~ved his progress towards Orien- 
I' talism by attempting to exact the ceremony of pro- 
stration even from his Greek followers. 
Wit11 the return of summer Alexander left 
Bactria to re-cross the Paropamis~~s (ZCo/r-i-Gab~) 
and subdue the still unknown lands of India. 
That name appears but once or twice in ancient 
history ; as a region that excited, only to disappoint, 
the ambition of conquerors si~ch as Semiramis, 
Darius, and Alexatlder; and chiefly known, after his 
time, by tlie rich products by which it rewarded the 
co~nmercial enterprise which had its centre at 
Alexandria. The India with ~vhich Alexander 
1 made his brief acquaintance of a year or two, was 
i .  ! 
tributaries ; in other words, Sirzdh. and the P a y a h ,  or 
country of thc Five Rivers. The details of Alexan- ~, 
der's march through Afghanistan are fill1 of interest ! 
for the geographer, but are chiefly rc~narkable for the 
liistoriao, on account of thc facility with which lic I f 
subdued the mountaineers, whose descendants havc 
proved so troableso~ne in our timc. The campaign, i ' 
like his former passage of the Paropa~nisus, was , 
made in the depth of winter. Following the course I .. 
of the river Coplien (Cnbid) ,  he crossed the  Indus I 
' !  
near Attocl;, and was met by the prince of thc . ; !  
country that lay between thc Indus and the 
I 
Hydaspes (Jhilnr~z), who came out to meet Alexander I ,  
with valuable presents, amongst '~vhich were twcnty- I / i  
five war-elephants, and brought a reinforcement of 
5,000met1. We ~voolcl gladly linger over the recital 
of Alexander's battle with Porus (said to be a corrup- 
I. tion of the Sanscrit P~nr+t~s/m, a hero, and, therefore, 
rather a title than a name of an individual), which 'I 
was fought on the left bank of the I-Iydaspcs 
(%iin~rz). The Indian Icing became a tributary to 
the ' conqueror, who founded the tolvt~ of Niccea, to 
commemorate the victory. The  rest of thc Panjab 
was easily subdued. The  swollen stream of ihc 
Acesines (Chsznh) was crossed on . inflated sliins ; 
and the Ilydrastes (Rnvi) with less dificulty. Thc  
Catl~ma~is and otlier indepet~clent tribes made some 
resistance, but their capital, Sangala (probably 
Lnholv), was storrned ; 17,000 oftlie inhabitants being 
put to the sworcl, and 70,000 taken prisoners. 
Alexander had IIOW reached the farthest limits of 
his conqt~csts, A t  the Hyphasis (Scztloj) his ambition 
was stirred afrcsl~ by tlie intellig-encc that he could io 
clcvcn days be o n  thc grcat Ganges River, and meet 
in battle t11c powerful ~iatkon of the Gsndaridac. But 
the soldicrs of his army, eve11 the officers, who might 
hove becn supposed to share his Iongi~ig for universal 
conqwst, reft~scd to proceed furtlicr, and Alexander 
wept, " not tilot tllere were no regions left to coilqucr, 
but bccausc he was a t  length made to fceI tlie curb 
which dcpc~~tlet~cc on fcllorv-1ne11 imposes on the 
s t ro~~gest  will." 
His rcturll was lnarliccl by the same daring spirit 
that had cl~arncteriscd his adva~tce. 111stead of se- 
tracing liis steps tl~roogh what is rlow called tlw 
lcliaibar Pass, lie adoptcd tlie plan of follorr,ing the 
course of l l ~ c  Indus to its mot~tl~,  and cxplor i~~g the 
sl~ores of the Indian Occan to the Euphrates. 
Before lcavitlg thc Hyplulsis twclvc irnmense 
altars wcrc built OII  its banks lo mark the 
furtl~cst limits of his progress, it1 itnitation of 
Hcrcules a t ~ d  Dionysus. A t  tllc I-Iydaspcs Ite 
was joincd by a irinforccmct~t ~vl~icb had mnrched 
from Europc, n fact which testifies to the wonderful 
tranquillity of his Empire. I t  should not be for- 
gotten, too, that Alexander's double march across 
the Panjab was performed during the rainy season. 
I t  is difficult in these days to estimate the magni- 
tude of the daring involved in that wonderful voyagc, 
on which Nearchus, Alexander's Admiral, now em- 
barked. Nine montlls were occupied in reaching thc 
mouth of the Indus. The  difficulty of the  voyage 
was enhanced by the barrenness of the shores along 
which it lay, for navigation then was depe~ldent on 
communication with the land. I-Ic brought the fleet 
safely, however, to the port of Har~nozia (Or~lzn,:), 
where he landed to report progress to Alexander in 
Carmania, aud then returned to completc the voyage 
to the Euphrates. H e  fillally rcjoined Alexander 
on the Pasitigris, near Susa, about February, BXc. 325, 
having set sail from the Indus a t  the preceding 
autumnal equinox. Ilis reward of a crown of gold 
was merited. 
Meanwhile, Alexander with his veterans had been 
accomplishing his celebrated march through thc 
deserts of Geclrosia (Brcl?tclzistn~z), in which he shared 
to the fill1 the terrible sufferings of fatiguc and thirst 
with his soldiers. The remainder of the march was 
through his recently-conquered Persian provinces, 
and appears to have been free from difficulty. 
Although the outlying provinces of Alcxancler's 
empirc fell away in rapid succession after his denth- 
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nactria alolic remaining a Greek ki~igdom as late as 
u.C. IZS , .W~CII  it was overthrown by tlie Parthians, 
who had previously shorn the empire of all the 
other provinces beyond the Euphrates-a distinct 
Helle~lisit~g influence pervaded these new Asiatic 
lringdotns from tlie large intermixture of Greek 
1. 
. , elements in their government, their population, and 
i i thcir language. I t  would be beyond the limits 
I '  1 assigned to this work to cnter further into this 
I interesting subject, but the materials are available for 
i ts  pursuit, and few fields of rcsearcli are more 
inviting. The visible material monuments of Greck 
/ . influence ~vl~ich are known to exist in these regions, 
a n d  those which still await discovery, may yet throw 
much light upon thc early history of the prcscnt 1 
I raccs that occupy the countries round the Oxus aud 
i t h e  valleys of the I-Iindu I<ush and its co~uiected j chaios. 
I 
1 ,  
CHAPTER V. 
AFGEZAN >ISTOi7Y FROM MUiLIAMMAD TO 
ZAIWAN SHAH. 
Pr41 Appcarnnce or Afglmi?i~ta~ in r\fcdili.~val History-Arab Sclllenncnts 
-Story or ICnsi~n aucl the Rnjput Princ-r-Tho Ghnzni Monnrchy 
Foundcd by Alplngin-I~~msion a l  Il~dln-Posl>a\unr tilo Fint 
Pel.rnnncnL hfuhnn~modnn Conciucsi i n  Indin-Sabaklngin-Piullder 
of Solnnnlh->,lahrnud or GlmznCShohnbudclin-Jc11gi5 IChnn- 
Tirnur or T'amcrlsnc Invades Northcrn Indin-Babar Founds tile 
bjugilnl Empirc of India-Nadir Si~sh  Inv~dor nnd I'iunrlcrs tlle 
l'anjnb-Allnmd Sllnh Pounds thc Durmi Empire oI AIghanisr*n- 
lllvnder ladla-Dnille af Pa.ipat-Znrnml Shall-Threatcur Lo Invade 
Il~din. 
WE may date tlie appearance of Afgllal~istan in 
tnedizval history froin the forty-third year alter the 
Hijra,* or flight of Muhammad from Mecca to 
Medina. T h e  warriors of Islam, urged 011 by fana- 
tical zeal on the one hand, and love of plul~der on 
the other, liad quickly overrun Central Asia, and 
in A.D. 664 liad advanced to Cabul, while tlie inter- 
vening provinces of Persia had been already brougllt 
under tlic sway of the Arab Caliphs. We need not  
attempt to trace the fluctuations of power that iol- 
lowed the first Arab settleinelits in Afghanistan. 
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Suffice i t  to say that they resulted in the acceptance 
of  the Muha~nmadan faith, and a nomii~al, if not in 
some instances an actual, snbmission to the central 
Muhaininadan governmeut. The  further extet~sion 
of  Mul~ammadan power into Northern India did not 
succeed beyond a temporary hold on Sindl~  by 
Rasitn early in the eight11 century. This ICasiin 
was nephew of Hejaz, Governor of Basra (Bnssor,nh) 
, . i..!.rli.,E 
. . . .  . .. 
and it is he of whom the story is relatcd which the 
.~!.n:i: 
. : - .  a 7  
. . ;: l-irst lovers of Eastern romance never tire of telling. 
.. - Two beautiful daughters of the Rajali Da l~u  having 
fallen into his hands, ICasim despatched them as a 
prescnt to the Caliph'sharem. Arrived at Damascus, 
one of them, who had attracted the Caliph's gaze, 
declared l~erself un~vortliy of his attention, owing t o  
her l~aving been dislionoured by ICasirn. In obe- 
:::inistan in dience to th; royal mandate Rasirn mas executed in 
:, d t c r  thc  Sindh, and his body senrn up in a raw hide and 
:,ficca to sent to the Caliph. When the body arrived a t  
hy fann- Damascus thc Princess admitted lier falsehood, but 1. Ir:~,~r~<lcr 011 , gloried in having thus avenged her father's death. 
,\sia. and I t  may be doubted whether this legend is strictly 
LL t l ~ c  intcr- t rue;  but i t  is certain that, by ICasim's death or  
,1y brought recall, the M~iliammadan power in ~ i n d h  mas much 
c ilrctl not weakened, and, after a titne, lsecame a mere tra- 
, r  that (01- dition. Caliph Ilnroun-al-Raschid (to adopt the 
<;JI 3nistan. traditional orthography) died i n  A.D. 806, and the 
Arab Caliphate was not long in dissol\ring. 
Ichorasan and Trans-Oxiana bccamc independent 
under the Taliirites, or successors of Tal~ir ,  who h a d  
successfully hcadecl a rebellion. I 
T o  them succeedecl the Sofnridcs, in h.n. 872 ; t hc  j 
founder of this short-lived dynasty being Yaliiib, a 1 
brazier of Seistan. Thcse gave way to the Samanis, 
ill A.D. 903, a d y ~ ~ a s t y  which continued to exist ill . I, %A 
Centml Asia for 120  years. 
Tile fifth prince, Abdul-Malik, possessed a Turki 
slave tlalnecl Alptagin, to whom lie had comtnitted 
/- j the 11igl1 office of governor of ICl~orasan. 111 A.D. 
- 
961 11e liad to flee from the suspicious nilger of his 
patron's successor OII the throne, and having escaped 
with a few follo~vers to Gliazni, ail outlying province 
t o  the south-cast!vard, flanked by the Suliman 
Mountains, he lnade hi~nseif independent, by the aid 
clliefly of the rude Afghan population of that region. 
W e  have alluded elsc~vl~ere to the claim which 
Afglian chroniclers have set up to a J e ~ v i s l ~  descant. 
Apart from this traclition, the earliest accoutit lvc 
have of t l ~ e  Afghans is their establishment in t h c  
east of the table-land, where they wcre found 
eficient allies by Alptagin. Thc son of  Alptagin, 
who succeeded to the ne~vly-erccted throne OF 
Ghazni on his father's death in I\.D. 976, died 
(according to Farisl~ta, the Persia11 historian) in less 
than two years without issue, and Sabaktagin, who, 
like Alptagin, liad been a slave, but had riscn t o  
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su$i favour as  to be admitted to an alliance with I 
the daughter of Alptagin, was elected to succeed 
the latter's son. 
1 2  Sxnianis, j gird, tlie last of the Persian Iciogs. His  talent in 10 csist  in 4 warlike enterprise, chiefly against the Indian tribes 
on tlie Indus, liad com~ne~ided him to notice, and j 
.I a Turki gained him the throne. 
committed H e  was not long in subduing Cat~daliar, ~vhicli he 
111 A.D. annexed to his small kingdom of Ghazni, and then 
:ir of his set his face towards India. I-Ie invaded the Faniab. I 
- 
~g cscapcd 
: province 
Su l i rna~ i  
tlie a i d  
1.tt region. 
,im ~vli icl i  
I d c ~ c e i i t .  
: s o ~ ~ n t  we 
i ~ t  I t h e  
.rc fo~111d 
,\lpt;lgio, 
rlirone oE 
q;G, died 
~ n )  i n  less 
t ,axill, xvl~o, 
181 riscn t o  
. . 
took forts, built mosques, and carried OR a large 
booty, thereby setting the example which other 
invade~s of India never failed to imitate. 
This was not suffered to pass without an attempt 
at revenge, and we soon find a n  immense army- 
the best of the Aryan chivalrj7-led by the Icings 
of Lahore, Delhi, Ajmir, ICalinga, and Icananj, 
assembled t o  resist the aggressive Ghaznavites. 
Twice did a great Rindu army march across the 
Indus. T h e  first time a furious storm so disheartened 
the superstitious Hindus that they sued for terms 
instead of giving battle. On the  second occasion 
the Muhammadans were victo~ious, and took posses- 
sion of the Valley of Pcsharvar, their first permanent 
occupation of Indian territory. 
Sabal'tagin d ~ d  not renew~his attaclts on India, 
and died in A.D. 997. His illegitimate son, Malimud 
or Gtlazni, first tlcreated his legitiinatc brother, 
Ismail, nlio had bccii ilominated s;iccessor, and then 
obtailicd the mliolc lcingdom, ~vliich hc clilarged to a 
greater extent than 11nd been done by Sabalctagiii. 
During his reign of thirty-thrce years, lie made ten 
T ' '5  great iiivasio~is of India, tlic Iast being directed -- 
against the sacred temple of Somnatli, to dcsti-oy 
\vl~icli scemed an act of great virtue to the zealous 
Muhammadan Siiltati, for he had assumcd this title. 
The Brahmins offered an irnmcnse sum i T  lic would 
mare the sacred t e m ~ l e ,  but he replied that he  
. . 
wished to be known t o  posterity as "Malimi~d the 
Idol-breakel;" and not as the " Idol-seller." I-Ie him- 
self strock off the ~iosc  of the idol, which was nine 
feet high, and was re~varcled for his religious zeal b y  
fincling in its inside precious stories aiicl peal-1s of a 
value far exceeclingr what had beeii offercd, and the 
other wealth of tlie temple was immensc. Invaders 
it1 all ages have bee11 rarely afflicted with twinges of 
conscieiice in the matter of spoiliiig the temples and 
palaces of the countries they honour wit11 their 
presence. The almies of even sucll civilised nations 
as France and Ellgland follnd it impossible to resist 
the temptation to plunder the royal p laces  of Pelcin. 
We are aware that there are alrvays cxcelleiit reasons 
fortl~coming to defend such acts in modern times, 
and we veil tlie realmotive of sudi cleeds-the love 
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of plunder-by alleging the necessity of" reading the 
barbarians a salutary lesson ;" "striking awe into the 
of Ghazni troubled himself to make any such hypo- 
critical excuses for his very natural corlduct. I t  is  
said to his credit, howevcr, that i f  he plundered 
temples and murdered priests ill tlie name of religion, 
he committed no reveligefi~l massacres or wanton 
executions upon the people generally, or his prisoners. 
"Tried by the slandcrs of his timcs," says the inoclern 
historian, " Mahmud must bc considered, 011 tlie 
whole, humane, and his unquenchable thirst f o ~  
pliinder is the wont feature ofhis  character." At his 
iinl- death, liis dominions extended as far as Ispahan, 
mcstward, and a gxeat part of India owned liis 
n i n e  
1 by supremacy. Altogether, he invaded India thirteen 
of a times, but ten only of these iilroads were of con- 
I t h e  sequence. 
.dcrs Mahmud's dynasty lasted till AD.  "$9,  and was 
succeecled by the house of Ghor, which reigned in 
cs of 
a n d  Afghanistan till the death of Shahabuddin, in 1206. 
For the events of this period, which are of the most thcir 
t i ons  thrilling interest to the student of early Af~l ian  and 
resist India11 liistoty, we must refer tlie reader to the worlcs of 
Elpliinstone and other historians. We can hcre talke 
'ckili. 
asons  but a very cursory view of the period. After Shaha- 
buddin's death, liis successor, Maltmud, resigned Iudia timcs, 
: love to I<utb-ud-din, originally a slave, but subsequently a 
I 
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great general, to whom the late inonarcll chiefly owed 
his conquests in India. I11 1215, Tajuddin E l d ~ l z ,  
the successor or Mal~mud on the throne of Ghazlli, 
attcrnptcd to regain his Indian dominions, but railed, I 
a i d  was taken prisoner. 
Meankhile, in A.D. 1217, the first echoes of t h e  
name of Jengis IChan, the Muglial conqueror, al ter-  24 
wards s o  dreaded tliroughout Western Asia, were 1 
heard. H e  invaded the dominion of the Sultan o f  
j i I<harizm, overran the country, and peiretrated as  
far as Ghaz~ii. IIis career of conquest did not, I 
however, extend to India. W e  cannot at tempt t o  
follow in detail the course of Mughal conquest ! 
during the next two cent~~r ies .  In A.D. I 398, Timur  
or Tamerlanc, himself a Tartar, headed the most 
famous, though by no means the first, Mugha! inva- ! 
sion or India, and was proclaimed Emperor of India.  i !
H e  only remained, however, firtcen days in Delhi, / I  
and then returned home, aRer a gelieral and indis- 
criminate massacre of t l ~ c  people. 
From 1478 to 1526, an Afghan dynasty (Lodi) 
reigned over Northern India, simultarreously with the  1 
rule or  the Mughals, descetldants of Timur, a t  
Cabul, although their capital was a t  Samarcand. 
The most celebrated of these last, Babal; s ix th  i n  
descent from Timur, invaded India in 1526, at  t h e  
invitation of a member of the Afgllan family t h a t  
rtlled a t  Delhi, and founded the Muglial dynasty of 
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Illdin. On the death of Babar, Afghanistan, and the 
whole of the Panjab, became a separate kit~gdorn, 
under his son Icarnran. The history of Afghanistan 
for the next two centuries is allnost iilextricably 
mixcd up with that of Persia and I-Iinclostan, the 
plains of Afghanistan being divided more or less 
equally between these empires. To those, however, 
who rejected a foreign yoke the mountains aKorded 
111 1720, the Afghan tribes threw OFT their allegial~ce 
to Persia, and, advancing illto the countrj: tool: 
Ispahan. In 1728, they were co~npelled t o  retrace 
their steps by  Nadir Shah, the celebratetl usurper, 
who follolved up his advantage by  occupying the 
wl~ole of Afghanistan, the ~vester~i  provinces of 
~vhich were still a nominal dependency of the Delhi 
.:,,I inva- 
" .-. i kings. 
, .: *.,f In(lia, : 
Ilcllii, i '.Then follo~ved Nadir Shah's invnsio~l of India, 
,\-.I indii- illto the causes of which we cannot now enter. 
Sufice. it to say, that the Persian king surpassed 
.=.... 
former invaders in the booty he obtained, carrying 
. . . (,L.i~dii 
off treasure valued. a t  from~g,ooo,ooo to &3o,ooo,ooo 
:!; -,i-ith llic 
sterling, besides the celebrated peacock-throne, which 
. 7ri:giur, at  
.53-;l:%rcalId, Tavernier valued a t  ~6,0oo,ooo, but which othcr 
j r .  5ixth i n  aothorities tnaltc t o l~ave  been wort11 only ~z ,wo ,ooo .  
The Icing's share was Lr$,ooo,ooo. On leaving r j:rl., at ihc 
Delhi, Nadir Shah presented Muha~nrnacl Shah, the T*:aiiI)- 11111 
conquered Emperor of  India, with his crown, and 
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seated him o n  his throne ; but he annexed to his 
own dominions all the western provinces of the 
officer, of the Durani or Abdali tribe, who had 
obtained a high cornmand in Naclir Shah's army, 
united the Afghan tribes into a monarchy under 
himself. He was young, ambitious, and capable; 
and, mindful of the rich spoil India had recently 
fi~rnished, t ~ ~ r n e d  his attention to that empire. I-Iis 
invasiol~s were continuecl till the famous Battlc of 
Panipat, fought on January 7th, 1761, when thc 
Mahratta forces were completely defeated. Ahmad 
Shah did not assume the government of Inclin, but 
contented himself with 11is Afghan kingdom and thc 
Panjab. It may be noted that Clive had broken the . 
power of the Muhammadan ruler of l3e11gal at the 
Battle of Plassy, on June zznd, 1757, thrce a l~d a- 
half years before the victory of the Afghan king over 
the Mahrattas at Panipat. The foo~ldation of thc 
British Empire in Inclia may justly be dated from 
Clive's famous victo~y. 
Ahmad Shah died in 1773, and was succeeded by 
an indolcnt and despotic son, Timur Shah, who lcft 
his throne lo  his two sons, I-lumayiin and Z;~rnan 
Shah. In the conflict for 1111divided rule which 
followed, Zaman Sliall was victorious. 
Ear[y Afghan Niitory. 
In  1798, Zaman Shah wrote to the Governor- 
General of India, Lord Mornington, announcing his 
intention of invading Hinclostan, and claiming thc 
assistance of the English. A t  the same time Tippu 
to  advance and join him in a crusade against all 
infidels. Tippu was also in league with the French 
Government, from whom he looked for assistance 
against the English. Napoleon had landed in Egypt, 
and Tippu looked forward to liis rapid conquest of 
that country, and anticipated a t r i~~mp la t ' i n a r c l i  of 
the French conqueror across Asia into India, follow- 
ing thc precedent of the great "Sclcatidar," as 
Alexander the Great is designated in India. 
But we have now carried our ncccssarily brief and 
imperfect review of Afghan history to the point 
where Afghan politics come into contact with those 
of t11c nations of Western Europe, and it will be 
convenient to  continue the narrative in another 
chapter. 
CI-IAPTER VI. 
AFGHAN HlSTORY FAOM ZAMAN SN/IH TO T J I E  
EVE O F  THE I;IAST AFGfI.4N WAR. 
Zamnn Sbnh Advnncer lo LnhorcPnn ie  In Rriiish Illdin-Rcvica o r  
Situation-Nsllvc I;eelillg in Indin-Ineidcna of I;onner Invwionr- 
Alarm nt lirsncll Inlrigoer-First Symplams of " Rurropbobin"- 
Eneronehrnenr of Russia an Pcl~sinSeI~emc of Join1 Rilrrinn nncl 
I'rcneh Invasion of India-Sir Joiln ICnye on tl>c l\m Clnsscs ot 
GovcrnorGenernl-Lor& Minlo ancl tVellericy Conrpnrad villa Lonl 
Lylton-Thc Rise or lllc Sikhs-Illilisil nlld RIISS~B~C Ad\m~lce C o w  
par~d-Wiriian to tbe S i l : h ~ b n h  Sujn-Rirc of lllc nm-ml~mlr- 
Sbnh Sujnnn Exile-AiTn.ir.,irs iu Afgl~anirlnn before tl>e Firit Argllnn 
Wnr-Mission olCaplain Burner nnd Siegeof IIerat-1Zidrr.d Poninger 
-Dost M u h n ~ o m n d S i k i ~ s  Gnin Pcshnwn1.-llarrin Invndcr Pcrria- 
Ncxv Ruiaa.Pcriinn bu#ldnry-Urillsh Policy. 
ZAMAN SIIAH, Icing of the Afghans, the grandson 
of Alimad Shah, cherislled, as we have said, designs 
of Indian conquest similar to t l l o s e  that Iiad i i n p e l l e d  
his grandfather to tlie invasion of the I ' a i i j ah .  We 
liave seen that i n  1798 lie had involred the assistance 
'of the English Governor-General against tlic Mah- 
rattas, >v11o had cstablislled tl~crnselves virtually as 
tlie most polverful State in N o r t l i c r l i  India, although 
thc Mughal Emperor at Dcll~i r e m a i i i e c l  n o i n i n a l l y  
supreme. The Afghan Icing Iiad advanced as far as 
Lahore, with the avowed object of extending the 
Durani Empire (as it was called after its consolida- 
tion by Ahmad Slmh) to the Ganges. But he was 
co~npelled precipitately to return to resist an invasion 
of IChorasan by the Persian troops. I n  the previous 
year lie hacl been similarly recalled to put down a 
rebellion headed by his brother Mahmud. For years 
aiterwards the threat of an Aighan invasion kept the. 
British Indian Empire in a chronic state of alarm, 
and Lord Wellesley, immediately on his accessio~i to 
the ofice oi  Governor-General, had augmented the 
native army on this account. 
However ridict~lous now this constant panic may 
seein to us, it must be remembered that at the 
beginning.of the century the Englisl~ in India Itnew 
little of the resources of the Durani Empire, and less 
of the people, and their monarch's unfitness for a 
great enterprise. Nor were the fears entertained so 
groutidlcss as may appear at first sight. The 
numerous enemies of the English in India looked to 
Cabul for deliverance from their encroaclii~~g empire 
with, says ICaye, "malicious expectancy." From 
tllc rocky defiles of that ro~nantic country they 
expected to see swarms of the Faithful hasten to 
save Islam from the yolce of the usurping Feringhees. 
All the Muhammadan princcs from Tippli in Mysore 
to Vazir Ali in Oudh, had promised money and men, 
and even I-Iindu rajahs had avowed their sympathy 
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with the cause. What Sir John Ibye says of his 
ow11 day (1857) reads rather strangely now, w1ie11 w e  
are told that thoughts of an invasion of India a g a i n  
agitate tlie breasts of some among Sliere Al i ' s  
advisers. He  writes : "We, wlio in these t i ines  
trustingly contemplate the settled tranquillity of the  
north-westem provinces of India, a n d  remember 
Zaman Shah only as tlie old, blind pensioner of 
Ludliiana, can hardly estimate aright the real im- 
portance of thc threatened tnovement." 
If the English in India felt such a t ~ x i e t y  a t  the  
, prospect of an Afghan invasion, how are w e  to 
.. - - 
picture to ourselves the feeli~lgs of t he  u ~ ~ p r o t e c t e d  
myriads wlio ltnew by tradition what were the tcndor  
mercies they might expect from bal-baro~~s hordes  
such as those that swooped do~v11 itpo~l the plains of 
India ~vith Tamerlalie the Tartar, Nadir Shah  t h e  
Persian, and Alimad Sliah the Durani. T h e  his- 
torian tells, u s  that whet1 Tamerlatie (or Timur)  
invaded India, his army pillaged tlie Panjab u p  to 
Delhi, taking vast nutnbcrs of captives. F ind ing  i t  
troublesoine to carry these along with him, he 
ordered a11 of them above tlie age of fifteen-to 
the number, says Farishta, of ~oo,ooo-to be  p u t  to 
death i n  cold blood. 
Tlie refusal of the people of Dellii to pay 
a heavy contributiot~ brought up011 them a general  
and indiscriminate massacre and plunder, du r ing  
. .  - . -....i... _ _ _ _ _  
~~~ 
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\vl~ich the monarch gavc a great entellainment to 
11is o6cers. 
Again, in  1738, Nadir Shah gave orders at DeIl~i 
for a general massacre; and wheo his soldiers had 
feasted on blood thcy gave themselves up for fifty- 
ciglll days to plunder, which they sought from the 
Emperor's palace to thc lorvest hovcls of the poor. 
I n  1755, Ahinad Shah proceeded to Delhi, and 
extorted R vast sum of money from the people by 
torture and massacre. I-Ie then attacked the rich 
c i ty  of Mathura, whilc a religious festival was being 
held ; and tllousands of Hindu worshippers were 
slauqhtered without mcrcy by the Alghans. 
Alter the  Battle or Panipat, ill 1761, referred to 
belore, betwee11 Ahtnacl Shah and the Mahrattas, 
which ended in the victory of the Afghans, wc read 
that ,  "Of all that mere taken in the [Indian] camp, 
woInea and children became slaves, and next lnoriiiug 
the  males were cruelly butchered in cold blood." . 
Such are some of thc gentle lnemories which the 
barbarians west of the Suliman and Hindu I<osh 
Mountains liave left wit11 the people of the plains 
of Northern India. What wonder that, in 179&, 
x v h e ~ ~  another attack was threatened from the same 
quarter, thc  English, xvl~o only ecl~oed the sentiments 
of their nativc subjects, sliould.havc viewed i C  with 
alarm. 
I t  was not, howcver, simply the Durani Icing 
who was dreaded. The  French Emperor was cre- 
dited with designs of almost universal conquest. The  
French were known to be eager for an alliance with 
Persia, and what was Inore probablc to the minds of 
the rulers of firitis11 India then than that an ofEensive 
alliance between France, Persia, and Cabul sliould 
make those dangers, that once merely seemed to 
threaten them from tlie north-west, oiily too real atid 
imminent. 
The great object then appeared to be to gain the 
friendship of Persia, so that by this means French in- 
trizue migllt be baffled in Central Asia. I11 that case, 
also, Zaman Shah would have in Persia a Britisli ally 
bcliind him, ready to avail lierself of his absence 
011 the Indian frontier to invade and reclaim some 
of the provilices of Afglianistan that had once 
belonged to her. T o  bring about so favourable 
a condition of afEairs, Lord Wellesley, therefore, s c ~ i t  
Captain Malcol~n as Envoy of the Britisli. Indian 
Government to Persia. 
I t  is not possible in these pages to trace tlie 
history of the negotiations that followed, in ~vliicl~ 
the rare spectacle was seen of an English Arnbas- 
sador Trom the Court of S t ,  James, acting in almost 
open liostility. to the British Indian Government. 
Tlic cncl to be sought was to keep Persia friendly 
to ourselves, atid prevent Frencli inflile~ice gaining 
any ground. 
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T o  understand the  politics of that day allother 
power has  to be talcen into account, and that Pomer 
is  Russia .  That formidable northern State had been 
extending its conquests eastwards for years, before 
the S h a h  of Persia, i n  1805, addressed a letter to 
Napoleon, whose fortunes were then at their highest 
point, requesting a id  from the Western " Rustam " 
to s t e m  the tide of Russian aggressiotl. " Before," 
says S i r  John Icaye, "the English trader had begun 
t o  organise armies in I-Iindostan, and to swallow up 
ancient principalities, the grand idea of fou~~di~ lg  an (. 
Eas te rn  Empire had been grasped by t h s  capacious 
mind of Peter the Great." The policy he ina~~gu-  
rated was zealously followed by his successors for 
Inore than a c e n t u ~ y .  Espccially had Russian 
ambition becn directed to acquiring the country 
between the Blaclc Sea and the Caspian. A small 
pa r t  o f  it, hcld b y  a race of sturdy, brave moun- 
taineers, still declines to bow to the rule of tlie Czar, 
and, from time to time, when efforts to subjugate 
thcm are  made, t h e  natural difficulties of the country 
to t h e  invaders aids the people in disposing of their 
assailants. But Georgia had been conquered from 
the Persialls bcfore the beginning of the century, 
after a succession of wars notorious for'their cruel 
and barbarous incidents. Thus Russia and Persia 
had, in 1800, become conterminous, and perpetual 
struggles between the great Russian frontier officers 
and the Persians marked the early years of t he  
century. Treachery nncl crilclty mark thc annals of 
this. period. The Russian general had received 
mders to extelicl thc Russian rronticr to the river 
Aras, ancl nothing short of that bounclary would 
satisfy him. I t  was wher~ irratters sccrned a t  
their blackest that tlie Persian Court applied t o  
Napoleon. 
The French emissaries, who sooti after found 
their way to Tehcran, not: only pers~~adcd  t h e  
Persians that England was an effete nation, doo~ned 
to call before Napoleon, and, therefore, not of value 
as a friend, but iiegotiations .were on foot for a 
France-Persian treaty for tlie joint invasion of India 
by a Frencli ancl Persian army. 
I t  is believed that a treaty to this cffect was 
actually sent home for the approval of Napoleon. 
But any hopes. Persia may have cntertai~iecl of 
French aid against Russia in ret~lrli 101. her services 
against the English in India were cloorncd to dis- 
appointment by the peaceful meeting of the Em- 
peror Alexander and Napoleon Uuonaparte ~ ~ p o ~ i  
tlie river Breitlen, near Tilsit, in hly, 1807. when a 
bloocly campaign was enclecl by a scene, in which 
tile two Emperors "einb~~accdlilrc Lrothcrs." Among 
thc joint scl~cmes or conqucst tlic two E~nperors  
cliscuss'ed, one was an invasio~i of India by n con- 
federate army uniting on thc plail~s of Persia. 
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Lucien Buonaparte, the brother of Napoleon, was 
scnt to Teheran on a missio~l to prepare the way for 
a hostile demonstration against firitis11 India ill thc 
spring. 
The  " non-intervention " policy of the English 
Government was now regarded as out of placc. 
Lord Minto was Governor-General, and felt that 
action was callcd for. Sir John I h y e  ~nakcs a 
remark conccrning this c~isis, which we cannot 
refrain from quoting, as its application at tlle present 
juncture of Indian affairs to tlic supposed rival 
policies of Lord Lytton and Lord Lawrence, the 
former an cx-diplomatist, and thc Iattel. one who 
rose from the rauks of the East India Company's 
service, cannot but bc acl~nowledged. 
H e  says :-" I t  is observable thatstatesmen trained 
in the Cabincts and Courts of Europe have evcr 
been lnorc sensitivcly alivc to thc dangers of inva- 
sion from the North than thosc wl~ose experience 
has been gati~erccl in the fields of Indian diplomacy. 
Lord Wellcsley and Lord Minto werc ever tremu- 
lous with intense apprehension of dangcr from 
without, whilst Sir John Shore and Sir George 
Barlow posscsscd tl~cmselves in comparative confi- 
dence and tranquillity, and if they werc not wholly 
blind to t l ~ c  peril, at ;\I1 events did not exaggerate it. 
Thcrc is a sensc of security cngerldered by long 
Jlabit alld familiarity wit11 apparent danger, which 
renders a man mistrustrill of t l ~ e  reality of tliat 
wl~ich has so often been shown to be a countcrfcit. 
The ioexperienee of English statesmen sudclcnly 
transplanted to a ncw spllere of action oftcn sccs i n  
the most ordinary politicaI pl le~~omena strangc a ~ ~ d  
alarming portents." 
Wc, of course, call afford to s~nilc now at the rcars 
excited by French aggrcssioii ; but loolii~ig at what 
Napolcon and his marslials had done, and rcmcmbcr- 
ing the apparent ease of Alexander's conquests in 
Asia, tlie prcscncc 01 a grancl Frcnch army 011 tllc 
Gaiiges did not scem an altogcther impossible or 
improbable prospect. 
T h e  alliance between Russia and France, instead, 
howevcl; 01 increasing tlic danger to British rule in 
the East, added to its security, by thromiog Pcrsin, 
whose whole hatred was directed agai~ist Russia lor 
lier encroacllil~g policy on the Caspian, into the arais 
of England. England's riglit policy a t  that time 
seems clearer to us now than it dicl to thc I-Io~nc or 
British India11 Gover~unent. Our formcr policy hnd 
been to liold Pcrsia as a buffer against our Europcnn 
enemics, the French, on tlie west, and to have licr as 
a usclul ally against Afgllaoistan on ha. eastern 
fionticr. During the sevcn or eight years, howcva, 
sirlce tile last threat of Afghan invasion iiacl been 
maclc, thc Afghan Power liad ccased t o l e  formidallc, 
owing to intestine quarrels. A t  tlic samc time a new 
- 
Power-that of the.Si1chs-was rising on our northern 
borders out of a dismc~nbered province (the Panjab) 
of the once formidable Duraui Empire. The Sikhs 
hated-and still hate-the Muhammadans, and hence 
the desirability of enlisting them on our side against 
the Frcnch and Persia11 confederacy, which was still 
believed to exist. 
W e  have alluded already to the rival missions of 
Captain Malcolm and Sir Harford Jones, the one 
despatched by the British Indian, and the othcr by 
the English Government to the Court of Persia. 
The incidents of these missio~~s are of interest at the 
present time, as they throw much light on the atti- 
tude which would be naturally talcen by Persia at any 
time if England found herself-which God forbid !- 
at war with Russia. Captain Malcolm advanced 
very specious arguments for the occr~pation by Eng- 
land of the island of I<aralc, in the Persian Gulf. He 
urged that with an established footing there, which 
would soon become an emporium of our trade, we 
should be able to exclude other European Powers, 
and carry on whatever military operations we deemed 
consistent with and necessary to our llonour and 
security. But British India then belonged to a 
trading company, and did not aclcnowledge an 
Empress as its ruler. Whether British l~onour and 
security have suffered by the neglect of Malcolm's 
advice will, of course, be a~lswered differently by 
I 
A fghanistan. 
people holding different views on E~igland's foreign 
In pursuance of tlie new policy, which consisted in 
an endeavour to unite the States of Afghanistan and 
t11e Palljab against thc supposed Franco-Persian 
al l ianccfor  it had not yet been seen that that 
alliance must fall to the ground on the reconciliation 
of Russia, Persia's enemy, to France-tnissions were 
sent to Cabul and Lahom,in September and October, 
1808. I t  is thus just seventy years since Mr. Elphin- 
stone set out ill obedience to tlie then Governor- 
General, Lord Minto, to do at  Cabul very much 
what Sir Neville Cl~amberlain would have tried to do 
for Lord Lytton, only ill the former case the danger 
anticipated was from France, not Russia. 
The necessity of including tlie Sikh ruler ill the 
alliance that was desired no longer complicates ihe 
Indian Viceroy's policy. There is no " Lion of the 
Panjab" to be conrted atid conciliated now. British 
legions liave swept away his magnificc~it Ichalsa 
army, tlie modcrn representatives of liis soldiers 
forming the finest of the Imperial troops ; while his ! 
exiled descendant lives as at1 English nobleman on 
an estate in Norfolk, and is proud of being a frieticl 
of the Heir to the British Throne. Ranjit Sinli's 
provinces have long been admitiisterecl by English 
commissioners and English magistrates, and could 
lie revisit his capital, he would find an English r 
1 of pulting it, snvouring of lhc silnilcs wvc linvc latcly 
Y seco drawn of a thief holding a Ioadcd pistol to a 
-1 
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~ientetiant-Governor and a Cl~icf-Court in pas- 
session. 
I t  is a s  well to rcflect now and then on tlie advance 
of England, as wcll as on that of Russia,, if only to 
enable ourselves to sce that an advancin:: Empire 
m a y  not  ncccssarily bc wilfitlly aggrcsslve, but may 
be forcccl by irresistible influences to  extc~id its 
boundnrics, and absorb scmi-civiliscd and barbaroils 
States on its borders, without this being any valid 
ground for apprehension on the part of a grcat 
European Powcr that [nay bc cloi~lg thc very same 
thing, undcr cxactly tlic same impulses, clsewherc. 
CVIicn i t  comes, of coursc, to  such a pass that both 
thc  Powcrs arc standing with open jaws ready to 
swallow tlic last remaining indcpendent State that 
lies betwecu thcir immcnse territories, wc get a con- 
dition o l  thitigs for which it is dificult to find a 
precccle~lt. I n  tlic abscnce of a "leacIi!?g casc," the 
partics that  now divide ~ t , g l i s h  opinion on the 
' l  Afglian Qucstion " would s c a n  to thin%-the one 
that  England should liastcn to forestall her ncigh- 
bour, a n d  sccurc thc by no rncans tcmpting morscl, 
and thc  othcr that thcrc is tio nccd for either Power 
to  dcvour it, but that cach can quitc comfortably d o  
i with wha t  it has already swallowed nrld is scarcely able to cligcst. This may bc a rather vulgar way 
ho~~seholderls head, and of the housel~older snatch. 
ing up a baby to place i t  between himself and the 
thief; to which a reply was made, we believe, 
how would the matter of right stand if the 
thief held up a "loaded baby "-whether then the 
householder might strike it down without too dcli- 
cate an inqt~iry into questions of intenlationnl law. 
Much advantage can rarely, however, be gained 
by far-fetched metaphorical arguments. 
The Sikhs were still a Power in 1808-a young 
alld rising Power-and Lord Minto had much 
dificulty to decide whcthcr the best policy requircd 
him to curb the Sikhs, or to foster them as  useful 
allies against the French. A midcllc course was 
pursued, and Mr. (afterwards Sir Charles) Metcalfe 
gained his spurs in diplomacy in carrying out this 
temporising policy. I t  was difficult, however, to 
enlist the sympathy of Ranjit Sin11 for the danger 
to the British Empire in India from French aggres- 
sion, and at the same time deny him the right he 
claimed of extending his nlle over neighbouring 
States not in alliance with ourselves. 
Shah Suja was now Icing of Afghanistan, having 
succeeded his brother, Zaman Shah, who had been 
dethroned and rendered blind by the Barakzai leader, 
Fateli Ichan, in revenge for the death of the latterIs 
father, which had been decreed by the Icing on the 
discovery of a treasonable plot against himself and his 
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Minister, in which Poinda IChao, the father or Fate11 
IChan a n d  chief of the Barakzais, was impliceted. 
T h e  rise of these Baralczais to power comtnenced 
with th i s  ill-judged severity on the part of Zatnan 
IChan, whose family belonged to a~iother branch-the 
Sadduzai-or the great Durani clan, of which both 
were branches. 
T h e  twenty-one sons of Poit~da IChan seemed for 
a t ime t o  live only to  avenge their father's death- 
revenge being an Afghan's first duty. T h a t  they 
rose-some a t  least among them, notably Dost 
Mullammad, the future Amir-was but an incidental 1 i 
consequence of tlie pursuit of their main object. For 
a full description of the varying fortunes of the 
Bar,llrzai brothers we have not space a t  our command. 
S h a h  S u j a  for a time made head against them, but 
in June ,  1809, was disastrously defeated, and bad to 
withdraw beyond the frontier, barely, indeed, escaping 
with h i s  life. T h e  wanderings of Shah Suja and his 
inany misfortunes; his futile attempts to regain 
his throne ; his imprisonment in Cashmere by 
i ts  governor, and afterwards in Lahore by Ranjit 
Sinh, t o  whom he lost the ICoh-i-nor by a stratagem, 
the s t o r y  of which has been often told,'-these are 
* The  trick was this: The Shah, for safety, carried the jewel 
in h i s  turban, and Ranjit Sil~h, having suggested an exchange 
of turbans, the unfort~lnate prince was obliged, by the larv of 
courtesy, to comply. 
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recounted in Shah Suja's own autobiography, and 
will be found in some detail in Sir John Icaye's ~vorli. 
I-Ie found a-resting-place and a pension in Ludhiana, 
ill British territory, in 1816, and .from that time until 
1838, never ceased to entertain hopes of regaining his 
ancestral throne. These hopes were clestiilecl to be ful- 
filled, but with fatal result to himself and his patrons. 
Before coming to the causes' of the First Afghan 
War, which had for its direct object the restoration of 
Shah Suja to his throne, it is necessary to review the 
course of affairs in Afghanistan itself, and also the  
condition of things as they affected British Inclian 
foreign policy. 
Dost Muhammad, the most capable of the Barakzai 
brothers, had established himself firmly at Cabul, but 
Prince Icamran, of the old Saddozai family-the 
legitimate line-reigned supreme a t  Herat. SulLat~ 
Muhammad, a brother of Dost Muhammad, held 
Peshawar, and other brothers held Candahar. 
Thus mutilated, the Durani Empire secmcd t o  
have lost all its former menacing attitude towards 
India. On the contrary, however, in 1831, Peshawar 
fell to  the Silch ruler, Ranjit Sinh, alld remained in 
his power until it passed with the rest of his 
dominions into British occupation. 
The anxiety of Dost Muhammad to regain this 
province of Peshawar from the Sikhs bccame the 
great ailn of his life, and he looked ~ount l  to sec on 
f i o ~ r r  Zn?~znlr Shah to Dost Mlrharatnd 1 3 ~  
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what  allies 11e could trust for assistance: I l e  roulld 
the  Persians and English most suitable for this 
pose, and, i t  is said, was willing, in 1837, to ally 
himself with either if lie could be assured of aid 
against the Sihks. 
I n  the autumn of 1837, however, rumot~rs of t,vo 
great events were heard, which vaslly affected the 
rt~ture of Dost Muhammad and of others besideshim. 
These were-a British envoy, Captain Bumes, catne 
to  Cabul as "commercial " resident, and Muliammacl 
Shah, the Persian I<itlg, was laying siege to  Herat. 
Persia had been strrlgglilig against Russian aggres- 
sion during the years intervening behveco 1810 and 1 
1837 A period or outward observance of peace is 
i~icluded in this length of time, viz., rrorn 1813 to  
1826, but i t  was a hollow one, so011 to be brolccn, A 
massacre or  thc isolated Russian garrisons and out- 
posts in Gokchar bronght d o ~ ~  an avenging army, 
and so low was Persia reduced that, in 1828, she was 
compelled to  cede Erivan and Nakhichevan, and 
consetit to t11e Rt~ssiatis drawing their frontier-line 
considerably eastward. An inclcmnity to  Russia of 
eighty millions or roubles was also stipulated for. 
Thus vas  Persia "delivered, bound hand and  foot, to 
t l ~ e  Court of St. Petersburg!' 
The  Englidl policy pursued a t  this time has b,een 
severely criticised, as  we appear to have porchased a 
release rrorn engagements which bound 11s to assist 
9-2 
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the Persia~is against Russia. The result was the 
immense adva~ice of Russian influence at the Court 
of Persia, the heir-apparent having, it is said, married 
a Russian princess, and adopted the Christian faith. 
Then began tliepolicy of tnaking Persia play Russia's 
game. I t  became the object of Russia to  use the 
resources of Persia in furtlierance of her own ends, 
without overt action on her part, thereby avoiding a 
collisioti with othcr European Powers, whose jealousy 
it  was her aim not to  arouse. The first outcotne of 
this new Russian move was a11 encroachment by 
Persia on Ichorasan. I t  became the conimoli talk of 
the bazaars of Khorasan, Afghanistan, and even of 
Bombay, that an allied Russian ancl Persian army 
would tnarcli upon I-Icrat, Cabul, ancl India. 
I n  1836, the Herat campaign commenced, and thc 
story of the ~nemorable siege of that city deserves to  
be read by all who would knonc what is tlie value of 
one brave English~nan in a cause upon which 11c had 
sct his lieart. 
I t  may be safely alfir~ned that I-Ierat would have 
1 fallen to the Persian Icing if it had not beeti for the 
courage and firmness of Eldred Pottingel; a young 
English officer, who foulid his way to I-Iernt just as  
the Persians began their attack. : 
On tlie 23rd November, 1837, the siegc of I-Ierat 
actually began, and continued until the 9th of Scp- 
tcmber of thc following year. 
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1-~era t  is described a s  surrounded by a fair expansc 
of country, filled with cornfields, vineyards, and 
; little fortified villagcs studded thc plain, 
and t h e  bright waters of small running streams 
liglltened the pleasant landscape. The beauty of 
Hera t  was, howevel-, without the ~snlls ; within, a11 
was dir t  and desolation. Strongly fortified on cvery 
side b y  a wet  ditch, and  a solid outer wall, with five 
gates, each defended' by a small outwork, the city 
presented but  few claims t o  the admiration of the 
traveller. H e r a t  was divided into four quarters, con- 
sisting of  four l o n g  bazaars. roofed with arched brick- I - - 
worlc, meeting i n  a small domed q~~adratlgle in the 
centre of t h e  ci ty.  T h e  total population is estimated 
as having  been about  45,ooo. Mosq~~es and caravan- 
serais, public ba ths  and public reservoirs, varied the 
wretched uniformity of  the narrow, dirty streets, and 
these were roofed across so as to be Iittle better than 
dark tunnels, where every conceivable description 
of d i r t  collected and putcified. When wonder was 
expressed b y  Ar thu r  Conolly that people could live 
in such  filth, t h e  reply was, "The  climate is fine, and 
if d i r t  killed peopie, where would the Afghans be?" 
T h e  picture drawn by Icaye of the political and 
moral condition of the people of Herat, forms a 
fitting counterpart  t o  the description of the outward 
imperfections of the city. Every kind of cruelty and 
to have been conckntrated here ; and if ever a clean 
sweep of a city and its inhabitants seemed liliely to  
be a matter of small loss to the rest of the liumati 
race, it might have appeared so in the case of Herat. 
But high moral character and honesty are not  
necessary concomitants of valour and martial prowess, 
although even these qualities are not the worse for 
being conjoined ~vitli the former. One man, at least, 
in Ilerat, possessed all these qualifications, and he  
saved Ilerat. I t  mould be unfair, however, to leave 
it to be supposed that the besieging army of the 
-Persians was much, if a t  all, supcrior to the Heratis 
in those moral qualities in which the latter were s o  
wanting. But the Persian Icing's troops were in- 
fi~iitely better soldiers, and quite as brave men as the 
Afghans. Their non-success lvas the fault of their 
leaders, while opposed to them was an English officer, 
who showed himself worthy to rank with some of the 
best generals of his country, but who had devotcd 
himself to the cause of the besieged simply as a 
valunteer. 
Russian officers aided the Persians a t  I-Ieral, and 
Russian diplomatists urged them to the expedition. 
I t  was a natural co~iclusion that, so encouraging and 
so aiding Persia, Russia had ulterior designs not 
wholly c~ncon~iected with thoughts of the British 
Empire in India. I t  is certain that such was the 
feeling of the Englisli Ministry. But w11ei1 an ex- 
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planation was desired by Lord Durham from tlie 
Russian Minister of co~~duc t  so contrary to the 
declarations of tlie Czar's Government, the reply was 
t h a t  if Count Simonich, the Russian Minister at the 
Court of Persia, had encouraged the Persian Icing 
t o  proceed against I-Ierat, he liad acted in direct 
violation of his instructions. This, however, was but 
a n  early example of that persistent course of en- 
croachment io Central Asia which Russian generals 
and  diplomatists have carried out in direct contm- 
vention of the instructions they are said t o  have 
received from St. Petersburg. I 
While the siege of Ilerat was in progress, Captain 
Burnes liad been prosecuting his "commercial " 
mission a t  Cabul at the Court of Dost Muhammad, 
t he  A ~ n i r  or  ruler of that part of Afghanistan. The 
Amir was believed, however, to be intriguing with 
tlie Persians for their assistance in a projected war 
against the Silchs to recover Peshawar. To the 
English in India tlie security of the Anglo-Indian 
Empire seemed in 1837-38, to be threatened both 
from within and without. From Nepal to Burma 
t h e  Nat ive  States were evincing signs of feverish 
interest in the advance of what they supposed was 
a Muhammadan invasion from beyond the Afghan 
frontier. Public seaurities declined in value, and the 
rulnour spread from mouth to mouth .that the Com- 
. . pany's reign was nearly at an end. 
T o  tlie high officers of the British Indian Govern- 
ment matters appeared somewl~at differently, but 
were sufficie~itly black. Herat was being besieged 
by tlie Pcrsian Icing-of-I<ings, Russian officers were 
directing tlie siege, the Barakzai Sirdars, including 
Dost Muhammad, were intriguing with Persia. I t  
seemed probable, therefore, that having taken Herat,  
tlie Persian Icing would either push on his conquests 
to Cabul and Candahnl; or render Dost Muhammad 
the vassal of Persia by aiding liirn against the Sikhs, 
and thereby make Afghanistan the basis of f i~ture 
I operations to be undertaken not only by the Persians . .
the~nselves, but by them jointly with the Russians, 
who were now their allies. 
I t  mas then tlie true policy of the Eritisli Govern- 
ment to keep Afghanistan independent, and to 
cement a friendly alliance with its rolcr or ru1cl.s. 
This, broadly, was the aim of Lord Auckland in all 
tlie diplomacy that followed. 
We have now arrived a t  the threshold of the First 
Afghan War, which arose directly out of this policy, 
the ostensible object of which was, it must be irrnem- 
bered, to make Afghanistan independent, if possible, 
or as much as possible, but a t  any rate friendly to 
British interests-to prevent its falling illto the hands 
of the Persians, and through them into that of 
the Russians; to be used as a weapon a g a i ~ ~ s t  the 
British Empire in India. 
CIIAPTER VII. 
THE FIaST AFGHAN WAR. 
~~~d Auckl~nd ' s  Policy h ,837-Case for Doil Muhanmad Shled by Sir 
jolln l ~ a y c A C l l a n  ldcssat I-leredilnry Claims to Savcrcignty-'l'ile 
~ ~ . ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ i i r e  Trcaly-'The Army of tlnc Indus-Pnrrsge Tilrough Siurlh 
~ ~ l ~ y e d - A p p o i n u n c l ~ l  or hlncnsgl~teu nr Folillcal O l c c r  witlt <he 
pxpeditian-English Gold Scntlcrcd Wecly-Shah Su ja ' r  Reccplion 
at cnadallar-Arrault and Cnplut-e of Ghnroi-klarraereof tlie Ghnris 
- ~ l i g I ~ l  a t  Do% Muhnumad beyond the Hindu Kurh-Liailureal 
pul.suir cllrougll Trenchcry of Hgi Khnn-lnlrhsic WeaGncrs of 
s h a h  Suja's Course Demonrlrnled-Cost of Living for Bnglirll Ofiterr 
nl cnbol-I:nycbJudg~nenl ol llie Dritirlr "Sylon " intradnced into 
~f~ lmnis tan-Hooour r  to  rile Vietors-Dcaigm of Purllter Inler- 
hrellco WestwmJs-'Pha Story ol Colonel Sloddart and Artlmr 
~ ~ , ~ ~ l l ~ ' s  "hlirsi0ns"-Tilcir Cruel Fale-Lord Bllenborough's 
~ ~ t t c r  ta tbc Amir of Eoki~ncl--Brief Review of "The Arghar 
T r a ~ ~ d y  " of 1838.4~-Story of Dr. Brydon's Er&%pe. 
IT is easy to be wise after tlie event. I t  is clear to 
every one now that  Lord Auclrland's mode or carry- 
ing out  the  policy of malring Afgl~anistan a fi-ee a n d  
independent State, to act as a buKer against Persia 
and  Russia, was not  the wisest plan to elfect that 
object, and did indeed result in malring that State 
bitterly hostile and independellt, not througl~ our 
aid, but, it may b e  said, in spite of it. I n  1837, 
however, matters were not so plain to the eyes of 
statesmen, whose days and nights were made 
anxious by the rumours of great preparations across 
the frontier, while the internal sources of disquiet 
were not few. 
I t  was believed, whether rightly or wrongly may 
now be questioned, that Dost Muhammad was not 
likely to be a sincere friend to the English, however 
ostensibly sb he might appear. In  the words of the 
Simla manifesto, he and his brothers were " ill-fitted, 
under any circumstances; to be useful allies to the 
British." Sir John ICaye has ably stated the case for 
Dost Muhammad. I le  l ~ a s  shown that that prince 
really wished for the English alliance, and only 
waited for some consideration to be shown to his 
wishes with regard to Peshawar ; the restoration of 
which province he claimed from the Silchs, and hoped 
to regain by our intercession. It1 that case h e  would 
have abandoned Russia and Persia at oncc. I t  did 
not suit Lord Auckland's policy to alienate thc Silchs 
by pressing Dost Muhammad's claims, cven if he had 
believed in Dost Muhammad's sincerity. I t  must be 
remembered, too, that Dost Muhammad was in pos- 
session only of Cabul and Ghazni, Candahar and 
Herat being in possession, the former of his brother, 
. and the latter of a Saddozai prince. T o  have a ' 
series of disjointed kingdoms or.chicftainships in 
Afghanistan, involving a separate. consideration of 
the interests of each, and all the trouble of conciliating 
rival princes, scemed naturally enough less favourable 
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to tlie policy Lord Auckland had adopted than 
the consolidation of the whole under one ICing. 
Some idea of Dost Muhammad's positio~l being that 
of a ilstlrper doubtless contributed to tlle determina- 
tion to inaugurate a policy which mas as startling as 
it  mas novel. This mas no other than to put forward 
the exile, Shah Suja, the former legitimate Icing of 
tlic Afghans, who had been driven out, as b~ fo re  
explained, b y  Dost Muhammad and his brothers, 
in pursuance of a family feud that arosc from tlie 
deaths of Poinda IClia~i and Fateh IChan, at tlie 
hands of Zaman Shah and Prince ICamran respec- 
tivcly. To  restore Shah Suja, the rightful sovereign, 
to the throne of his ancestors, did riot seem so 
h 
wro~igful a proceeding then as it does to  uq now. 
I t  mas believed that the Afglians would ~velcome 
their Icing if once the strength of the Barnlczai family 
were brolzen. The Duranis had been terribly op- 
pressed by Dost Muhammad, and it was supposed 
they would floclc to Shah Suja's standard. But i t  
has been since learnt how little the Afglians regard 
legitimacy and the hereditary rights of roynl houses. 
Their notions of sovereignty have little in common 
with refined Western ideas or it. The strongest is tlic 
one whom they willingly aclcnowledge as ICing, A 
fatal objeetion, too, to the restored monarch was tlic 
fact that he had come baclc to them as a puppet in the 
hands of thc infidels, and that his power rested on , 
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no lnore national basis than British bayonets and 
British gold. I t  would be tedious and of little use to 
enter at length into all the workings of that policy 
which we have briefly sl<etched above. A tripartite 
treaty was signed between the British Inclian Govern- 
ment, Ranjit Sinh, the Sikh ruler of the Panjab, and 
Shah Sr~ja. The Sikhs were to co-operate in the 
restoratioo of Shah Suja to the throne of Cabul, and 
theI<iog8s eldest son was to march with a Sikh army 
from Peshawar througl~ the Icliaibar Pass, while Shah 
Suja himself, with some levies of liis owti, but accom- 
panied by an English army of mixed European and 
Sepoy soldiers, on which the brunt of the campaign 
would fall, marched through the Bolan Pass, to 
Qucttah, and thcnce to Candahar. Sir John Iceane 
(afterwards Lord Iceane of Ghazni) led the Bombay 
column, and Sir Willoughby Cotton commanded 
the Southern Army, called the Army of the 
Indus, which set out from Firozpur, on the Indus, on 
the 10th Decembcr, 1837. This army consisted of 
about 9,500 men, and 38,ooo camp-followers. Thirty- 
thousand baggage camels, well-laden, accompanied 
them. On the 14th January the army entered 
Sindh. I t  was the 16th of Marc11 before it reached 
Dadar, at the mouth of the Bolan Pass. I t  had been 
delayed by difficulties in Sindh, which was not the11 
British territory. The  A~nirs  of that country required 
a good deal of over-aweing belore they would grant a 
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passage t o  0111' troops. The privations undergone by 
the army in its march across the desert were extremc. 
The distance from Shikarpl~r to Dadar is 146 miles. 
I t  was accomplished by the Bellgal column in sixteen 
painful marches. Water and foragc were so scarce 
that the cattle suffered terribly on the way. The 
camels fell dead by scorcs on the desert, and further 
on the Baluchi robbers carried them off with ap- 
palling dexterity. When they reached cultivated 
land the green crops were used as forage for the 
Sir Tohu Iceane with the Bombay Armv had 1 
landed a t  Vilckur at the end of Novembel; but was 
compelled, from the hostility of the Sindh rulers, to 
remain inactive till December 24th. On the 4th of 
April h e  reached Quettah, to take coln~na~icl of the 
expedition now increased by the Bombay column, 
which had made a long and difficult march tl~rougll 
Sindh. As the expedition had for its object thc 
restoration of a Icing and the pacificntio~~ of his 
4r 
coantry, i t  was deemed desirable to send with it a 
civil officer, as representative of the Governor- 
General of India. The choice of Lord Auckland fell 
upon Mr.  W. 13. (afterwards Sir William) Mac- 
naghten, then Foreign Secretary with the Govern- 
I lnent of ~ n d i a ,  a Inan of great abilities, ao eminent I Oriental scholar, and withal fully imbued ~vith the 
i spirit of Lord Aucklantl with regard to the a f i i r  in 
1 
1 
I~and ; unless, as some tl~it~l;, it lvci-c niorc correct to 
say that he 11ad infi~sed his spirit and sentiments 
into Lorcl AucLla~~d.  
D c s ~ ~ i t c  tlic dihiculties in tlic way of supplies, aiid 
tllc loss of beasts of burden, the army rcachcd 
Cnndaliar without serious opposition, altlioi~gli a 
sniall but resolutc band of tlic enemy might liavc 
barrccl tlicir way a t  tlic Bo1a11 l'ass, and pcrhaps 
cffcctually rcpcllcd the l~ivadirig forccs with disaster. 
Thcrc is no do i~b t  that E~~gl i s l i  money was largely 
\ ~ ~ s c d  to buv off tlic arllicrcnts of tlic 13arakzais. Tlie 
Afglians dincovcrcd that the gold of the I'criiigliccs 
was as scrviccablc as otlicr gold, and Afghan ;llle- 
gla~icc was p ~ ~ r c l ~ a s c d  to a large cxtcnt. Tliesystc~n 
of conuptio~i tlius co~n~ncnccd could not but involvc 
tlic invaders ill dificulty afterwards, wlicn the 
trcasurc-clicst hecntnc cxliaiistcd. 
Sliali Suja's cntralicc illto Candaliar was morc 
rcinnrkablc for thc curiosity than lor tlic cntbasiasm 
clisplayccl. Maciiaglitcn ii~tcrprctcd tlic dcmonstra- 
tiori ill tlie most favourable light, and saw an 
unclouded prospect of succcss in  the futore. And 
so for a time it secrncd. Gl~azni was takc~i by assault, 
lvitli at1 ease that sccmed rnarvcllous to t l ~ c  Afglia~is, 
seeing that Sir Jo111i ICcane liad no  lieavy guns witli 
11im. Trcaclier): liowever, 011 the part of tlic enemy 
aided as much as British bayoricts. 011e of tlie 
Barakzai nobles-tlie ~iepliew of Dost Muliatnmad- 
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turned traitor, a n d  gave information which enabled 
Sir  Johil Keane's  engineers to blow up part of the 
walls of Ghazni  by gunpowder, and so effect an 
entrance, and tile captu1.e of the city. Shah Suja. I ! 
showed his capaci ty  for co~lciliating his subjects by. 
ordering the s laughter  in cold blood of fifty Gliazis, 
who were talcen pl.isoners. These fanatics court 
:I  
i j  
death in battle, but the inassacre of them in cold 1 ;  blood was in t h e  highest degree impolitic, to say ti 
nothing of t h e  i n h u ~ n a n i t ~  of the deed. "That 11 
i '  
martyrdom," s a y s  Icaye, "was never forgottell. The , !  
day of reckoning c a m e  a t  last ;  and when oor unholy 
policy sanlc bur ied in  blood and ashes, thc shrill cry 
of the Ghazis sounded  as its funeral wail." He refers, 
of course, to t h a t  terrible death-struggle some two 
i~.~ : 
years later, o f  the  retreating army in the passes of 1, 
the IChurd-Cabul, xvl~en the Ghazis rushed in, hungry 
for the  blood of the infidels, and completcd the 
slaughter of thesurvivors .  
I A t  Ghazni Brigadier Sale, who alterwards became 
famous a t  Ja la labad,  commanded the main column, 
and greatly distinguished himself. .Although the 
capture of t h i s  c i ty  was not marked by the worst 
feature ofwar-for the wornell were not ill-trcated- 
the carnage was  terrible. Upwards of $00 of the 
garrison were buried b y  the, besiegers, besides those 
who fell b e y o n d  t h e  walls ; tbe victors losing only 
seventeen kil led a n d  165 wounded; 1,600 prisoners 
-- 
-- 
wcrc talicn, a ~ ~ r l  immensc stores of graiil, many 
Iiorscs, and numerous arms. 
After a futilc attempt a t  negotiation, Dost Mullam- 
mad, scei~lg that resistance was hopeless-for his 
own followers se re  deserting him, or wcre lute- j 
warin in their support-mounted liis horse at 
Urghandi, a few miles to the west of Cabul, wl~it l~er  
11c 11ad gonc out to dispute the progress of tlic 
ii~vadcrs, and, with a few followers, turned his face 
to!vards the regions of the I-Iindu ICush. 
1 On the and of Aueust Dost Mul~a~ninad fled, and I - J on the following day thc British army, which mas 
marclling upon Cab111, heard the news, and a party 
of horse~iicn set out in pursoit. Haji ICl~an ICalcar, 
a man of ineail origi!i, who 11ad risen to he an 
Afgl~ail chief, olfcrccl to lead the pursuit. I-Ie was 
all the tvl~ilc, l ,o~vc~~er, ill treasonable com.espondence 
with Dost Muliammacl, and did all lie could to mis- 
direct the English oficers. The  pursuit failed, the 
Amir cscapcd beyond tlic mouotains, and Haji ICIian 
sul~cicl.ccI for. 11is trcacl~ery by banislimmt as a State 
prisoner to Chunal: 
On thc 7th of August Shah Snja and a British 
artny entercd Cabul, the for~ner, after an absence of 
thirty years, the latter for the first time. H e  had 
bcen restored to liis throne by the money-bags and 
t l ~ e  bayonets of thc British; but it was a hopeless 
task t o  attempt to keep him on it. He had fallen 
- -- 
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once miserably, and not even English soldiers and 
Indian rupees coulcl set him up permanently again. 
H e  might have succeeded without the assistance of 
the hated infidels, but the lcnowleclge that they, atid 
they only, supported him on his tottering throne 
alienated even those who would naturally favour the 
lincal descendant of the famous Ahmad Shah. 
I t  was no  part of the original programme that an 
English army sl~ould remain in occupation of the 
Afglian capital and country ; but it soon became 
manifest that  the puppet we had set up would not 
be able to retain his throne without extraneous aid. 
So  Macnaghten remained as British Envoy, and the 
Bellgal c o l u m ~ ~  remained as wcll. 
O n  the 18th of September the Bombay troops 
commenced their return march to India through the 
ICojak a n d  the Bolan Passes. Those who stayed 
b e l ~ i ~ l d  were disappointed, for, says ICaye, "a country, 
in which wine was selling at the price ol 300 rupees 
(L30) a dozen, and cigars at a rupee (2s.) a-piece, 
was not one in which the officers o l  the army were 
likely t o  desire to pitch their tents for a sojourn of 
any long continuance." A small detachment, how- 
cvel; of the Bengal troops afterwards returned to 
India, under Sir John ICeaue, leaving the rest under 
Sir Willoughby Cotton in occupation of Afghanistan. 
Thcn began the system of planting small detach- 
mcnts of British troops in isolatecl positions through- 
I0 
out t l ~ c  oontry ; which was, in the opinion of some, 
one of the grcat errors that marlied our sojourn in 
Thc unpopularity of Shah Siija grew daily more 
manifest, but thc pcoplc sccmccl to have settled down 
into son~cthing lilzc quiescence under the reign of 
Engiisl~ gold, for cupidity is of their strongest 
passions. They hatccl thc Fcritighces, but did not rc- 
fuse thcir gold. The old csperic~~cc, which we had 
scen so often in our relations with thc States of 
- - I India, bcgan to be fclt, British bayoncts .were 
cmploycd to executc thc ordcrs of the Shah and his 
oficcrs. Boulid by trcxty not to il~tcrfere wit11 the 
intcrtlnl affairs of thc country, they hacl to permit, 
and cvctl aid ~ I I  enforcing, 1nucl1 that mas unjust. 
Says Sir John Icaye, " I t  would have bec11 a miracle 
if sucl~ a systcln had not soon broken dow11 with a 
clcsolaling crash, and buried its xutliors i ~ i t l ~ e  ruins." 
Thc  lnorc we surrounded Shall Suja ~\ritll our autho- 
rity the less firmly was he seated on the throne. 
I\lcanwhile, the successes of the recent campaig~i 
brought Ilotlours to the cllicf actors. Lord Auckland 
was creatccl an cad;  Sir John Iceane became Baron 
Iceanc of Ghazni; Mr. Macnaghten was made a 
baronct ; Colonel Wade (who had led the force 
tl~rough tile Ichaibar) a knight ; and brevets and 
Bath l~otlours werc numerous. 
The extent to which our success in Afghanistan 
Tlre First Afglmjr War. 
had e r~couraged  designs of further interfcrcncc 
the p o w e r s  to tile west of Cabul can bc understood 
only by a reference to the correspondence of Sir W, 
~ a c l l a g i l t e n ,  and other higll Anglo-Indian officers, 
during the bricf occupation of Afghan territory by a 
~ r i t i s h  army. Not only did Macnaghtcn advise an 
upon Herat, which was "giving trouble," alld 
its annexa t ion  to Shah Suja's dominions, but 
s io~is  were sent to Bokhara, I<holcand, and I<llivn. 
Colo~le l  Stoddart, indeed, had been at Dokhara ever 
since t he  close of 1838, having been sent by the 
Ellglish Minister.at the Court of Persia to obtain the 
release of some Russians lvlio mere in captivity thcrc, 
alld a l s o  t o  conclude a friendly treaty with thc Amir 
of Bokhara.  T h e  s t a y  is well knowl~ of Stoddart's 
imprisonment, in violation of all the laws that regu- 
late international intercourse-but what do barbarous 
I<hans and  Amirs know of such ?-of the gross and 
wanton  cruelties practised upon him, and of his final 
atrocious murder. Arthur Conolly farcd no better. 
H e  s t a r t ed  from Cabul in the autumn of 1840, osten- 
sibly 011 a mission to IChiva and I<holcand. Thence, 
on an invitation of the Amir of Bokhara, he pro- 
ceeded to that city, where he found Stoddart in a 
s ta te  of  captivity, but more honourable and less 
than that  which h e  had bee11 condemned to 
suffer during part of tlie preceding years. One of 
.Conolly's reasons for visiting Dolchara mas, i t  is said, 
A ffha~~istaf~. ' 
to  i~iduce Stoddart to recant tlie profession of Mu- 
Iiammada~iism he had made. H e  found, on llis 
arrival, tliat poor Stoddart's conversio~i had been 
effected by sucli gentle meatis as i~icarceration in a 
pit full ol  vermin and filtli. I-Iis grave, too, was dug, 
with tlie tlireat that unless h e  professed the faith of 
Islam lie would be buried alive in it. Conolly fou~id 
h e  liad only bee11 decoyed into a trap lo  undergo 
similar trentmcot, and was in the end subjected to 
the satne fate as Stoddart suKcred. I t  is believed I tlia 
tliat botli died by tlie l ~ a ~ i d  of tlic public executioner, ' 
but tlie precise period of tlieir death is doubtfill. 
Native accounts malie it the 17th of Junc, 1842 .; a ~ ~ d  
lnaliuscripts written by Arthur Conolly himself and 
dcspatclicd to Cabul bring up the sad narrative of his 
sufferings to tlie 24th of May ol that year. O n  the 
28th of May Stoddart clespatcl~ed an official letter to 
tlie Indian Government, which was forwarded with 
Conolly's journals. The  neglcct of the Government fio I 
they served so faithfully embittered the hard fate of ol 
these officers. I t  was after their death that Lord 1 
ex( 
Ellenborougl~ wrote a letter to  the Amir of Bokhara, 
in which h e  described them a s  "in~iocent travellers," 
a n d  as sucli reqiicsted their release. ICaye rightly on 
says that 11ad tlicy been then living, such a repudia- OC( 
tion of their official cliaractcr would have sealed tlieir 
wa 
fate, as it practically proclaimed them to be spics. 1'0 
Le t  us hope this is no precedent to be followed in Ge 
the case of other officers of Government wlio may 
fall into the clutches of barbarous rulers, wlieii 
serving their country. Icaye describes the fate of 
these officers as " a  painful episode in the epic of the 
Afglian \var." I t  was so, truly. 
The  Afghan tragedy is conveniently divided into 
three periods, the first of wliicli ends witli tlic 
restoration of Sliah Suja to thc thronc of Cabul on 
tlic 7th August, 1839. Tlic second period embraces 
those two years of Shah Suja's short reign, during 
which lie was kept on his throne only by British 
bayonets and British gold ; tlie evetits which led to 
the  insu~.rection of tlie Afghan tribes against the 
Fcringliee infidels, as they callcd the English; the 
subsequc~it difficulties arising, it is now believed, 
Inore from the dividcd authority and incapable com- 
manders of tlie British than from tlic strength of tlic 
enemy ; and the crow~iiiig disasters of tlie retreat 
from Cabul and massacre of tlie whole Cabul division 
of tlie British army and its camp-followers, with the 
exceptioii of about a hundred prisoners and oue man, 
Dr .  Brydon, wlio effected his escape, in a coiiditioii 
more dead than alive, to Jalalabad, which lie reached 
on 13th January, 1842. T h e  third and last period is 
occupied wit11 tlie march of tlie avenging army that 
was slowly collected and despatched under General 
Pollock from Peshawar to effect a junction witli 
General Nott's division, which had been shut up in 
Candaliar during the winter, but which now com- 
lne~icecl that extraordinary "witlidmwal " to thc  
plains of India vid Gliazni, Cabul, Jalalabad, and 
Peshawal; \vhich looked so remarkably like an 
advance, that Kayc has riglitly designated it  as a 
retirement "unparalleled, perhaps, in the political 
liistory of thc ~vorld." The punishment inflicted 
upon tliose deemed guilty of ally participation in the 
previous disasters t o  tlie Britisli arms, more cspc- 
cially upon tlie tribes co~icerned in the massacre of 
not so011 forget. The English prisoners, too, ~vlio 
liad almost co~iclucled that tlicy liad been abandoucd 
by tlic Government to their fate, were recovered after 
adventores Inore tlirilling atid cscapes more woncler- 
ful than a~iytliiiig to be found in fiction. The policy 
of ~vitliclra~val was eve~iti~ally carried out, and 
Afghanistan left to its own people in December I of t h ~  
1842, after more than four years of deep anxiety 
,I gled. 
caused by our wilful intcrfercnce with its rude politics. Bryd 
To give anything approaching to an cxliaustive he s; 
account of these evezits would far excced our present I an 
intctition, and Sir John Icaye's masterly work on tlie 
Afghan W a r  renders i t  unnecessary to do so. In liis t o  el 
pages the student of Indian history will never cease i nde  
to find delight, for the clear and incisive judgment cotlfi 
which lie has brought to bear upon the difficult ques- 
.----.---- 
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tions of policy that then arose leaves little to be 
desired. The Afghans could have wished no fairer 
, or more impartial chronicler, while the present 
generation of Eng l i sh rne t~~na~  thank him For llaving 
cleared up what was dubious, evenwhere it involved 
proving, as in so Inany instances it did, that our ovn 
actioii was indefensible. 
A correspondent of t l ~ e  Bniiy &ws, subscribing 
himself " II.J.R.L.," sent the following interesting 
account of the escape of Dr. Brydon, the sole sur- 
vivor of the Cab~ll forc6, who found his rvay to 
Jalalabacl, to tell, the sad stoly of its fate. 
" H. J .R.L.'s " account agrees substantially with 
that givc~i by Sir John ICaye. I3e says :- 
" Dr. Drydon rvas the doctor of my old regiment. 
His pleasant face a ~ ~ d  rotund figure always inadc it 
2 the more dimcult to vealise that he was the only 
survivor of that terrible retreat, af which hc was 
I most relucta~lt to speak. It was towards the a ~ d  i of the Cabul Pass that a few survivors had strug- gled. Among the111 lvas the nativc doctor of .Brydon's then regiment. Calling Urydon to Ilim, he said, ' Doctor Sahib, I cannot possibly escape ; I am dying from cold and hunger. Take my pony, 
and do the best you can for yourself.' ' Drydon tried 
to encourage tbc poor man, but, seeing illat hc wvas 
indeed dying, lie took tlie pony, and tlirougli the 
confusion forced his way to the front. There he 
found a small group of mounted oficers, who, know- 
ing they were just a t  tlie end of the Pass, where it 
ol~ens out on the plain on ~vhicli Jalalabad stands, 
had determined to male  a push for life. Seeing 
Brydon on this wretched, half-starved pony, they 
declared they could not possibly wait for him, as 
any delay miglit cause their utter destruction. On 
they went, leaving Brydon slowly toiling after 
them. The Afghans saw this group approaching, 
lnet and slew every man ; then, thinking 110 one else 
~ . 1 was cominc. went back to the liills. Just then 
I 
" A t  Jalalabad the greatest anxiety prevailed as 
to the ~vliereabouts of General Elphinstotie's force, 
no news having come through the Pass, though it 
was known lie was retreating, when one evening a 
man, slowly riding a worn-out pony, was descried 
at  the entrance of the Pass. Some cavalry were I 
sent to bring him in. I t  was Brydon, the only sur- I 
vivor, As  lle entered the gate he fell senseless I 
from fatigue. When he came to himself his first 
question was about th i  pony that had saved his life. 
I t  was dead. 
"When B~.ydon told me the story v e  were 
walking home one night from mess, under the 
solemn calm of an Indian night. He bade me 
put  my finger into the mark left by an Afghan 
sabre, which, glancing from a boolc he had put 
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;,. . into liis forage cap, had sliced a piece of the skull 
.,:.: : clean out. 
: ... 1 " Brydon took part in the defence of Jalalabad 
. . ,  
.: : ,  as one of tlie 'illustrious garrison,' and, strangely 
enough, lived to take part in the defence of Luclcnow." 
-1 Pa 
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CHAPTER VIII. i n  
Al;CfIillNAFFilIRRT AFTER THE W A R  OF 1838-42. 
Tim Itcnl Cnaro of lhc Dnlnnge to England's Parilian in Ccnlml Arln 
Irom lllo Cnbul Disarlcr-Lard Ellenborough's Policy in 18~12- k' 
Nnlivc Vicws on thc Evncunlion of Algl1nnlslnn-Ro~r~Iinso11~~ 
Opinion 01 thc r\lglnnnr ns Saldiers-Englnnrl " The Dumt Child." 
nnrl Alghnnisan "Tile 1:ire"-Internnl Allilrr or Algbnnislnn 
bclwccn l l ~ c  I<elrenl 01 Genornl Elphinrlane null thc i\dvnncc of 
I 
(;cnernl l'allack-hiul~nrn~nnd Sllaln I<hnn n Noble Eseeption lo  tho t 
Gcnernlily 01 llle Alxllnnr-hlurdcr 01 Shnh Sujn, tile I'appel-l<illg 
--Acecrrian of I'nlill Jnng-r\kbnr I<bnn Illlrigllcs lor Power-I'nll 
I 
01 1:alill Jnng-l'roraclomnlion of ShuI>par-Lo1.d Hllenborough's i 
"Song 01 TrIs1ap11"-l'olicy will, Kcgnrd lo Dort Mul~rmmnd 
IChn11-Englnndb i\lghall I'oiicy iram 18.12 lo 1852-Origiin of lllc 
I'er5i.m War 01 1856-Hem1 nnd Treaty 01 I'nrir or i857-Vil~r~ml 
Dismgard 01 l'renly lby I'enin-Dorr hlul~ammncl's Neutrality In 
1856.58 I'urchnred-Policy 01 Suhrldies Diroorred-Cost of Algl,nn I ! Wnr-Tile lllood I'ead bcl$\~ccn tho i\lghsar nnd lhe Englisb-Sir 
John 1,o.lwrence's Tvenlies  will^ Dort hlal~nmmnrl-Eslenl of Dost ! 
hlt!l~nmmnd'r Don~inio~>r-I-lc Snbduer Candabnr nnrl lleral-His 
Denlll-Subrcqucnl Aonrehy in Alghnnislnn-Rlvnl Clain~nntr lo tile 
" h1nmod"-Sberc All. Lhc Designnlcd Successor-His Son. Ynkub 
I<Ih111, is Alndc Governo~~ of Hent-Aleul I<hnn Obtnins Parrersion 
01 Cnhul, rind is I'radnimed Amir-Shcrc All's Defenl-Ynkub 
Khna's Gallnnl Aei~icveme~~ls-Sherc i\li Rertarod in 1868-IIe 
Sllrj'ecls Ynkub I<hnn 01 'I'rcnchery-Ynkub Dcmnllde lo bc Aeknom- 
lctlgcd Iidr - Applrcnt-Ova Quarci  l3elmcca the Amir and 
Ynkub-Ynkub's l i l Igh l -R~co~~~i l in~ io~~ nnd I~l~prirot~ment-OLhor 
CLiaol la  lo the Succession. 
IT was not so much our retirement from Afghan- 
istan, in 1842, as the co~lditions under which it was 
Afglmrt Afairs nfier flre War. 
carried out that injured British P~estige and dis-. 
England's position in all Central Asia. IT, 
aTter recovering the prisoners, our officers had 
remained for another year in the country ; and tlleo, 
in a n  orderly and honourable manner, after a 
suitable arrangement with the native authorities 
into whose hands wc inight have thought it fitting 
t o  resign the government, we had withdrawn from 
Afghan soil, the eKects of our previous disasters 
would have been mitigated, if not entirely removed. 
But Lord Elle~~boro~igli  was too anxious to rescue 
the artnics of Generals Pollock and Nott fxom what 
he cotlsidcred to be their critical position in an 
intensely hostile country, hardly capable of furnish- 
ing supplies, always a t  their wits' end for carriage, 
and  oppressed with the recollection of the fate that 
had so recci~tly befallen their predecessors, t o  let 
delicate coilsideration of the honour of the English 
name weigh wit11 him against the terrible dangers 
his imagination saw in a further occupation of 
Afghanistan. 
Indeed, it was a t  one time possible-nay, so pro- 
bable as to bc deemed by some almost certain-that 
t h e  rears of the Governor-Gencral would so Tar 
paralyse llis j~~dginen t  that a distinct refusal would 
be given to I'olloclc to advance on Cabul " to assist 
the retreat of the Canclallar force" as it was the 
fashion officially to style that \vonderful " retirement 
on  thc plains oT India ~ ~ i t ? -  Ghazni, Cabul, a11d 
Peslia!var," to  which we Ilavc alrcady referred. 
What really llappcllcd ill the cnd, as tllc result of 
Lord Bllc~~boroogI~'s policy, was that aftcr rcadirlg 
t l ~ c  natives ccrtain u l~ssons"  the British army jaz 
retired precipitately from Afghan tcrritory !vithout doul 
any undcntaodil~g having been colnc to with thc subs 
Durani chiefs, and pursued, indced, by an implacable rcde 
foe-generally, but ]lot nlways, a t  n respectful Rav 
distance-dow11 to the last pass debouching on thc strcl 
plaios. Tll~ls no doubt can be entertained that the info 
previoi~s ill..cflects on our reputation were consider- Am 
ably cnlianced ; thc general native idca being, both 
in India and in Central Asia, that we wcre in 
reality driven from the mountains. Nor has the of 
belief been uncommon alnollg our own otiicen that whi 
in rctiring from Afghanistao we yielded to superior 
strength ; whereas, in troth, never was the coutitry 
morc thoroughly in our power durillg the whole 
pcl.iocl from thc commencement of [lie Afghan War 
than a t  the moment of our retreat. 
I t  l ~ a s  been assclted on the highest anthority, 
ma 
that,  except during the fatal minter of 1841-42, !vlien the 
by a concurrc~~ce of the most unforeseen events, our rat 
forces a t  Cabul had become utterly dernoralised, the 
Afg11a11s wcre never able lo make a successful stand, 
even for a n  hour, against either British soldiers o r  
Indian Sepoys. Sir Henry IXawlinson declared in 
Afglragr Aflairs after the. Way. 
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1875 that no officer wllo served throug.11 the Afghan 
W a r  ~vould hesitate to meet the whole assc~nbled 
forces of Cabul a n d .  Candahar combined with a 
single brigade of British troops; and even in moun- 
tain warfare, where the Afghaa marksman with his 
substitution of the breechloading rifle has now 
redeemed our only wealcness. Whether Sir I-Ienry 
Ralvlinson would be willing to co~ninit himself to 
such a statement in the fall of 1878, after the recent 
i~lforn~ation we have received of thc state of the 
Amir's army, drilled, it is alleged, in part at Icast, by 
1Eussian officers, and with the arsenals of Russia, a s  
i t  is also asserted, to select from, we have no means 
of deciding. We opine from the much l a r ~ e r  forces 1. 
- - 
which it has been dcemed necessary to assemble on 
the  north-west f r~nt ie r  that i t  is not the opinion of 
high military authorities in India that the Afghans 
a r e  such contemptible enemies as Sir Henry Raw- 
linson, in 1875 a t  least, supposed. The object, we 
s11ould observe, ~vhich Sir Henry Rawlinson had in 
malting the above observatiot~ was not to encourage 
t h e  idea of our again ascencling 'the passes, but 
rather to correct the erroneous impression which h e  
believed to be generally entertained of the military 
strength of Afghanistan, and the consequent ovcr- 
estimate that might be made of the difficulties which 
~voold lie in t11c way of a Russian advance upon 
India from any opposition tlic Afglia~is tliemselves '1 
coulcl intcrposc. 
W e  propose in this and the succeeding chapters of 
this booli to trace vcry i;?pidly, but ~vith as much 
succii~ctncss as may be, the relatio~ls betweeri 
Afghanistan and the British Illdial1 Govcrnment 
from the evacuatio~l of that cou~ltry in 1842 to the 
prcsent time. This will enable 11s to consider with 
more advantage, perhaps, the causes that may have 
led,to tlie present complications, and to cstimate the 
value, from various standpoints, of tlic vcry opposite 
opinions that have been cnllcd forth opo~i ~vliat ~vill 
now talcc its place in history as " thc Afghan ques- 
tion of 1878," u~ilcss a deeper significance slioold 
accrue to it, demanding a Inore comprehensive and 
far-reaching title. 
For  a nomber of years after the Afghan War xve I 
imitated the "burnt cliild," and sturliously avoided I 1 
all intercourse with the country that lind beell the 
sccne of our disastcrs. I 
TIie tlirec independent Governmetits of Cabul, 
Candaliar, arid I-Icrat, that had been it1 existence 
before our advent, agai11 assertccl their rule. Persia 
11ad too much occupntio~i a t  home to interfere with 
11~1. eastern iieighbour. 
S i r  Jolin Icaye, ill his admirable work on the 
Afghan War, has collectcd from various sources all 
tliat i! 
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that is known of the internal affairs of Afghanistan 
aRer the departure of the ill-fated Cabul .column, 
1v11ich marched forth to destructio~~ ut~der General 
Elphinstolle on the 6th of January, 1842, and bcfore 
tlle arrival of General Pollocl~ with the avenging 
army. Of the wretched puppet-King we had set up  
in the place of the really capable Dost Muhammad, 
we know that he remained for a time nominal ruler 
of Cabul, to the astonishmet~t illdeed of those 
believed that the insurrection ~vhicb had caused the 
expulsion of the English had been as much dircctcd 
against Shall Suja as against his Ferillgllec patrons. 
The fact was that t he  chiefs dreaded thc vengeance 
of the English for the fearful injuries dealt to them, 
andfelt that Shah Suja was the only o l ~ c  that was 
ever likely to, stand bct~vccn them aud that vcn- 
geance. Of Shah Suja's conduct 'various opinio~ls 
have bcen held, some believing that IIC was the  
original fomenter of the insurrection, but that 11e 
intended it only to attain such dimensions as would 
compel his English patrons to remain and support 
. 
him against his enemies ; while others suppose that 
he was sincesely friendly to the English, but !veal< 
and incapable to the last degree. There is n o  
doubt, however, that one Afghan Prince, Muhammad 
Zaman Khan, mas a noble exception to the mass of 
his countrymen ; for while the i~~depcllde~lcc of h i s  
country, was d e a r  t o  him,. he never stained h i s  
I Go A fghsistna. 
patriotism witli those foul crimes in whicli others 
delighted; and it is recorded of 11im that nothing 
could exceed the kindness of this old mall to the 
English hostages, who fouiid a sanctuary in his 
house. I-Ie even raised and paid from his limited 
resources a force of 3,000 men, chiefly for the pro- 
tection of his E~iglish gucsts, or (as they were really) 
prisoners. This Nawab had bee11 made Vazir or 
Mi~iistcr of Shah Suja ; but soon disse~isions brolcc 
out among tlie rival factions, and mutual distrust 
prevented concerted action. Shah Suja was mur- 
dcrcd by tlie son of the Nawab, against the wish, and 
notwithstanding tlie effo~ts, of the old niali to save 
him ; and tlie body of tlie wretched l<ing,after it 
had bee11 stripped of its royal apparel and orna- 
tncnts, was flung illto a ditch. His death was the 
consumniation of tlie fierce strife that had bee11 
mging between Slial~ Suja and tlie Baraiczai princes 
for forty years. 
Tile second son of Slial~ Suja, Fatih Jang, was 
liorv raised to the tkiroiie, a ~ i d  he condolied the 
murder of his father on the ground that  it was no 
time for avenging private family wrongs when all 
ought to make common cause against the infidels. 
But tlie Barakzais were not likely with patience to 
see the son of their hatcd rival seated oil the throne. 
Civil war soon raged in the city ; and ABbar ICIian, 
~ 1 1 0  had remained a t  a distance witli tlie majority 
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of  the Enzlisb prisoners still in his possession, 
waiting to see how matters went at the capital, IIOIV 
tnarched 011 Cabul. Akbar Khan, it mill be remern- 
bered, was the son of Dosl: Muhammad, and is 
known to history as the murderer of the E ~ ~ g l i s l l  
Envoy, Sir Willialn Macnaghten, at a conference 
held near the ~valls of the cantonments a t  Cabul, 
just previous to their evacuation. This prince, 
1v110se character seems to have been a strange 
mixture of ferocity and sensibility, besieged Fatih 
Jang, the unfortunate young Icillg, i n  tile Uala 
Hissar, or citadel of Cabul, and when, at last, t he  
place was taken, began himself to exercise regal 
power by the usual Arghan device of keeping thc  
nominal sovereign as a puppet. He fo1111d it con- 
venient to support, as titular prince, this Sad- 
dozai youth, Fatih Jang, because the Nalvab, 
Muhammad Zamao IChan, of his own (Barakzai) 
tribe, also claimed to be Icing of the Afghans. T h e  
good Nawab, xvllo had so nobly protected the 
English captives, was defeated in battle, owing t o  
t h e  desertion of liis followers, and was made most 
reluctantly to give up'his prisoners, whom he had 
treated as guests, to  the High Priest, Mir Haji.  
F rom his custody they were soon transferred-sold, 
~ v e  should rather say-to Alcbar IClian, who thus 
obtained possession of thepersons of all the English 
who had been taken captive before and after the 
I 1  
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massacre. His object io doing this was to lllake 
good terms for Ililnself on the returll of the Ellglisl1 
with an avengiog army-an event he fully expected. 
Fatill Jnng was driven fr01n l l i ~  tllron~ by Alcbar 
Ichan as soon as the latter had possessed himself 
of the trensure,' to  which Fatill Iclla~l had SUC- 
ceedcd on Shall Suja's dcnth-treasure ~vliich liad 
bee11 amassed from the subsidies drawn from the 
Indian Governme~rt. I.'atih Jnng lrad escaped i n  
rags and tatters to thc camp of General Pollock, 
as that officcr, with the army of vengeance, was 
approaching Cabul. Following General Pollock to 
thc  capital, lie was reinstalled on his throne, but was 
cmpl~atically told that the English liad liad enough 
of supporting poppet-Icings a t  Cabul, and he must 
now shift for liimself. When he learnt this, he 
peremptorily refused to wear the crown, and begged 
to bc allowed to accompany Pollock's camp to India, 
a request which was granted both to him and the I 
olcl blind Icing, Zamao Shah, who had now a second 
tinle to hod refuge in British territory. Another 
Icing, nn~ncd Shahpul., of thc  same unluchy Sad- 
clozai fiunily, was l~roclaimed OII the day Pollocl< 
\\'as leaving Cabul, but it was a mere mockery, for 
h c  was dethroned again beforc the British forces 
reached Inclia. 
After Lord Ellenborougl~ had proclailned the 
* About ~200,ow. 
victory o l  thc English troops it1 his famous proclama- 
tion or tlte Gates, called by tlie Dukc o l  Wellington 
a "Song of T ~ i u m p h  "-than which no document 
that  evcr emanated from the bureau or a statesman 
has bee11 more ridiculecl and cetlsured Tor its bom- 
bosity and folly-it becarnc necessary to decide what 
should be done with Dost Muhammad IChan, ~vho  
was, it ~ v ~ l l  be ~crnembered, a prisoner along with his 
I family in our il~ands. Wc had decrced and carried out his dethronement ; and, deserted by his followers, 
1 and rceling how liopcless was his resistance Lo British 
might, h e ,  had surrendered himselr to Sir W. 
Macnaghten, by whom lie was l~onourably trcated, 
a n d  ronvarded as a State prisoner to Calcutta. I t  is 
annecessary here . t o  detail the irtl-rigues which lol- 
lowed the first departure of the Eoglish from Cabul. 
Suffice i t  t o  say tliat when Dost Muhammad round 
his way back to.his capital, lle was not long in re- 
gaining his former authority as Amir, and Akbar 
I<han becatnc 11is Vazir, or Chid  Minister. From 
that time to 1852 we carerully avoided arty inter- 
ference with Afghan affairs. In that year, howcvcr, 
,died Yar Muhammad I<linrt, tlie notorious FvIi~tister 
of Shah I<amran of Herat, wl~o had, with tlie aid of 
Eldred ~o t t i nge r ,  successfully co~tducted thc siege of 
that city against the I'ersia~t host in 1837-38 
Persia would gladly have taken advantage of the 
confusion tliat rollowed upon the Vazir's death to 
11-0 
Afjni~istnrr. 
again attempt the reduction of Herat. This, however 
wc prcvcntcd by t l ~ r c a t e ~ l i ~ ~ g  to suspelld diplomatic 
relations, a ~ ~ d  so  co~~~pcl lccl  the S l ~ a l ~  into a conven- 
tion b y  which he bound l~imself not to make ally 
future attack upon Afghan territory, This committed 
us, doubtless, to l~ostilitics with Persia in the event of 
her b r c a k i ~ ~ g  the col~vention, but it was deemed im- 
pcrntivc to prevellt I-lerat falling into her hat~ds, 
chicfly bccausc it was [cared she miglit exchange 
that city wit11 l<ussia for Erivan, or some other place. 
. ~ .. This doctri~~e-tliat Herat must be indepeodent of 
1 Russia and Persia-l~as bee11 a political maxim with 
most English states~neu cvcr since. 
111 1856 tlie cootingcncy whicli had been foreseen 
occurrec1,and Pc~siati  troops wcrc sent to occupy Herat, 
ancl did succccd temporarily ill cloi~ig so. The war 
wit11 l~nglancl ~ollowecl 11po11 this action-there were 
otl~ercauses, bot this was t l~clnost important--during 
t l ~ c  course of ~vhich Persia t l ~ o u g l ~ t  i  prudetit to 
abal~don its conquest ; and a t  the Peace of Paris, con- 
cluclecl in 1857, special provisions regarding Herat were 
inserted in the Treaty-an evidence of our tradit io~~al 
drcad of Russia. The  wisdom of t l ~ e  provision whicIi 
burclenecl us wit11 the liability to attack Persia the 
m o ~ n e l ~ t  she ma~.checl eastrvanl has been mucli ques- 
tioned. Still more has the barren stipulation against 
the Shall's interference with tlie Government of Herat 
been adversely criticiscd. Tha t  this latter one was 
- -- 
r ~ t i l c  : 
n licpl 
T c l ~ e r  
\\-a5 38
G o v e t  
l'crsi; 
n u s t  
Pc rs i ;  
rlcfcr 
Gave 
u n d c  
S l l C C l  
Alll l  
\\.as 
D o 3  
Inrli 
scell 
OllCl 
icre 
futile soon became evident, for Sultan Ahmad IChan, 
a ilepllew of Dost Mul~ammad, who was a refugee at 
Tcheran when the Treaty o l  Paris was concluded, 
was sent by tlie Persian Shall to  assume the reins of 
Government immediately up011 the ~vithdrawal of the 
Persia~lgarriso~i from I-Ierat, and he remained for the 
next five years in undisguised dependence upon 
Persia, althougli llis independence was proclaimed, in 
delercnce to their obligations, by botli the Britisll 
Gover~l~ncnt and t h e  Shah. A Russian mission, 
undcr M. IChan~likof, ivhich visited I-lerat in 18q8, i 
- . 
succeeded in compIcLing the dependency ol Sultan 
Alimad upon I'ersia. I n  1857 the great importance 
was secn of sccuring the neutrality of the A ~ n i r  
Dosl hIullammad during the Persian War aild the 
Indian Mutinics,when the fate of our India11 Empire 
seemed trembling in t l~c  balance. We, thererore, for 
once steppcd aside from the policy of non-intcr- 
fercncc which had been pursued for fifteen years, and 
sent a lricnclly mission to  Alghanistan under Major 
Lumsdc~l.  Our officers proceeded only to  Candahar, 
but succeeded in purchasing the Amir's goodwill lor 
a subsidy of a lakb of rupees (f;~o,ooo) per mensem, 
t o  be continued as long as  his selvices migllt be of 
advantage t o  us. 
O l  thc morality of this bargain, Sir Henry 
Rawlinson remarks that it may appear questionable, 
and of the tcnns, 11e admits that they lnay seem 
exorbitant to English politicians, but, lie adds, " when 
worl; is to bc dolle, subsidies are still tlie rule in t h e  
East, and experience has cver sltown that t rue  
economy co~isists in paying wcll, o r  not a t  all." I n  
tliis case tlic "work"  stipulntecl for in retor11 for 
British gold and artiis was in rcnlity sometliil~g whicll 
it is very clificult to buy-viz., friendship. W e  
watitecl-it may safcly be  statcd that  we still want 
-a friendly I'owcr to be cstablisliecl it1 Afgliatlistan. 
We liad spcnt sevcntccn millions of Et~glisli money 
and sacrificed ninny tliousands of English and Indiati 
lives, in the endeavour to makc for ourselves a Icing 
of the Affiltatis wllo should be t o  our liking, atid 
wllom a sc~rsc o l  ctcrnal gratitude for the recovcry 
of his erowll would bind t o  us cotnplctcly. W c  liad 
failed miserably. Thc  very Icing ~ v c  liad made 
turticd to plotting against 11s ; tlie peoplc rosc, 
and with one great cffort swcpt away our legions, 
burying them in the clnrl; defiles of  tlicir moutttains. 
Tlie m a n  me had Iiuntrcl from ltis tliro~ic, and itn- 
prisotied for no fault, but becallse it suited tlic policy 
of Lhc Govertimcnt of tlie d a y  to d o  so,.liad regained 
liis thronc in spitc of us, and wc espccted to malcc 
him our  very good fricnd by a payment oftnoney. 
And for a time this tnodc of  secul.ing tlie friendship 
of the Afgllan Icing succeeded, or a t  least appeared 
to succeed. Whether wc are tiow, in the time of liis 
successor, about to reap the  fruits o f  tliis subsidising 
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policy, the effcct of which has been to strengthen a 
traditional enemy, to stiffen his neck wit11 pride, and, 
perhaps, i~istil into him the notion that, after all, we 
havc sometlling to fear from his wrath, we leave to 
others to decidc. 111 ail £26o,ooo was paid to the 
then Amir of Cabul during thc years 1856-58, the 
subsidy being continued for fonrtecn months after 
the war with Pcrsia 11ad ceascd. Thc chief reason 
for thc continuance of the subsidy scarcely needs to 
be stated. We wcre locked in a death-struggle with 
our own mutinous Indian anny, and it was of the 
utmost importance that Dost Muhammad should 
refrain from at tacl i i~~g us, and should rcstrain his 
ficrcc suhjccts from a general Afghan invasion of the 
Panjab. And so Dost Muhammad-our former pri- 
soner, whom \vc had so shabbily treated in 1838-40 
-was now courtccl by an Englisll Envoy, and his 
l~eutrality purchased at tlte price above mentioned. 
T h e  spectacle was one not v c ~ ; ~  creditable, perhaps, 
t o  a dignificcl Government ; and 110 wonder Anglo- 
Indians havc fclt sore about it, and made apologies, 
on the ground of necessity and expediency, such a s  
that abovc quotcd. Unfortunately this was not the 
last occasion on lvl~icll an Afghan Prince receivcd 
English arms and gold in thc vain effort t o  kcep 
11i1n " friendly." A time can~c-not long ago-when. 
in haogl~ty disdain Sherc Ali flung back the ~ r o f -  
fcred rupees, and lias bidcd his time to avow ihc 
A f g h ~ ~ ~ i s ~ ~ z ~ ~ .  
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liostility that  has all along only bccti latc~it. Bar- firs 
barous natioiis dcliglit in blood-feuds ; and if ever ant 
t l ~ c r e  wcrc grounds for a blood-fcud bctwcen two Sh< 
nations, tlicy exist in tlic case of tlie Afghans and Ru 
ourselves. a !  
I t  is tlie duty, lion.evcr, of a natioti calling itself wh 
civiliscd, not to say Clirist ix~~, to restrain to the me 
utmost tliose savage instil~cts mliicli, in the case of f ;  
individuals, are readily condetn~ied, but in the case Po 
o r  natiotis arc too oltcn uncliccl~cd, ir  not actually 
fostcrcd, by false ideas of patriotism. 
Ijeforc passing 011 to more recent events, we should 
not omit to mention that Si r  Jolin (now Lord) 
Lan~rcncc, on bclialr of the Indian Govcr~iment, on 
signcd a treaty in 1855 with tlie Amir Dost  frc 
Rluliammad I<lia~i, in which we agreed t o  respect the  hr 
tcrritorics of tlie Amir and his heirs, and tlie Amir,  be 
for liimself and liis heirs, agreed to respect the terri- br 
tories then it1 the possession or the East Ind ia  in 
Company, whicli liave sitice devolved upon tlie 
Crown. Mr. Me~iry Richard, MI'., in some letters 
publislicd recently in tlic Cll~islintr World, d raws  CI 
espccial attention to this treaty in connection wit11 P 
the proposed "rcctilication" of our frontier. T h e  n 
only derence, nfe think, of ~vliicli an infringement by d 
us or the second article or this short treaty is a t  all I 
capable is, that  this second articlc may be held to ( 
have been cancelled by Shcre Ali's violation of t h e  ( 
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first articlc, which declares that there shall be peace 
atid friendship between the parties and their heirs. 
Shere Ali has apparently given his friendship to 
Russia. In January, 1857,  Sir John Lawrence made 
a secontl agreement with Dost Muhammad, under 
which thc latter received the subsidy of L I O , ~  per 
mclisem (in addition to a previous present of 
~ ; ~ O , O O O ) ,  to which rcfcrence has already been made. 
For many years after his restoration Dost 
Muhammad's possessions were much curtailed, when 
compared with those that for~nerly o~vned the sway of 
the Durani monarchs before Shall Suja. Shah Suja 
himself had grumbled greatly ivlien we replaced him 
on his throne a t  the diminished area of his kingdom, 
from which Herat, Cashmere, Pesliawar, and Sindli 
had been lopped off. Dost Muhammad had little 
beyond the Cabul valley in his possession. His 
brothcrs a t  Candahar, atid his nephew a t  Herat, were 
independent of hirn. When Icohandil Khan, of 
Candahar, liowcver, died, Dost Muhammad overran 
tlic Western Afghan province, and so011 aftenvards 
commenced a . contcst \vith his nephew, Sultan 
Ahmad, for the possession of I-Ierat. Persia 
naturally rescnted this attack on her virtual depen- 
dent, and we remonstrated with Dost Muhammad. 
I-Ie pcrscvcrcd, IIOWCVC~, ill his designs, and the 
climax was reached in  the su~iirner of 1863, without 
our liaving intcrfcrcd furlher in tlic affair-by a triple 
and sin~ultaiicous catastro~,lic, tllc death of Sultan 
Alinind by apoplexy, illc [all of Herat to tlic Cabul 
army, aotl the crowning misfortt~tie or the death 01 
Dost i\lulia~ii~ii:~d liiniself. 
On t l ~ c  leatli of tile great U;~ralizai chief, nllo llad 
passed LIirough so lnatly vicissitudes or  fortulle, and 
\vhosc nilme !!'ill go down to future gc~~erations, 
coupled \!sit11 thc history of the most calamitous 
pcriod in our own history, Afghanistan relapsccl into 
tclnporary anarcliy amid tlic slruggles that cnsued 
for the succession. Dost Rlu11amm;icl had nominated 
Shcrc Ali, n youligcr son by a ravouritc wifc, to .  
succcccl l~ im,  passing over l ~ i s  many other sons, of 
whom filuhnm~iiad Aha l  and h~ulia~iirnacl Azim, by 
an eldcr  vile, wcrc tlic most notable. Four pre- 
tcnrlcrs j r ~  diKcrc~lt parts or the collntry collected 
'Tollonscrs wit11 :I vicw to asserting Ll~eir cl;~ims to the 
', 
~nasnacl," or, ;IS wc should say, "throne ; " but the 
lxcsent rulers of Arghanistan ;ivoid the title of 
" Sltall " 01. Iiilig. Sllcre Ali for a sllort time made 
Itis aull~ority recog~~iscd, but alienated many of the 
chicfs by placing o11c of his youngest sons, a youth, 
of sixtcclt, named Ynla~b  IChan, ill ilic gover~lorsliip 
of Herat. T l ~ e  standard of revolt was raised all over 
tllc cou~itry a t  almost the same moment, ; u ~ d  Shere 
Ali nrxs compcllcd to bend to thc storm. I-Iis clder 
brother, Afzal Icllan, succeeded in getting possession 
of Cabul, and was there proclaimed A ~ n i r  .of 
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Afghanistan, altliough Herat still held out against 
him for  some time under Yakub I<han, who sl~onecl 
hitnsclf even a t  that youthful age, a leader of no 
mean capacity. He had indeed discovered a con- 
spiracy in the interests of one or liis uncles in E-Icrat 
itself, alid had suppressed it with firmness and com- 
plete success. 
A {C\V montlis after Sherc Ali's defeat, which 
11a~)penccl in 18&, Yaliub was obliged to seek 
safety in flight, and Herat was Captured by Afzal 
Khan. Yaliltb and liis fatlier became exiles, and 
the former ineffectually endeavoured to obtain assisl- 
ance from tlie Persians. As they declined, however, 
t o  talce part with Sliere Ali, yakub,'nothing daunted 
by t h e  failurc of his negotiations, collected a small, 
band of followers, and, after several smaller engage- 
melits roulid Hcrat, took that placc by a vigorous 
a t tack  nt the liead of 5,000 men. Many were 
attracted by Yakub's gallant achievements to his 
fath'er's standard, and i n  1868 11c rcgalncd Candaliar. 
L a t e r  011 he  rendcrcd material assistance in the 
recapture of Cabul, wlicn Shcre Ali succeeded in 
driving out Azirn, who iiad se ixd  the Government 
on Afzal's death, ill October, 1867. It  was'in Sep- 
tember, 1868, that Slicre Ali regaiticd the thronc, 
and  it was allnost directly afterrvards that tlie fa~nous 
quarl.cl broke out bctwcen him and his bravc son, 
Yakub I<lian, to whosc valiant arm it may bc said 
I:I/ 1 :?I '72 A fJ~/rfll~i~/fll~. 
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,! 11c owcd 11is rcstoratio~r. Tlrc Amir appcars to  
., ,i linvc bccomc suspiciol~s of Iris son, fearing probably 
;I that his military c;lpncity and reputation might 
i 
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rcndcr him a daligcroos rival. A t  thc same timc 
Ynkub discovcrcd tlrat Abdulla Jan's ~notlicr was 
3 intrigui~rg to sccurc the succcssion to her son, a boy i 4 
'I I! of tc~ldcr  years, but wliosc place in his father's ; i 
I '  4 rcaard wtrs shown bv  liis a ~ l ~ o i n t m c n t  to the - . . 
Govcrnorsliip of Candaliar, Accordingly Yalcub also 
rcsortcd to ilrtriguc with thc vicw of keeping his 
$ 8  t 
. . .  . . hold upon Ilcrat as Covcrnor, and a t  t l ~ e  same timc 
-. 
I-Icir-apparent. Slicrc Ali gnvc l l i~n no dircct 
ansnrcr, anlid Yal;ub Followcd up liis d c ~ n a ~ i d  by others 
morc s\vcepi~ig, tnoet of them rclnling to an cnlargcd 
share in thc admillistration of t l ~ c  cou~itry. I-Iis 
fatlicr tcmporiscd by 1na1;ing partial concessions, 
which gnvc Yal;ub a voice in thc govcrlrment of the 
capital, but nt tlic same time lie stlrrounded liiln with 
adhcrcnts of Iris favouritc son, tlrc boy Abdalla Jan. 
Undcr tlicsc circutnsta~ices thc position of tlrc bold 
a ~ r d  ambitious Yakub becamc ontenablc. I-Ie per- 
ccivcd that ~~o t l i i l lg  \vo~lld prevent Abdulla Jan's 
nomination as l~cir-npparcnt; and in 1870 he fled 
fiom Cabul, acco~ripanied by his full brothcr Ayub, 
a boy of tliirtcen or fourteen years. Yakub tried 
lrard to provol<c a rcbellion against liis father, but 
Shcrc Ali's influence ]lad n o n  beco~nc too strong for 
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all that his  sons could do against it. Yalcub and 
his f e w  adherents were beaten off from Cal~dahar, 
Ghazni ,  and  Girishk, and once more he took refuge 
i n  Pers ia .  I n  the  spring of 1871-this time with 
s o m e  Persian assistance-Yalcub again laid siege to 
Herat, a n d  it fell into his hands. Through the 
influence of Lord Mayo, father and son became 
reconciled. Yalcub presented hi~nself at Cabul and 
declared llilnsell p e ~ ~ i t e n t  ; and in September ol  1871 
h e  w a s  made Governor of Herat, but with a strong 
b o d y  of  Shere Ali's adherents around him. Yalcub 
a nd  S h e r e  Ali's nominees were never in accord, 
Y a k u b  endeavouring to keep them from any real 
sha r e  iri tlic administration, and they reporting to 
Ca bu l  everything that might turn to Yakub's dis- 
advantage .  There can be little doubt that Yakub 
justified their reports, especially alter the formal 
nomitiation ol  Abdulla Jan as heir-apparent in 1873. 
I-Ie intr igued with the Persians and the Turkoma~ls ;
and it is believed that he also asked help of tile 
Rus s i ans  to assist 11i1n against his father; but he 
failed al l  round. T h e  Amir declined his request to 
hold t h e  governorship of FIerat in perpetuity, free 
f rom Cabul influence, and in the autumn of 
1874 summoncd him to Cabul. Yalcub suspected 
t reachery,  and de~nalided a sale conduct, which was 
g r a n t ed .  No sooncr, however, liad the young man 
arr ived in t l ~ c  capital than his lather put him under 
I j /  : ! ! I  . ,. ' 74 A f~rh/m~rist/mrr. 
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i :  arrest, and lie has been in confinement ever sitlce. 
. : <  
, The Indian Goverli~ncnt iliterceded with tlie Amir 
: :  
, . :  to spare his life, and to treat hitn well ; but the first 
i i i  
rcquest only was grantcd. Yakub's imprisonment has 
been, according to tlie best accoutits, very rigorous ; 
and tlie story lias filtered from Cabul into India that 
his ir~tellect has been serioosly affccted by tlie harsh- 
ness of his tncnttnetlt. YaLub was a tnan of rare 
encrgy ant1 tale~lt, but IIC sulfered from tlie dis- 
advantage of ltavi~tg a mother of lo\v birth-a 
i circutnstancc ~vliicli will seriorlsly affect liis cliances of ) coming to the throne, if cvcn it be i~titrue that lie is 
tnsalle, and supposing it possible for Shere Ali to 
become reconciletl to him. Captain R~arsli's interview 
with I'akub at  Herat in 1873 1,evealeda not unfriendly 
disposition on Yakub's part towards England, and 
tlic traveller discovered that Yakub lvas one of tllc 
few Afglians rvlio cot~ld speak English. 
We lnay liere shortly notice tlie other sons a ~ l d  
nepltews of Slierc Ali, of whom, probably, one will 
have to be ~iominated to succeed tlie deceased youth, 
Abdulla Jan ,  as heir-apparent, 
Ayilb I<han, the full brother of Yakub, took no 
part  in public affairs till he fled wit11 Yakub from 
Cabul ill 1870. Tlle two lived togetlier at I3erat till 
Yakub set out a n  his l~aplcss journey to Sliere Ali 
in 1874; and nheu Ayub heard of his brother's 
arrcst, lie endeavoitred to prepare I-Ierat far r es i s t a t~~e  
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against his father, and to fotnetit a rebelliol~ in the 
neiglibourliood, a project which failed. A few 
months altcrwal~cls lie fled illto Persian territory, 
where, meeting one ol tlie Afglia~i generals who had 
bee11 treacher~ous to Yakub's cause, lie endeavoured 
to put him to death. Tlie Persians prevented this. 
With Yakub's cxample belore him, Ayub declined 
Slicre Ali's invitation to return to Cabul, and 
we believe that Ayub has cver since livcd in exile. 
I-Ie marricd a dauglitcr of Sl~ere Ali's half-brother 
Aslam, lor whose ~nurder Shere Ali was rnai~ily 
responsible. 
Atiother claimant to the throne of Cabul is Abdul 
Rahman, tlie son o l  Sliere Ali's eldest brother Afzal. 
Rahman took a very active part in his father's cause 
against Slicre Ali, and in the earlier stages o l  the 
war bctwecn Shere Ali and liis brothers, he displayed 
as much military skill as his cousin Yalcnb. I n  tlie 
end, however, Sliere Ali deleatcd him, atid h e  took 
r e l ~ ~ g c  a t  Tasltkend. For the past five years the 
Russians havc given this man £3,000 a year as a 
subsidy, so that they may have a nominee o l  their 
own at hand i l  disputes again arise in the Alglian 
s~~cccssion, Abdul Ralimati has been to St. Peters- 
burg ; Ile is Lhorougl~ly Russianiscd, is coiisidered a 
very ablc man, and Sherc Ali is said to be grcatly in 
fear ol liis i~ifli~e~ice in the district ol Dalkh. 
I n  nddilion to thcsc Llirec, Yaltub, Ayub, and 
tliro~ic who does not lie under the clisadvantagc of 
having incurred the Amir's l~ostility. This is Alimacl 
Ali, a youtl~ of scvcntcen, the son of Slicrc Ali's 
cldcst son, wlio fell i i ~  battle a t  tlie head of liis father's 
army, in 1865, in a hand-to-hand encounter wit11 liis 
father's t~nclc, wlio was also left dead on the field. 
This young inan has always been in favour with thc 
Amir, and would probably havc been proclaimed heir- 
apparent it~stcad of the late Abclulla Jan  but lor the 
1 iof luc~~cc ol the mother o l  that prince, 1-Ie is now 
consiclcrecl to have the best cliancc of being no~ni~iated 
as Slicre Ali's succcssor, Abdulla Jan having died quite 
rcccntly, since, indccd, Ll~e project of an English 
Mission to Cabul was a i ~ ~ ~ o u ~ ~ c c c l .  
Abdul Ral~man's only hope is in Russiai~ influence. 
Even if Yalcob be relcnsed, and found in full possession 
of liis laculties after liis long and severe imprisonme~~t, 
i t  is doobtf~~l  wl~et l~cr  the Alghan t~obles would give 
liirn moc11 cordial support, as liis low birth on his 
mother's sidc stands it1 the way of liis pop~ilarity 
wit11 thc haughty Afghan cliiefs. He is by t l ~ c  latest 
acco~ll~ts, however, still i l l  prison. I t  is 'col~sidercd 
unlikely that tlie English Government !vould hcartiIy 
support Yalmb, because lie is believed to llave 
intrigued with Russia during Iiis latter clays a t  Hcrat. 
We have continued our account of the domestic 
affairs of Alghanistan down to the present time. 
11 ffhntt f l f (~ivs  afev ihe War. 
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Thcre is mucll of importance still to be said of the 
foreign relations of the Amir towards Russia and 
England, and Lhesc will be considered in the next 
and concluding chapters. 
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IN the  last c h a p t e r  \vc c o m p l e t e d  thc outline of 
Afglla11 1iistol.y up t o  t he  present time, r e s e r v i i l g  
Sllcrc Ali's relations wit11 his Russian and Englis11 
~,eighbours for con side ratio^^ alo~lg with tllc widcr 
subject of what is called the Central Asian question. 
Sir H c ~ l r y  Rawlinson and other able mctl havc lo). 
years been labouring to vender this difficult subjcct 
illteiligible to the English rcader. There is naturally 
3 fascination about it for Anglo-Indians wllicll lcads 
them OII tbrougl~ l o ~ ~ g  and too oftell dreary pagcs 
crammed TLIII of Oriental names o l  mcll and placcs 
clressed in such fa~ltastic guises that t h y  bccolnc 
frequently insoluble pnazles to tl~osc who arc versed 
in Oriental la~lguages, and must bc the most bopc. 
lees enigmas to tile ordinary E11glis11 madcr. 
T l ~ e  xtremely tecl~nical nature a t  most discourses 
011 the Ce11tra1 Asian question llas probably had 
mucll to do  wit11 the indiKerence with ivl~icl~ the 
Englisl~ people have treated it. They cannot bc 
cxpccted to care m~rch about matters wvi~ich even 
experts d o  not always seem to unde~stand, and so 
tile n e w  from India that a new page in the llistory 
of h f g l ~ a n  foreign politics had bccn opened excitcd 
about as mi~cll general interest as if it had bccn 
at~nol~nced that thc Snltan of Tit~.lrey had been 
deposed and another appointed in his  placc. 
Those, llowever, \vl~o called to mi~lcl that. Ihc 
. prese~~ce  of a Russian agent (Viktevitcll) a t  Cabul 
had bcen one of the proximate causes of our inter- 
ference in Afghan politics in 1838, :lnd of our 
sllbsequent disasters, nttncl~cd more imp0l.tnllce to 
tile news that General Abramoff had been sent to 
Cnbr~l by Gci~clal I<nufin~a~~rl, a t  present 12ussian 
Governor-Gcocml of Tashkend, but better lcnown 
pcrl~nps as the successful commander in the cxpedi- 
tion against l<hiva. We have since learnt that the 
oficcr scnt in charge of this so-called " commercial" 
missioll was General Stolieteff, not Abramoif. We 
naturally credited t l ~ c  Russians with as much I~ollesty 
in s t y l i ~ ~ g  their missioll a "commercial" one as we 
ourselves exercised when we scnt Captain (afterwards 
Sir Alexa~lder) Uurnes, in 1837, to Dose Muhammad's 
Court wit11 n view to gai~li~lg him over as all 
ally against 1:usso-l'crsinn ag~ression. We called 
Ilurncs's missiorl " coo~mercial," altl~ougl~ i t  was 
political fronl the lint, and had an object very fim 
from fric~~dly to liussia. BFKO, we supposed Russia 
ruen~lt Gc~~ernI Stolietelf to exercise otller than mere 
" co~n~nercial " functioos a t  Cabul. The closing hours 
of tlie lost Session of Parliament wcsc harassed by 
questions from anxious members as to the truth of 
rrports from India wlticl~ spoke of t l ~ e  projected 
despatch of an English mission to Catrol to counter- 
act t l ~ e  inllue~~cc of the Russiao envoy. The news 
of the latter's arrival at Cabul reached us on the r re11 
of August. We heard a t  the same time that Lord 
Lytton had, on tflc 2 ~ 1 l d  July preceding that, 
acldressed letters to  the Amir. T l ~ c  Russian mission, 
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we now laiow, 11ad rcnclled Cabul it1 June, alter (it is 
alleged) Sliere Ali had sllo\v~i great disinclination to 
receivc it .  Once, liowcvcr, i n  his capital, lie appears 
t o  have treatcd his unbidden guests well, to have 
given tlieln a royal salute, to  have llcld a rcview of 
his troops in their lionour, and to have sent a mission 
of his own to Gcncral I<auKmann iii return. Part oT 
tile Russian mission rcmained behind a t  Cabul, and 
tile rest returned to Tashkcnd with the Afghan 
officcrs of thc Amir. We have lieard plenty of 
rumours since of caravans of Russian arms and 
ammunition having reached Cabul, and oT Russian 
officers swarming into AFgIianistan to drill the Afghan 
troops arter tlic most approved European methods. 
OT xvlivhnt lias actually passed between thc Amir 
and his IZussian visitors we krrow hardly anything, 
and we can only conjecture from his co~id~lc t  since 
their arrival whether lie has given ear to their 
counsels or not. 
The  rcadcr will scarcely now need to be told that 
Tor years past i t  has been an axiom with most Anglo- 
Indian politicinl~s that any interference by Russia 
with Afghanistan ougl~t  to bc made a subject of 
remonstrance and, if necessary, o l  war. The  reason Tor 
this state of reeling 118s becn obviously the dread 
that  if  Russia were pcr~nilted to establish hcrselT in  
Arglianistan, shc would thcreby be enablccl t o  con- 
solidate her poavcr ill Ccl!tral Asia, 1.0 corr~plete her 
I83 dffhalti~tfrl~. 
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long line or communication with llcr E~lropcnll 
provinces, not only through the difficult tracts of 
desert and stcppc that now separate Orenburgh from 
Tashkc~~d,  but tliroufi.11 the territories of Persia, OVcr 
wliich Alcsander thc Great marchcd with so much 
apparent ease to India, and so tbreateti our Indian 
frontier ill a way that can hardly norv be realised. 
Tlic c o ~ ~ s e q u c ~ ~ c c  of Russia's possession of Afghan- 
istan would, it is believed, bc to put British India in 
i perpetual clrcad of Russian invasion ; and as Our 
. 
Indian fe~~datories and fellow-subjects are supposed 
4 to bc particularly sensitive to Russophobia, and many of them, indeed, have beell even credited with a willingness to gct rid of our yolce altogether a t  the I risk of only changing their mnsters, the onc certain resl~lt of sucli an event would be that a iarge army of observation would bc requircd to guard OIII. existing I frontier. Thosc who think ~ v c  are not justified in extenrlil~g our frontier, even by peaceful negotiation 
i 
i -bclicving that a still more advanced frootier moi~ld 
I be still more costly to dcfend-do not deny that if Russian influence wcre to becolne paramount in 
Akhnnistan, IVC should havc to lceep up a larger 
European al.my that1 at present in J~idia, 
Pew persoils are aware how large a proportion of 
tile revclilles of India arc already expended for 
military purposes. Tlic Indian army charges for the 
current year are estimated a t  ~r,$,8oo,ooo, wliile the 
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who\e revellue derivcd from Excise, Custorns, salt 
duties, stamps, and land revenue, is rather less than 
~ ; ~ S , O W , O O O .  WC t l ~ i ~ s  sce that in India nea~ ly  one- 
half of. tllc taxes arc spent for mllitary purposes ; 
w]lile in England, wllich is as rich as India is poor, 
tile arrny expenses for tllc currcntycar are estimated 
a t  ~1~,595;8m,  or less than one-fourth of the rever~uc 
derived from Customs, Excise, stamps, lst~cl tax, 
income tax, and house duty, ~vhioh ainounts to abollt 
f;66,5oo,ooo. Again, if the results of the army ex- 
penditure in England and India are compared, it nrill 
be Seen tha t  while the expenditure lor both services 
is allnost identical, the strength OF tbc English service 
is-regular army, 128,037 ; army rcserve (first and 
second .class), 4 3 , ~ ;  ~nilitia and ~nilitia reserve, 
1 ~ 6 , 7 7 8  ; and voluutcers and yeomanry, 254,734-0ra 
total  of  562,545, men. On the other hand, the It~dian 
army ~iumbets only 62,G~o Europeat~ and rzj,ooo 
nativetroops, or  a total of about 188,030 mc~i. T l ~ c  
excessive cost of the Indian army-two-thirds of 
which is co~nposed of native forces-as compared 
rvith tha t  o l  England, seems to demand attention, 
with a view to a decrease, if possible, lather tllal~ an 
ai~gmentation. , 
Thus, if we once grant the assumption that Russia 
intends, if left alone, to advance her tronticr prac- 
tically t o  the Sti l i rna~~ 'Mollntains and the I<haibnl. 
Pass, we cannot avoid the conclusio~~ that such a 
proceeditig on her part will involve us in heavy ex- 
!, penditure. 
If our present frontier were u~iiversally considered 
deFensible, 110 one could reaso~iably hope to persuade 
E l~g ln~ id  to go to war with Russia in order to keep 
lier out of Afghanistan. W e  do not ourselves want 
that country for its own sake;  but the utmost concern 
! 
~ v e  could feel with regard to it is that i t  should either 
be independent and friendly, or so under our control as 
i to be prevented From being used against us by Russia. - - 
~ h i s e  n l ~ o  regard our preserlt rrofltiel. as  a 
sufficiently strong one, or as capable of being made 
so, or, a t  least, that i t is  better to put up witli it than 
advance it any Ct~rther, object witli great veliemence 
to the recent policy of Lord Lytton and the Con- 
se~vative Government as ~~eedlessly involving us in 
complications that may lead to awar  whicl~ tiley tlii~ilc 
woulcl l~ave no adequate cause. T o  this scliool 
belong soell liigl~ a~~ t l~o r i t i e s  as Lord Lawrence, 
General Sir John Adye, Lords Mayo, Northbrook, 
and Napier, and Sir Henry Norman. T o  these, Mr. 
Fawcett adds t l ~ e  Dulce of Wellington, 1,ord 
Hardinge, Lord Sandl~urst, Sir I-Ierbert Eclwarcles, 
Geueral Nicl~olson, General Ueecher, and General 
Reynell Taylor. 011 the other side are ranged Si r  
Bartie Frere, the late Governor of Bombay, and, 
apparently, the present military advisers of Lord 
Lyt to t~  and the Premier. 
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k v e  have spoken of " the Afghan question " hitherto 
if i t  were merely one concert~ing the rectification 
of o u r  Indian frontier. In doing so we have followed 
the l ine  taken by Lord Beaconsfield it1 his speech at 
the RIansion Housc on November 9th. Our readers 
,"ill remember that on that occasion the Pretniec 
:-" So far as the invasion of India in that 
q u a r t e r  [meaning on tlic north-westcr~i frontier] is 
concerned, it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Govern- 
m e n t  that it is Ilardly practicable. The base of 
o p e r a t i ~ ~ l s  of any possible foe is so remote, the 
, communications are so difficult, the aspect of the 
c o u n t r y  so forbidding, that we have long arrived at 
an opinion that an invasion of our Empire by passing 
the  mountains which form our north-western frontier 
is one ~vhich wc need not dread. But it is a fact 
t h a t  t h a t  frontier i s a  haphazard, and not a scientific 
f ront ier  ; and it is possible that it is in the power of 
a n y  f o e  so to embarrass and disturb our dominion 
t h a t  w e  should, under tile circumstances, be obliged 
to mainta in  a great military force in that quarter, and, 
consequently, entail upon this coootry and upon 
I n d i a  a greatly increased expenditure. These are 
evils no t  to be despised, and, as  I venture to observe, 
t h e y  have for some time, under various Viceroys and 
u n d e r  direretltAdtni~~istrations, occupied the attention 
of our statcsrncn. 13ut while our attention was , 
, I  na tura l ly  drawn also to this subject, some peculiar i 
~ ~ & J I , ~ / I ; s ~ < z / ~ .  
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circ~~~nstances occurrctl in t l ~ a t  part of the world 
wllich i.et~dc~.cd it absolutely neccssary that wc sl~oulcl 
give our immeciiate and carllcst a t tc~~t ion  to tllc 
sobjcct, and sce \vl~cthcr it was not possible to tcr- 
l n i ~ ~ n t c  tlmt . absolute inconvenience and possible 
illjury, wliicl~ must or would accrue if thc prcsent 
stntc of aff;lirs wcrc not touched and considered by 
tllc Govcrnmctrt or the Queen. With thesc views we 
have taken S I I C I I  mcasorcs as wc tl~inlc will cf(cct tllc 
object mc rcqairc. W ~ C I I  tl~cse arran~cmcnts arc 
-.-.-.-.-.~ . . . . 
n~adc-and I cannot suppose that any co~~sidcrable 
1 time will clapsc bcfore t l~cy  arc consun~mated-our 
north-\vcsteru [rolltier will I IO  Iongcr bc a source o f  
a n s i c t y  to the Englisl~ people. Wc sllall live, I i I~opc, ott gooil terms wit11 our i~nrncdiatc ~lcighbours~ 
I and pcpllnl~s not on bad tcrlns wit11 somc neigh- 
I Lours that arc rnorc retnote. B u t ,  in  ~nalcing 
t l~csc  rc~narks I sl~oulcl be sorry Tor it to be 
bclicved that it was t l ~ c  opinion of I-Icr Majesty's 
Govcr~i~ncnt hat an invasion of India  was im- 
possible or impracticable. On tllc contrary, if Asia 
Minor  and t l~e .Val ley  of tllc Eupllratcs wcrc i n  
tllc posscssion of R very weak or  of a very powcrf~~l  
State, an ailcquate force might nlnrcl~ through the 
passes or the Asian mountains, througli' Persia, and 
absol~~tc ly  menace the empire of the Queen. Wcll, 
we hnve foreseen that possibility, and have provided 
for ~vllat  we believc will secure its non-occurrence. 
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and t h e  chief  mocle by ~vhich wc have providccl Tor 
tha t  result is that convention with Turkey or which 
.. *,, yo11 have heard so much, By that convention we 
. . 
. . . .: .,.; . . ]lave secured that tile regions in qucstiorl sIialI bc in 
the ponsession of an ally, and a t  thc same time, if I I C  
. ' ,.'L;.xs 
. . . .:.:?!I: fulfils, a s  we  do not doubt he mill fi~lfil, the conditiol~s 
. . of tha t  agrcemcnt, thcy will be in the possession of 
.,: ;:,j <! 
.. ,.-...  
an ally supported by subjects whose prosperity every 
. . . 1,.-. 
. . .~..i 5: year will render his ai~tllority more firm and valid, 
,>.- - 
I e r e c t i n g  this result wc ]lave occtlpiecl tile i l a n d  ' 
..y: 
-. ..'-*. 
of Cyprus, in order to encourage 2nd strengthen and 
.. 
aid tllc Silltall." W e  ]lave quoted the wliole pnssngc 
rererring t o  Afghan affairs, as  it contained tllc most 
at1tllo1-itative statement we ]lad l ~ a d  givcn to us up to 
' . 7.. :, 
that d a t e  of the state of our re la t io~~s  with thc Amir. 
. .. .;-: 
. - ',.. ., I t  was an ,important disclosure which infor~necl us 
that  " t h e A f g h a n  question" was one mainly of "a 
rectilicatioil of frontier," and not, as t l ~ c  Englisl~ 
public for  some time believed, a quesLioi~ of upholcling 
the honour of  England agninst insult. 
Without  discussing further here the merits and 
clcmerits of  the rival frontier politics, we continue 
our brief review of the negotiationsthat have passed 
between t h e  -Indian Governrne~~t and the Amir of 
Afghanistan since the dcatl~ of Dost Muhammad in 
1863. St will be remembered that we 11acl collcluded 
a treaty with Dost Muhammad in 1855, by \r'l~icl~ 
each p a r t y  bound himself to respect the integrity of 
tllc otl~cr's territories, a treaty wbicli \\,as follo\ved 
by  a subsidy or £ro,ooo a lnotith during our war 
wit11 Pcrsia, and u11ti1 wc put  donzn tllc India11 
mutiny. T l ~ c  virtuc clisplaycd by Do'st Mullalnmad 
ill abstaining iroln all ilivasiol~ of Norther11 I l ~ d i a  
during the mutiny ,of 1857 llas been so loudly Cx- 
, 
tolled of lntc that it is clcsirablc to poilit out to tllose 
who ~vould attril~otc it to cxccssivc gcilerosity on his 
part that thcrc werc two very good rcasons why 11c 
did not avail himself of tlie opporttinity to stl.ikc a 
~vllat easc tile Englisl~ liad dctl~rol~cd him ill 1839, 
and lio\v crfect~~ally wc had avenged our subscquci~t 
disasters. Lord Nortl~brool~ has especially rcferred 
to Dost hlu11amm;td's rorbcarancc as proof or  the 
good resolts of col~ciliation. This latter reflection 
may l~ave liad quite as lnucl~ to do wit11 keeping 
him stao~ich as m y  fccling of generosity, a sentimc~it 
wl~icli hc could hardly bc expccted to e i~ter ta i l~ 
towards tllc 13ritisli Power. yioudy wit 
From tlie dcat l~ of Dost Rluhnmlnad to thc year ai~h im. 
1868 Arghanistan was t l ~ c  sccne of interoecioc wars, Lord No[ 
a sllort sutnmary of wl~icli has been given ill the last 
chapter. Lord Lawrence was Governor-General , 
during that period, and as one o f l ~ i s  successors in 
tile Viceroyalty (Lord Northbrook) said of his policy 
the other day, "tnost wisely abstained from all 
- 
saying that whoever became ruler of the country 
~vo i~ ld  be recognised as such by the il~.itisli Govern- 
ment." I t  was to this abstention on tlie part of 
Lord La~vre~ice from interfelrnce in tlie affairs of 
Afghanistan tliat the late Mr. Wyllie, an Indian 
civilian whom Lord Northbrook described as "very 
able," applied the term "masterly inactivity," 
which so much has been made sioce. The phrase, 
however, of masterly inactivity in no ivay applied to 
the policy pursued since that day. Indeed, blr. 
\Vyllie himself, who liad written the articlc lieaded 
" Masterly Inactivity " in the Foufni~ht& Rcvime, 
wrote another called "Miscliievous Activity," and 
gave the reasons Ire liad to advance against tlie 
policy afterwards pursued by Lords Laxvreiice and 
Mayo after the civil war i n  Afghanistan had come to 
an end. This later policy consisted in cxtcnding to 
Shcre Ali, rvho had got the upper hand of his 
brothers, that moral support which liad been pre- 
viously withheld, and o l  entering into closer relations 
~irith him. With regard to both these lines of policy 
Lord Nortltbrook has recently' given his opinion 
tliat they ivere wisely adopted. W l e o  the resolve 
to recognise Shere Ali was made, Lord Beaconsfield 
was Premier and Si r  Stafford Northcote Secre- 
tary of State for India. Lord Lawrence, however, 
resigned office to Lord Mnyo in January, 1869, 
before the ncw progralnliic liad beet] carried out.  
W c  1;11ow that it included onc of thosc gorgcotls 
Sta tc  ccrcmonics ill whicli the Orictitals and Conser- 
vative I'rcmicrs arc said to dclight. Lord Mnyo 
met Slicre Ali  a t  Alnballa in Rlarel~, and 11ad a 
conlerc~icc with him, surrounded by all the palnp 
\rfliicl~ attends those viceregal assemblies, and, alter 
hearing all tliat Shere Ali wanted, lie decided wliat 
he \\'auld give liim, and wliat 11c did not reel it con- 
sistcnt wit11 British interests to give Iiiln, and, a s  
Lord Mayo lias been cl~allengerl a good deal by the  
IJrcss as  to wliat he did, it is o ~ i l y  rair to lliln to use 
his own words as to w l ~ a t  he intended to give and 
\\,\.hat lic did give on that occasion. H c  said on the  
1st o r  July, r8Gg:-"Whilc we distit~ctly intimatcd if, lor tile aPP" 
lo tile Amir that lll~der IIO c i rcumsta~~ces  should a lli[il officers 
British soldier ever cross liis rrontier to assist liim in 
cocrcing liis rcbcllious subjects ; tliat 110 European 
oficers sl~ould be placetl as rcsidcl~ts in 11is cities ; 
that no fixed subsidy or money allowance should be I ~ P  Viceroy ' 
given for any named period ; that  no promises of E M V O ~  hag, 111 
a s s i s t a~~cc  ill o t l~er  ways sl~ould bc made;  that IIO lions with 11 
trcaty ~vould bc cntcred into obliging us under any  Amiis, Court. 
circumstances to recognisc liim and liis descendants 
 he second 
as rulers in Afgl~anistati, wc wcre prcparcd by the  
, d a propoia 
most open and absolute present recognitioo, and b y  I ,ions uncondi 
cvcry public cvidenee or friendly disposition, of re- Thc third f 
spcct for his cliaractcr, a11rl interest in his fortunes, t o  
I prl any on< 
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a ive  all the moral support in our power, and, in 
addition, we were willing to assist l ~ i ~ n  with money, 
arms, alnmunition, and native artificers, and in other 
ways, whenever we deem i t  possible or desirable 
t o  d o  so;" 
Three  mattersin.  this declaration specially deserve 
notice. First, 1.ord' Mayo promised that no Euro. 
pcan oficer sliould be placed it1 Shere Ali's territory 
without liis consent. This was o~i ly  following the 
l.equest of Dost filuliammad, who Jlad said, in 1856, 
t o  Lord Lawrence, "If xve are to be friends, do not 
lorce British officers up011 me." The sound policy 
of this promise, rvliicl~ seemed like a concession, lias 
been questioned, but a later Viceroy lias approved of 
it, For the  apparently very good reason that " ~ ~ n l e s s  
British officers wcre to be there on good relations, 
t hey  would be of no usewhatever." I t  most not be 
s~rpposed either, that because we were not to have 
European officers accredited to Sllcre Ali's Court, 
t h e  Viceroy would be unrepresented. A native 
Envoy has, until the present rupture in our rela- 
tions with him, ~~ninterruptedly resided at the 
Amir's Court. 
Thesecond matter to be observed is the rejection 
of a proposal for a treaty guaranteeing liis domi- 
nions unconditionally from without. 
The  third point is the refusal of a promise to sup- 
por t  any one 'a t  liis death ~vliom lie ~niglit  have 
A fghrrnistm. 
nominatccl Ileir. To liave guaranteed liis dominions 
~~nconditionally would have been to ellcourage 
him to attack his i~eiglibor~rs ; a ~ i d  to have given . . 
tlic promise to support his tiolninee in  obtain- 
ing tllc "~nasnad " alter liis death would have 
beel) to commit ourselves to interrere i n  the 
do~nestic policy of Afghanistan, and against such 
interfcre~se ~ v c  had liad suficient warning in former 
ycars. 
T o  counter-balance our refusal of' tl~cse requests 
practical assistance in the shape of motley and war 
a matcrials" was oKered to tlie extent of 12 lalrhs 
of rupees (A1 ,200,ooo) in all, besides arms, gons, and 
amm~~l~i t ior i ,  Tlie only return wliicl~ the Govcr~ior- 
Gcncral expectcCl for this being "abiding confidence, 
sincerity, and goodwill." 
Sir  I-Ic~~ry Rarvli~iso~~ remarlcs upon this trans- 
action, that Lord Clarendon mayhave bcen"justificd 
-in so (ar as he possessed any lcnoivledge of the 
intentions or tlie Indinn Governrncnt-in assuring 
Prince Gortscliakoff at I-Ieidelberg that Sir John 
Lar1,rencc's policy in assisting Shcre Ali Khan ' liad 
no relerencc to tile advances of Russia in Central 
Asia ; ' but no onc convc*,sant wit11 tlie negotiations 
rvliich preceded the Arnballa Con(ere11ce can doubt 
that thcse advances did exercise a very important 
influence on the feelings and conduct of the Amir of 
~ a b c l . "  
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But, however clear and u~lqualified the refusal of 
Lord Mayo to the proposed guarantee and prolnise 
of future Support may appear to us now, it is not 
certain that, in 1869, Shere Ali did not believe be 
had  been granted more than in fact was conceded. 
F o r  Lord Mayo did give a written declaration that 
t he  British Government "would view wit11 severe 
displeasure any attempt on the part of his rivals to 
disturb his position." Coupli~lg this with Sir John 
Lawrence's promise of "practical assistance in the 
shape of money and materials of war," to be fur- 
~ ~ i s l l e d  to him ill the future " at the discretion of the 
head of the administration in India," and Lord 
Mayo's confirmatory declarations that "any repre- 
sentation he might make would always be treated 
wi th  consideration and respect," it is believed Shere 
Ali went away understanding these expressions of 
general  interest in a more liberal sense than they 
were  meant to convey. I t  is thought, says Sir 
H e n r y  Ra~vlinson, that he considered "the threat of 
' severe displeasure ' to be equivalent to an assurance 
of armed support against his allies, while the pro- 
mised consideration of his iuture demands amounted 
in his view, to an almost unlimited credit on the 
Ind ian  Exchequer." 
Two views of Lord Mayo's proceedings were taken 
b y  the  authorities in England. The bolder spirits 
would have preferred a bolder policy, to the extent 
I 3  
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of accepting the liability of an armed intervcntion by 
giving t l ~ c  Amir a direct guarantee of protectioll 
against insorsectiot~ and also invasion, talzing dire 
advantagc or the favourable positions me should then 
have obtaincd to secure tlie Afghan frontiers, and to 
estnblisi~ our influence permanently in the country. 
The Inore cautious statesmen ivitll ~110111 the dcci- 
sion restcd wcre, on tile contrary, of opinion that 
Lord hlayo had already gone too fat; the thrcat 
of "severe displeasure" against Shere Ali's internal 
'I enemies havine probably committed us to a more 
- .  
active interference in Afghan politics than had been 
contemplated, or suitcd tile interests of India. 
Lord Mayo cxpiaincd that, without risking tile 
f~ i lo re  of the wllole sciieme, he could not avoid using 
the languagc objecled to, and pointed to the results, 
in Shere Ali's strengthened position a t  Cabul, as  the 
best justilication of his policy. 
0 1 1  the very day of tlie U~nbal la  Conference a 
very important correspondence on Central Asian 
affairs was cotnmenced between Lord Clareudon, the 
British Porcign Minister, and the Russian Govern- 
ment. This had for its object the demarcation of 
rvl~at has been calicd " a  neutral zone" of territoly 
between the frontier of ut~doubted British and 
Russian dolninions. The  suggestions for laying 
clow~l soc l~  a zone sprang from the anxiety to allay 
the.increasing disquietude of the Native States along 
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tlle north-west .frontier of India, ~vlvhicl~ was caused by 
tllc persistent approaches of Russia. The Govern- 
1,ent of Lord M a y o  regarded the proposal allnost as 
attack on thei r  independent action; but Lord 
Claendon seems to have really tlvhougl~t it desirable 
in the interests of both Governments to have a 
lleutral zone. T l l e  great objection to suc11 an 
arrangement would be  that it would make either 
power responsible t o  the other for its dealings with 
tile peoples inhabiting theirfrontiers, many of whom 
. oftell require chastiselneht for marauding attacks on 
. 
the subjects of t h e  great Powers. The correspon- 
dence dragged i ts  slow length along, cl~aracterised 
by some geographical errors not creditabie to our 
Foreign Office, unt i l  1872, when Her Majesty's 
Government notified t o  Russia the extent of terri- 
tory which Shere A l i  claimed on the Upper Oxus, 
and to which they were prepared to recognise his 
right. I n  expressing the  boundaries native authority 
had to be followed, for we lcnew little or nothing of 
the bend of the river Oxus to the i~orth\vard,.or of 
the upper feeders from Pamir. Thus it was not 
defined which of the feeders was the main stream of 
the Oxus, and so fo r  a time i t  seemed that part of 
\Vakhan had been abandoned to Russia. Subse- 
v e n t  inquiries seem t o  show that the feeder entitled 
to be considered the main stream really forms the 
110,rthern bollndary of that province. The territories 
13-2 
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tllus indicated as belonging to Afghanistan wcrc t11e11 
fortnally dcclarcd by Prince GortclialcoCI to bc " com- 
plctely outside tllc spllere withiu whicl~ Russia 
might be callcd to cxercise her influcnce." The 
Russian bou~ldary line is tllcrefore that of her 
depcndcncics, ICllokarid and 13okhara, and is con- 
tcrminous with the frontiers of Dadaklishan and 
\Vakhan, whicll were concedcd by Russia to bclo~lg 
to tltc Amir. We !nay liere briefly refer to the 
Russian conquest of IChiva in 1 8 7 3  This cxpedi- 
-.~-. 
tior], says Rawli~lson, "affords an apt illustration of 
! tlte ~~orrnal  course of Russian progrcss in the East!' 
I t  resulted in the anncsation of a large cxtcnt of 
tcrritory to the Russian E~npirc, and reduced I<hiva 
to n pericct state of vasselagc, and tl~us fillally 
sccured acccss to tliosc strategic lines across the 
Stcl~pe, Ivliich were cssc~ltial to Russia's furthcr 
progress, ancl whicl~ had beco, in rack, t l~c  primary 
object of tlie expedition. 
Dut the importance to 111dia of tlie Kl~ivau cam- 
paign, and its results, pcrlrnps, chiefly lics in thc 
remarkable light thrown by them up011 Russian 
diplomacy. More notable instances of repudia- 
tion of promises could scarcely be found in modern 
history than those given by Prince Gortchakoff ill 
tlie course of the representations that passcd between 
him and the British Foreign Oflice. 
I<lliva had been mentioned during the earlier 
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negotiatiolls in 1869 that aimed at making the Oxus 
the limit of Itussian influence. The  Russian Ambas- 
sador in Locidon had objected to that river being 
the boundary, because it would include a portio~l 
of IChiva which lies to thc south of the OXUS, 
and Russia woulcl then be dcbarrcd from pu~~ i s l~ ing  
tlic ruler for outragcs on Russian subjects. Lord 
Clarcnclon, Lhc English Foreign Minister, admitted 
tlic right of thc Czar to punish thelChan "on his owl1 
territory," but added this important proviso :-"That 
England would rely on thc honour of Russia, as soon 
as shc had obtaincd reparation, again to revert to the 
armngelncnt, should shc have assented to it, and 
considcr thc Uppcr Oxus as the boundary which was 
]lot to bc passed." Shortly after that convcrsation 
rumours of an intcl~dcd expedition against IChiva 
nssunicd n dcflnitc shape, and Sir A. Buchanan, our 
Ambassador at  St. Pctersburg, questiocled Prince 
~o r t c l i a l~o f f  OII the subjcct. Thc  Chancellor denied 
Illat tllc 12ussia11 Govcrnmcnt had any intention " to 
dcspatcll a niilitaly expedition to Khiva." H e  
rleclnrcd, inorcover, that " hc would never consent to 
any fllrthcr cslcnsion of the territory of the empire." 
11 I'rince Cortcl~akoWs language was so apparently 
sincere," csclnimcd Sir A, I3uclianan, "that, not- 
wit\istanrling ihc strong grounds which exist for 
I,elicving t11:lt an cspedition is preparing agaillst 
I<lliva, I sl~nll  cndcavour " to believe evcl-y word the 
Russian Cl~a~lcellor has said. I n  the course of some 
il~rtlier conversation on the ICIiivan qiiestion in June; 
1870, Prince Gortchalcoff assured tlie English 
Ambassador that " lZussia neither required nor 
desired to possess the khanates." Ichokand atld 
Bokhara, he said, were ready to act according to her 
wishes, but Khiva was still disposed to be hostile. 
Nevertheless, a t  the same moment, Russia was 
secretly preparit~g an expcclition to I<liiva ; while as 
to Bokliam, within hvo months of the last-mentioned 
date Russia toolc the important Bokliarian fortress 
of Shahr-i-subz (August 24, 1870). But the promises 
about Ichiva still vent  on. 
In  June, 1871, it was admitted that an expedition 
llad been thought of, but we mere assured that i t  
would not take place. I n  March, 1872, tlie Director 
of tlie Asiatic Departmcnt at St .  Petersburg (M. 
StremooukoK) admitted that reconnaissances had 
been already made against I<hiva, and that the 
Russian generals had found "tlie occupation of the 
place would offer no strategical difficulties." In  
summing up the result of his conversation with M. 
StremooukofC, Lord Augustus Loftus wrote :-" I 
have gained the conviction that an expedition 
soon as  the weather and circumstances permit." 
S ix  or  seven months la ter  the Russian papers 
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announced that the expedition had been prepared, i ( 
but M. Westmann denied (in September) that i !.; 
measures had advanced to s ~ ~ c l i  a stage. He, how- ,I 
ever, practically admitted that if the IChan interfered il: i 
with commerce, and refused to give up the Russian 
prisoners, the Russian Government would punish 
him. As  the winter advanced evidence increased of 
thc Russian intention to send a force against I<biva. 
Tlie subject came up, as we have already described, in 
tlie celebrated intcrview between Cottnt SchouvaloK 
and Lord Granville. Tlie Russian representative 
admitted that an. expedition was dccidcd upon for 
the spring, but declared that both its composition 
and its objects would be insignificant. The force 
k I 
I 
would consist of " but four-and-a-half battalions," 
and its objects would be " t o  punish acts of i 
brigandage, to  recover fifty Russian prisoners, aiid to 
teach tlie I<han that such conduct on his part c o ~ ~ l d  
not be continued. Not only," continued Count 
,,I 
Schouvaloff, "was it far from tlie intention of the 
Emperor to take possession of Ichiva, but positive ! 
orders had been prepared to prevent it, and direc- 
tions given that the conditiotls imposed should be 
such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged 
occupancy of I<liiva." I t  was not long before the 
departure of tlie expedition gave an opportunity for 
testing the veracity of one of Coulit Schouvaloff's 
1 I 
bromises. The insignificant force of four-and-a.half i 
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battalions grew into three columns, which altogether 
numbered about ~o ,ooo men, and was accompanied 
by forty guns. On June 10, 1873, Ichiva fell, and 
the time came for fi~lfilling the second of Count 
Schouvaloff's engagements. The treaty which was 
imposed upon the Khan, in face of the Russian 
promise to make no territorial accessions, bestowed 
on Russia the whole of the Ichivan territory on the 
right banli of the Oxus. Besides thus taking pos- 
sessioil of a large extent of country, the treaty 
prepared the way for the entire absorption of the 
khanate, if Russia were so minded. I t  imposed an 
enormous indemrrity, the payment of which ex- 
tended over nineteen years ; it extorted a declaration 
from the Ichan of Russian suzeraitlty, and a renun- 
ciation of thc right to maintain dipIomatic relations 
or enter into treaties with the rulers of neighbouring 
khanates. Russia also obtained excIusive control of 
the navigation of the Oxus, and the right to estabIish 
cominercial buildings on the left banli of the river. 
Lord Granville, when the treaty was communicated 
to him in January, 1874, merely replied, in cold and 
measured terms, that " Her Majesty's Government 
saw no practical advantage in examining too 
minutely how far the Khivan arrangements were 
i n  strict accordance with the assurances given by 
Count Schouvaloff as to the intentions with which 
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rebuke," says Sir Henry Rawlinson, " seems to have 
ranltled somewhat in the hearts of the Russian 
statesmen, who, however, did not coildescend to any 
apology or explanation further than by calling their 
acquisition of territory on the right bank of the 
Oxus ' sterile and onerous,' and contrastiilg its dis- 
advantages with the brilliant position they might 
have gained had they yielded to the pressing invita- 
tion of the IChail that they should place a garrison 
in the town of I<hiva." Lord Granville, however, 
proposed another arrangement. He declared the 
necessity of " a clcar and franlc understanding" 
as to the relative position of British and Russian 
interests in Asia, but suggested no definite plan 
for the attainment of that object further than 
to  reco~nmend another pledge from Russia not to 
take Merv nor interfere with the independence of the 
Amir of Afghanistan. Lord Granville's moderation 
proved very agreeable to the Government of St. 
Petersburg. Prince Gortchaltoff expressed his 
" entire satisfaction" at the "just view which Lord 
Granville had talten." " In my opinion," he ex- 
claimed, " the understanding is complete." All that 
was required, according to his opinion, for the future 
agrecmcnt of the two Governments was a spirit of 
mutual goodwill and conciliation. The understand- 
illg between thc two Powers rested " not only upon 
the loyalty of thc two Governments, but up011 mutual 
political advantages." As a proof of this loyalty, he 
repeated "the positive assurance that the Imperial 
Cabinet continues to consider Afghanistan as entirely 
beyond its sphere of action." This was in January, 
1874. 
I t  is necessary here to follow in some detail the 
advances of Russia in Central Asia since the fall of 
Khiva. The most important event, perhaps, in her 
progress eastwards has been the subjugation of the 
Yomdt and Goklan Turkomans. This has pushed 
her frontier on towards Merv, a large city and a 
strong strategical position, which was supposed to be 
her next object. Shere Ali, alarmed at  the reported 
advance upon Merv, as well as by the example of the 
Khivan Expedition, had sent his confidential agent 
in September, 1873, to wait on the Viceroy (Lord 
Northbroolr) at Siinla to discuss the general questioil 
of the Indo-Afghan relations. 
In  those negotiations it is curious to observe that 
the Amir treatcd the safety of Afghanistan as essen- 
tially necessaly to the safety of India, and he pro- 
posed that the British Government should assist 
him with money and arms. Money he had already 
received to the extent of two lalrhs of rupees, and 
lle was now pro~nised ten lalrhs in addition, as well 
as ro,ooo Enfield and 5,000 Snider rifles. But it 
soon appeared that these large grants did not satisfy 
the Amir's wants. He  evidently thought it the duty 
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He dreaded a liussian advance upon Merv, and he 
wished to -make this country'responsible for pro- 
tecting him against the consequences of that advance 
being continued to Herat. The English Govern- 
ment  showed no unwillingiiess to accept a consider- 
able share of the duty which the Afghan ruler 
desired to place upon them. I t  was declared that 
a in  the event of any aggression from without, the 
~ r i t i s h  Government would in all .probability afford j 
material assistance in repelling an invader," and 
Lord  Derby stated in the House of Lords (May 8, 
1874) that " i t  was highly probable this country 
would interfere" in tlle case of any attack upon the 
independeilce of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the 
negotiations with the Amir did not progress favour- 
ably. The  chief obstacle to a definite course of 
action arose from the refusal of Shere Ali to enter 
in to  reciprocal engagements. I le  declined to accept 
a proposed survey by English officers of the frontier 
which he considered to be exposed to Russian 
attack ; and he was equally indisposed to permit the 
presence of Residents at Cabul, Herat, or Candahar, 
wbom the English Government desired to place there 
in  order to  prevent this country from undertaking 
a n y  measures on behalf of Shere Ali without 
knowing why. From that period we may date the 
A fgAa7zistan. i 1 
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defection of Shere Ali fi-om the English alliance. \VitI~in a 
Shortly after the Simla conference had revealed to 1lery.s of a 
the Amir that England considered some return for from I(raslll 
her responsibility necessary on his part, we find him Instcad, l~ov 
in communication with General Icaufmann. That it turr~ed ou 
i 
officer was wise enough t o  express horror at the 
rebellion of Yakub Ichan, which naturally pleased 
the Amir better than our intercession in the young 
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Within a few weeks of that engagement we had 
news of a scientific exploring expedition, starting 
from ICrasnovodsk to "the old bed of the Oxus." 
Instead, however, of its having that innocent object, 
it turilcd out to be a Cossack force from Chikisliar, 
along the course of the Atrek, which succeeded in 
obtaining thc submissioll of certain tribes in the 
nc ighbourh~~d  of that river and the Simbar. This 
was in 1875, and other expeditions followed in 1876 
and 1877. All this time the Russian Government, 
nccordi~~g to their semi-official journals, were endea- 
vouring to restrict General Lomakin's operations, 
and it camc with surprise upon this country in 1876 
that in thc course of that year a small Russian 
expedition l ~ a d  actually reached ICizil Arvat. That 
demonstration, however, seems to have been no 
more than a recoilnaissance ; but in the following 
year a new expedition, consisting of 4,000 men, 
marched in the same direction. Beyond the 
ailnouncement that the force reached Icizil Arvat, 
thc ltussiail newspapers threw no light upon its 
operations. Current reports, which were probably 
true, rcprcscnted that General Lomakin suffered a 
severe defeat, and this was ultimately admitted by 
aMucnts of that river, to the north of which the Simbar is one, 
:~nd she also claimed the Yomuts inhabiting those valleys as 
her su1)jects. Little regard, however, has been paid by Russia 
to this claim, as she has established a military post on the 
A~rck. 
the Rzrsskz' Mil.. The information supplied by the 
Indian Press respecting these expeditions indicates 
that the Russian endeavour to  advance towards Merv 
was not overloolted by the Viceroy and his Council. 
These were the days of Lord Salisbury's appeals to 
large-scale maps, and he seems to have rejected all 
proposals that may have been made by the Indian 
Government for counteracting Russian enterprise 
against the Turkomans and Merv. I t  may be that 
the Indian Secretary received some assurailces from 
the Russian authorities that Merv was not to be 
I interfered with, and that 11is simple faith in Russia's 
promises was undisturbed. Indeed, an Allahabad 
paper recently announced that in 1876 Prince 
Gortcllakoff added one Inore to the long series of 
pledges "to regard Afghanistan as remaining out- 
side t l ~ e  sphere of Russia's action." 
Meanwhile, Russia's advance was being continued 
in Bolchara and I(ho1cand. IChokand had become 
Russian territory, and the last remnants of Bolt- 
hara's independence had been destroyed. Although 
the Czar and his Chancellor had professed to regret 
the conquest of the northern portion of Bokhara, 
ancl had even promised to restore Samarkand to the 
Amir of Bokhara, yet, in 1873, they compelled him 
to enter into a treaty, by  which he virtually placed 
his country in the possession of Russia. 
The course of procedure wit11 regard to Khokand 
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PS exact] 
professed 1 
*ortion of 
mises tha 
region ha 
should be 
February, 
been SuKt 
I<han wa 
ghatla, it: 
left in a c 
Russia 
advance 
These a 
Herat ; 
third, b: 
Bamia~l 
its stear 
her bast: 
that sht 
position 
allowed 
necting 
with tlli 
such sc 
develo~ 
of tt1esc 
Rz~ssinn A dvn~zce Ea.stzvnr&. 207 
was exactly similar. I n  that case also there were the 
professed regrets at the cruel llecessity of annexing a 
portion of the territory. There were the same pro- 
mises that the terms of Russian advance in that: 
region hacl been reached, and that what was left 
should be independent. Nev~rtheless, on the 7th of 
February, 1876, the portion of the country that had 
been suffered to remain undcr the rule of I<hudayar 
Khan was annexed, and received the name of Fer- 
gbana, its feudatory State of Icarateghin being alolle 
left in a conditioil of semi-independence. 
Russia has thus, by means of her recent conquests, 
obtained the choice of three routes by which she can 
advance upon the Afghan frontier from the Oxus. 
These are-first, from Charjui through Merv to 
Herat ; second, from Icarshi to A~ldlthui; and, 
third, by Ichoja Salih ferry to Ballch and the 
Bamian Pass. She would then have the Oxus, with 
its steamboat service to and from Lalte Aral, for 
her base and source of supplies. I t  is certain, also, 
that she would be able to greatly strengthen her 
position in Turltestan in the course of a few years, if 
allowed to do so, by railways through Persia, con- 
necting the Russian possessions on the Oxus directly 
with the ports of the Blaclr. Sea. There are several 
such schemes at  present i?z ?zz~ljibv.s, but capable o f  
development, if opportunity offers. The most feasible 
of these seems to be the proposal to make a railway 
A fg/Lmzistcirz. R 
- w- 
from Batoum on the Black Sea, wl~ich has now be- question of F 
come a Russian port, to Erivan, Tabriz, and Teheran, land seemed 
thus passing through the eastern extremity of Arme- rations, \$re r 
nia and the Persian provinces of Azerbijan, Ghilan, a blow, or, 
and Mazanderan. This would have to be continued direction o: 
through Khorasan for another seven or eight hun- quarter. NC 
dred miles, to connect Batoum with Herat. 
The Russian system of railways ends at  present at  deemed to b 
Orenburg, and no scheme of continuing it through gained by dt 
Ichiva to Merv has been suggested but may be re- hostile inter 
garded as purely imaginary. But the expectations mcnts of tro 
that have been raised by mooting these schemes an expediti 
I are altogether extravagant. Persia is miserably . April. 1878, 
poor, and no railway such as the one suggested 
would pay. It is doubtful, too, wllether Russia, after 
the late exhausting war, has any means of raising 
the enormous sums that such gigantic undertakings 
would require. Her hold on the newly-conquered 
provinces of Turlcestan will require to be further 
strengthened, and her administration more fully 
organised, before such schemes will commend them- 
selves to  her own or foreign capitalists; even were 
she to attempt to raise the necessary funds by 
guaranteeing a remunerative rate of interest, after 
the example set by the Indian Government. 
That she is disposed to be inactive in Central 
Asia is negatived by the recent events there. Long 
before the Congress met a t  Berlin, and while the 
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now be- ,question of peace or war between Russia and Eng- 
Teheran, land seemed to be trembling in the balance, prepa- 
)f Arme- rations, we now Itnow, were being made to strike 
Ghilan, a blow, or, a t  Icast, to create a diversion, in the 
mtinued direction of India, England's most vulnerable 
:ht hun- quarter. No sensible person cah blame Russia for 
taking such a step in what she may have fairly 
'esent at  deemed to be her best interests, but nothing is surely 
through / gained by denying that she had, or could have, any 
y be re- hostile intentions towards England by any move- 1 
tctations 
schemes 
~ i s e r a b l ~  
~ggested 
;ia, after 
raising 
rtakiilgs 
lnquered 
further 
re fully 
d them- 
en were 
,rids by 
st, after 
Central 
. Long 
rhile the 
lnents of troops in Asia. If, as is now fully believed, 
an expedition was being concentrated, as early as 
April, 1878, at I<rasnovodslt, on the Caspian, with 
the ostensible object of attacking the Tekkeh Turlto- 
mans, and of seizing Merv, no one acquainted with 
the importance attached by the Indian Government 
to Merv as the last stage towards Herat, which is 
regarded as " the Gate of India," can wonder that 
this movement appeared to Anglo-Indian politicians 
as intended to be a demonstration against India. 
I<izil Arvat, which is the half-way house, so to 
speak, to Merv, has been captured ; but we have 
no intelligence whether the Krasnovodslt column 
has advanced beyond that place. Some persons 
are assured that i t  returned immediately after the 
signature of the Berlin Treaty was known at St. 
Petersburg. Other reports state, however, that on 
the very day the Berlin Treaty was signed the 
I4 
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Russian envoy was directed to advance to Cabul, gence of this 
and that: the I<rasnovodslc column is still hovering D o u n c e m e n t ~  
about Merv. Eastern Turk 
Accurate information is still wanting as to the real directly aftert, 
movements of these troops, but it is stated that it a Russian mj 
was a part of the Russia11 plan that the I<rasnovodsk t r u s t w o r t h y  g 
column sl~ould act in co-operation tvitll the army forces have 
whose movements accompanied the progress of the the O x u s  th 
Russian envoy to the Afghan capital. The Eastern papers. 
Turl~estan forces are said to have numbered about The news 
~E;,ooo men. There were three columns, but only E n v o y  seems 
one or two at the most reached tlie neigllbourhood 
of the Upper Oxus. The Tz~rhesta~z Gazette an- 
E nounced that Samarlcand was to be  tlie rendezvous of the principal column. The right wing was to 1 conceiltrate at a fort: opposite Ichiva and march 
I to Charjui, to operate, no doubt, with the Icrasno- 
vodsk column against Merv. The left wing was to 
be  established in Ferghana. How far these three 
columns advanced soutl~wards we have no intelli- 
gence. Three months ago the statement was current 
that the Ferghana column had suffered disaster. St. 
Petersburg telegrams indicated that the central or 
Samarlcand forces penetrated farther tllan either of 
the otllel- two columns ; and there is strong reason 
for believing that the main body of the army 
reached Kal-shi, and that the advanced guard even 
touched the Balkh fords of the Oxus. The intelli- 
Cabinet to a , 
Foreign O f f i c  
in te i l t ior~s  of 
July last, wl 
A f g h a n  territ 
was a few IT 
ICrasnovodsk 
A r v a t ,  a spe 
I no intent ion 
an army aga 
The story 
1 
! Her last an1 
IChokaxld in. 
yet further ; 
! part of I-ar 
the Pamil- s 
This exten: 
to Cabul, 
1 hovering 
to the real 
ed that it 
asilovodsk 
the army 
ress of the 
le Eastern 
:red about 
but only 
hbourhood 
ha?tte an- 
.endezvous 
lg was to 
nd march 
.e Krasno- 
ing was to 
:hese three 
no intelli- 
?as current 
;aster. St. 
central or 
n either of 
ong reason 
the army 
guard even 
rhe intelli- 
Russian Advance Ea.stwnj*ds. 21 I 
gence of this rapid advance was followed by an- 
nouncements in the St. Petersburg papers that the 
Eastcrtl Turkestan army had been recalled, and 
directly afterwards we had news of the reception of 
a Russian mission at Cabul. We have no more 
trustworthy ground for believing that the Russian 
forces have been recalled in their march upon 
the Oxus than paragraphs in the St. Petersburg 
'1 papers. 
T11e news of the arrival at  Cabul of a Russia11 
Envoy seems, at last, to have roused the English 
Cabinet to a sense of possible danger. The Russian 
Foreign Office was, therefore, interrogated as to the 
illtentions of General Icaufmann; and so recently as 
July last, when General Stolieteff was already on 
Afghan territory, when a part of the Turkestan army 
was a few miles from the Afghan frontier, and the 
Kras~lovodsk column was in full march on Kizil 
Arvat, a specific pledge was given that Russia had 
no intention to send an Envoy to Cabul, or to direct 
an army against the Turkomans. 
The story of Russian advance is not yet complete. 
Her last annexation, as we have stated, was that of 
Kholcand in 1876, but her most recent maps show a 
yet further advance ; for she has absorbed a large 
part of Icarateghin, and brought her frontier across 
the Pamir steppe to within I50 miles of Cashmere. 
This extension of territory is at present, probably, 
I I 4--2 
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ollly on paper, but its importance, if effectually made, 
is ilidicatcd best by stating that it is a direct advance 
towards the valley of Chitral, from ivliicli the 
Baroghil and other passes lead into Cashmere. 
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CHAPTER X. 
THE AFGHAN POLICY OF THE LAST TWO 
VICERO YS. 
Resum6 of Lord Northbrook's Negotiations with the Amir-Proposal to 
Permit Sir D. Forsyth to Return througll Afghan Tcrritory Negatived 
-The "Grievances " of Shere Ali-Sir Lewis Pelly's Conference with 
the Afghan Agent in 1876-The Occupation of Quettah-Lord 
Lytton's Letters to Shere Ali-The Englisll Envoy at Ali Musjid- 
Repulse of the Mission-False Account Sent to England-Question of 
Peace or Wnr Reverts to Consideration of Neccssity of " Rectifica- 
tion " of Frontier-Is Refusal to Receive English Officers an Insult?- 
Rawlinson's Opinion of England's Policy in the Presence of Russian 
Agents nt Cabul-Policy of English Cabinet in Sending an Ullimatunz 
to Shcre Ni-Lord Northbroolc on the Conduct of Russia and the 
Amir-And on Sir James Stephen's View of the Amir's " International" 
Rights. 
WE have now considered a t  some length the ad- 
vances made by Russia since the Indian Mutiny in 
the countries round the Oxus. It remains to bring 
up the account of our relations with Shere Ali 
Khan, Amir of Afghanistan, to the present time. 
We have shown l~ow, in 1873, when the agent of 
Shere Ali visited Lord Northbrook a t  Simla, he 
made what seemed then to be extravagant demands, 
and declined to enter into reciprocal engagements. 
We pointed out, too, that, shortly after the Simla 
Conference, 1v11en lie found England wanted a p i d  
p r o  q7lo in  return for the subsidies and protection she 
was willing to give, that p z l i d p r o  g ~ o  taking the 
form chiefly of the receptio~l of an English Envoy 
a t  Cabul, Shere Ali entered into a correspondence 
1vit1i General Kaufmann, the Russian Governor- 
Genera1 of Tashkend . 
Lord Northbroolc, in his exposition of his own and  
his predecessor's policy, at a public dinner at Win- 
-- - chester, on November rzth, 1878, gave the following 
explanation of the refusal of Shere Ali to receive 
English officers, and, as  the point is important, we 
quote his statement a t  Ieagth. After disclaiming 
any idea of discussi~lg matters that the Governme~lt 
might wish to lteep secret, lle co~ltiilued as follows :- 
" On one matter I may say a word without any indis- 
cretion, and that is about European officers; and  
here I would refer to Sir Douglas Forsyth and his 
suggested return to India through Afghanistan. I 
saw the Prime Minister of Sliere Ali in 1873, feeling 
as I did that occasiolls ~n igh t  arise when i t  would be  j 
I of great advantage that English officers might b e  
i sent through Afghanistan, particularly as there were 
; some questions about the frontier which we desired 
to have know11 in the interests of Afghanistan b y  
I British officers. I desired the Foreign Secretary of 
the Goveniment to consult with the Prime Minister 
- --rc -- . _-------- 
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the Simla of Shere Ali to ascertain whether he would be likely 
. - ... -- . - 
nted a quid to recerve anglish ofhcers if he was asked to do so, t \I 
and a confidential cominunicatioll toolc placc accord- 
~tection she 
taking the ingly. Shere Ali's Prime Minister of that time is 
lish Envoy now dead; therefore I can see no impropriety in 
espoildence making known his opinion. This is the opiilion of 
Governor- the Amir of CabulJs Prime Minister in 1873, in 
reference to the stationing of British officers in 
Cabul. Spealciilg as a friend, and in the interest of [is own and 
ier at Win- the British Government, he could not rccornmend a 
le following specific request being made to station British officers \ 
to receive 
:portant, we 
disclaiming 
;overnment 
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in certain places. Such a demand, however friendly 
the Amir might be, would give rise to distrust and 
misapprehension. The reasons he gave were that 
the Afghans were deplorably ignorant, and enter- 
tained an  idea that a deputation of British agents is 
always a precursor to annexation. He  also said 
there was a strong party in Cabul opposed to the 
Amir entering into intimate relations wit11 the 
British Government. Soon after that. the question 
whether Sir Douglas Forsyth should return to India 
through Afghanistan, or not, came up, and the Amir 
regretted that he could not be allowed to return; 
giving as a rcason that shortly before a British officer, 
Colonel MiDonald, had been shot on the frontier by 
the Afghans-a circumstance which had occasioned 
considerable inconvenience to the country, and ,in- 
clined him to say that he could not be answerable 
reignt)'- Bu' for the safety of any English officers. I felt I had 
,,othing "Or' 
no right under the circumstances, and under the 
rnatic relati01 
assurances which had bcen given by Lord Nayo that factory colldi British officers should not be sent against the opinion Sir Lcw~! 
of the Amir, to consider that any offence had been 
committed against the British Government." agent at l'es 
,ication There is no doubt, however, that Shere Ali sullted, Amir until 
and refused, indeed, for a time to take the very 11and- 
somc subsidy of ~120 ,000  and 15,ooo rifles which Neville 
were offered him. passed at th 
The Amir's "grievances," which began with our ~~itish Gov 
recognising his brother's before his own accessioil, it known ye 
and were increased by our refusing in 1869 to guar- stone, Lord 
ailtee the succession to his domillion of Abdulla Jan, of the delay 
his favourite son, received an addition in 1871 in the of a soulld 
result of an arbitration which the Indian Government demerits, tl 
had uildertaItetl between Persia and Afghanistan con- policy of ti1 
cerning the boundary of Seistan. The  result was a But it i 
compromise, which, as often happens, was satisfactory authorised 
to neither party, and Shere Ali resented it deeply as oKer to th 
an infringement of his sovereignty, which, as he which She 
erroneously held, the Indian Government was bound " 1873, on t: 
to preserve unimpaired. Again, in 1875, in return have acces 
for courtesies shown by the Ruler of Waltham, a to Russia. 
vassal of Shere Ali, towards the British Mission to a British 
Yarkand, a .letter and gifts were sent by the Viceroy that such 
without previous reference to the Amir. This the Arnir, 
Shere Ali resented as another breach of his sove- 
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reignty. But the supposed slight was manifestly 
nothing worse thatl an oversight! and if our diplo- 
matic relations with Cabul had been in a more satis- 
factory condition, it would never have occurred. 
Sir Lewis Pelly's conference with Shere Ali's 
agent at  Peshawar in 1876 is the only other cominu- 
nication the Indian Governlneilt has had with the 
Amir until the recent one with reference to Sir 
Neville Chamberlain's intended mission. What 
passed at the Peshawar Conference is not ltnown, the 
British Government not having thought fit to malce 
it ltnown yet to Parliament or the public. Mr. Glad- 
stone, Lord Lawrence, and others, have complained 
of the delay in doing so, as it prevents the possibility 
of a sound opinion being formed on the merits or 
demerits, the wisdom or unwisdom, of the recent 
policy of the Indian Government." 
But it is understood that Sir Lewis Pelly was 
authorised by  the Viceroy (Lord Northbrook) to 
offer to the Amir's envoy the treaty and guarantee 
which Shere Ali had previously sought in 1869 and 
1573, on the conditibn that British officers should 
have access to points of the Amir's frontier exposed 
to Russia. I t  was not, however, proposed to establish 
a British agent at  Cabul, for it was already lcnown 
that such a proposal would prove unacceptable to 
the Amir. The  conference proved abortive. Shere 
* See Publishers' Note prefixed. 
A fghnlzistnn. 
Alils ellvoy recapitulated the grievances of wl~icll his 
sovereign complained, but suggested no way of 
removing them, or of establishing better relations; 
a t  the same time, though he professed to have 
no authority to conclude a definite treaty, he 
declared that Shere Ali held the British Govern- 
ment pledged under any circumstances to protect 
his territory. We must assume, however, that he was 
left in no doubt, when the confereilce came to an 
end, as to the view ~vllich the Indian Government 
tool\: of its own obligations towards Afgl~anistan. 
The occupation of Quettah has been the last of 
the Amir's " grievances " which we have caused to 
exist. I t  11ad for years been contempIated as neces- 
sary to the security of our position in India that we 
should com~nand the entrance to the Bolan Pass. 
Qucttah is not in Afghail territory, but is in Baluchis- 
tail, and.we occupied it in 1876 with t l ~ e  full consent 
of the IChan of Relat, to whom it belongs. T11e 
Amir does not seem to have objected to our policy 
of making Quettah an advanced military post before 
i t  was accomplislied, but now heis said to have made 
it a grouild of complaint. 
All we need say here of Lord Lytton's most recent 
action is that he sent letters to the Anlir aImost 
directly after the news reached him of .the reception 
of a Russian mission demanding that an English 
mission should be also received. The death of Ab- 
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which his dulla Jan, the heir-apparent, having occurred before 
o way of an answer was received, Lord Lytto1-1 despatched a 
relations ; second letter, stating that the English mission would 
I to have be delayed till the days of inouriling were over. On 
treaty, ha the z ~ s t  September, no answer having been received 
h Govern, from Cabul, General Sir Neville Chamberlain ad- 
to protect vanced, according to orders from Simla, into the 
:hat he was 
ame to aq I 
overnmenf 
Rhaibar Pass. 
The followiilg account of what passed on that 
occasion is talren from the Piolzeer, a newspaper 
inistan. 
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In English 
:at11 of Ab- 
which is sometimes spoken of (with what truth we 
cannot say) as the organ of the.Indian Goverment: 
"On the afternoon of Friday, t l ~ e  zoth, everything 
having been rcady for a move for some days, i t  was 
announced that orders to march to Jamrud would 
probably be issued about midnight. Accordiilgly at 
I I a.m. the word came ; tents were struck, camels and 
i mules loaded, and long before daybreak: the escort, 
, with the whole impedimenta of the Mission, saving 
only the personal baggage of Sir Neville Chamberlain 
and his staff; were on the move. Many of your 
I readers may Itnow the road from Peshawar to Jam- 1 
rud, beyond which it has been given to few to pass. 
For the first three or four miles it lies due west, 
through rich cultivation and groves of young sissoo 
trees, to Burj-i-Hari Singh, a tower where a picket 
under ordinary circumstances warns peaceful travel- 
lers that if they venture further west it is at the risk 
Afg/lnjtisi?zn. 
of their lives. Beyond Burj-i-Hari S i~ igh  a bare, 
gravelly desert stretches to the foot of the IChaiber 
I-Iills, some seven or eight rniles off. Three miles 
from tllc mouth of the Pass lies the half-ruined fort 
of Jamrud, a somewhat picturesque structure, lying 
just inside Uritish territory, and held for us by the 
chief of a village in the neighbouring plain. Just to 
the east of its cri~mblilig towers our not very preten- 
tious camp was pitched. The total nuinber of souls 
with tlie Mission amounted to sotnething under a 
thousand, of \vhom eleven were Britisli officers, four 
1 native gentlemen, and 234 fighting men, natives of 
the escort. Tlie rest were camp-followers, includillg 
over 200 people, catnel-drivers and others, belonging 
to tlie Commissariat, which carried nine days' rations 
for man and beast. Tlie carriage consisted of 315 
camels, about a50 mules, and 40 horses. The whole 
would have formed a carf~ke coilsiclerably over a mile 
in length. Conflicting reports liad been b ro~~gh t  to 
Pesha~var as to the intentions of the Amir's officials to 
admit or refuse passage to the Mission ; and opinioils 
differed as to tlie probability of our passing Ali 
Musjid. The one thing certain was the presence 
at that place for the last two days of the Mir 
Alchol; the sourest old fanatic in Afghanistan, and 
the bitterest enemy of the Rafir, English, or Russ. 
I t  was difficult to imagine any reason for his pre- 
sence, except doubt on the Amir's part as to the 
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2nd opinions by force. A message was sent on some hours ahead ! to inform Faiz Muhammad I<han of Major Cavag- passing Ali 
the presence 1 nari's approach. I t  should be premised that the 
; of the Mir Khaibaris on our side of the Pass, that is, between 
Ali Musjid and the mouth, had promised that no ;hanistan, and 
;lish, or Russ. opposition on their part, or on that of their friends, 
should deter the Mission, or its advanced guard, from n for his pre- 
)art as to the being brought face to face with the Amir's officials. 
llgh a bare, I firmness of the commandant of Ali Musjid, Faiz 
the Ichaiber Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai, in excluding the Mission. 
Three miles Under these circumstances Sir Neville Cha~nberlain 
If-ruincd fort considered that it would be unwise to send the wbole 
ucture, lying co~lvoy into the Pass, where even the stoppage in 
I 
r 
front, necessary during the pozlr pnf,Zer certain to 
'or us by the 
ain. Just to talte place under any circumstances, must necessarily ' 1  1 
very preten- I cause great co~lfusion ; and where anything like an 1 immediate resource to their weapons to prevent the 1 I t  I nber of souls 
1 passage of the Mission on the part of the garrison of 
i 
I ling under a 
nficers, four Ali Musjid would probably lead to a panic and pos- I r  !!m 
.II, natives of sibly a disaster. His Excellency, therefore, ordered 
ers, including Major Cavagnari to ride on towards Ali Musjid as 
:rs, belonging soon as possible after the arrival of the camp at 
days' rations Jamrud, {aking with him only a small escort of the 
Guides, and the heaclmen of our own frontier villages, 
and of the  friendly Ichaibaris. Thus attended he 
lristed of 3 I 5 1 
. Thc whole ? 
ly over a mile \ was to proceed until met by armed resistance, or by 1 
:11 brought to positive assurances on the part of the Amir's officials 
ir's officials to 1 that they would prevent the passage of the Mission 
This, of coursc, was a mattcr of the very highest 
importance, as preventing tlie possibility of excuses 
of non-responsibility. 
"Somewhere about nine in the morning Major 
Cavagnari left Jamrud ; with him were Colonel 
Jenkins of the Guides, commandillg the escort, 
Captain Wigram Battye, and twenty-four sowars. 
Tliree miles from camp the little party entered the 
Pass, and shortly afterwards met the messenger to 
Faiz Muhammad returning with an answer, begging 
them not to advance, &c. Of this, of course, no 
notice was taken, and a ride of four or five miles 
over the capital road made by Mackeson in 1840 and 
still passable for heavy artillery, brought them in 
sight of Ali Musjid, a picturesque little for( perched 
on a precipitous hill overhanging the valley through 
which flowed a little stream. From tlie lofty hills to 
the right, two parallel spurs of half the height of the 
fort abutted on the road; and on the nearest of 
thcse Major Cavagnari and his party took their 
stand, sending forward a messenger to annoL1nce 
their arrival. Directly they were perceived, the walls 
of the fort were manned; and shortly afterwards, 
seeing that no advance was made, a number of the 
garrison left its protection and lined the opposite 
ridge. I t  was tl~eli evident that the reports that 
had reached Peshawar about the substitution of 
regular troops for the irregular levies usually forming 
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the garrison were false, and that the warriors in front: 
were only matcl~lockmen. The distance to the fort, 
a mile or more down one hill and up anothel-, made 
the exchange of messages tedious ; a couple of hours 
~ a s s e d  without any appearance of a satisfactory 
result ; and Major Cavagnari was beginning t o  
abandon any hope of meeting a responsible official 
of the Amir face to face, and had begun to  prepare 
an ultimatum, when a messenger arrived bearing the 
welcome news that Faiz Muhamtnad I<han would 
come out to meet Major Cavagnari and three others 
at an indicated spot by the side of the stream half- 
way between the two ridges. Shortly afterwards he 
mas seen approaching, and Major Cavagnari, takitlg 
~ & h  him Colonel Jenkins and two of his men, went 
down the hill to meet Faiz Mullammad, accompanied 
by the headman of the tribes and of the Britisll 
frontier villages, Captain Rattye and the rest: of the 
Guides remaining on the ridge. 011 his way t11e 
chief of one of the other Ichaibar tribes, friendly to, 
or at least in the pay of, the Amir, made a show of 
stopping him, saying that he had more than the 
.stipulated three men ~vivitlz him ; but Major Cavagnari 
put him aside, saying that he had not come to 
tall: with him, but with the Amir's pcople ; and 
nothing further was said. On nearing each other 
the two parties dismounted, Major Cavagnari and 
Faiz Muhammad shool: hands, and the former 
224 A fg/I~~rtistirrt. 
- 
rc~narkcd that the place appointed for the inter- 
view mas inconvcnicnt, and suggested a grove of 
trees near a watermill close by. This was accepted, 
and the two parties sat down, surrounded by a couple 
of hundred or so of Faiz hIuhammadls ruffianly band. 
The conversation, after the usual fricndly greetings, 
was opened by Major Cavngnari, ~vho  said that Faiz 
hluhammad and he were equally servants of their 
respcctivc Governments, and therefore only carrying 
out their orders. There mas thus no llecessity for 
the discussion being carricd on in any but a friendly 
spirit ; that he, Faiz RIuhamnlad must be aware of thc 
prescr~cc and intended advance of the Mission ; and 
that Sir Neville Cl~ambcrlain had sent the spealcer 
on to ascertain from his own lips ~vhethcr 11c had 
orders to admit or stop thc Mission. If  there were 
any latitude in  11is orders, 11c felt sure that Fniz 
hIuhammad mould be aware of tllc heavy responsi- 
bility he ~vould incur by preventing the advance of 
the hlission, as his act in so doing would be talten as 
that of the Amir himself. Faiz Muhammad replied 
that lie himself was also actuated by friendly feelings 
towards Major Cavagnari, wlvhom he had great plea-, 
sure in meeting for the first time, in  proof of which 
he pointed out that he might, instead of coming 
down to meet Major Cavagnari, have ordered his 
men to fire on the party when it appeared. He  then 
went on to say that he had been severely repri- 
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the inter- I manded for letting Nawab Gholan Husain (the Vice- 
r grove of roy's native envoy) pass, and how, therefore, could be 
s accepted, risk the responsibility of permitting the advailce of the 
by a couple Mission ? H e  then begged that Sir Neville Chainber- 
fianly band. lain would halt a few days till he could communicate 
y greetings, with Cabul. This, Major Cavagnari replied, was not 
d that Faiz I only impossible but unnecessary, as the Cabul autho- 
~ t s  of their I rities had long been aware of the approacll of the 
Mission. The conversation continued in this strain , 
lecessity for 
ut a friendly 
aware of the 
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for some little time, Major Cavagnari urging the 1 weight of the responsibility Faiz Mi~hammad would 1 incur, and the latter repeating his inability to allow 
I: the Mission to pass witllout direct orders from Cabul. 
1 At last, on the Englishmail again pointing out the 
friendly character of the Mission, the Afghan, showing i 
1 for the first time some warmth, said :-' Is this lj! friendliness, to stir up dissellsion in the Amir's domi- II' 
4 nions by bribing his subjects to disobey his orders 
by bringing you and others here? '  alluding to the !{ 
negotiations carried on with the Ichaibaris for the 
first of the Nawab and afterwards of the 1 I Mission. A t  this an ambiguous murmur was heard 
from the crowd, and Major Cavagnari turned the 
subject by saying that was not a matter for subor- 
clinates to discuss, .and that if His I-Sighness the 
Amir hacl any complaint to make, no doubt the 
British Government would give him a satisfactory 
I reply, He then aslced Faiz Muhammad for a final 
15 
1 
i 
.1 
answer; wllether be was distinctly to understand 
that the Mission mould be resisted by force should 
it  thc next morning. To this Faiz Muham- 
mad replied that he had no alterrlative but to use 
force, if necessary. On t l~is  Major Cavagnari aslied 
chiefs with hiin, if they considered this a suffi- 
ciently clear answer, to mliicl~ they replied that it 
lvas so. Ilc then, thanking Faiz hluhammad for the 
courteous and friendly spirit that he had showrl, 
- . ... . - . llopccl that they might meet under mose agreeable 
! circumstances, shoolc hands with him, and departed. 
It should be noticcd that, tl~ougli the Mir Aklior 
did not show himself, his deputy was prcsent at 
thc  mecting, but witllout spealcing. 
"Major Cavagnari and his party a t  once came 
back to the camp at Jutnrud, whence he rodc on to 
l'cshawar to communicate the rcsult of his Mission 
to the Envoy, who returncd with liitn to Jamrud 
latc in the evening. At  day-brcak the nes t  mornirlg 
orders nrcre issued for at1 immediate 1-etul-n to Pcsh- 
aivar. Before leaving Sir Ncville Chamberlaitl 
asscmblcd the frienclly Rhaibaris, and told them 
that tlie stipulated rclvard would be paid them 
exactly as if the Mission had passed through tbe 
Rhaibar; and that he promised them in the nanle 
of the Britisl~ Government, whose word they Irneiv 
they co~tld trust, that as long as there remained a 
rupee in the treasury, or a sepoy in the army, 
p i  I 
rstand they should be protected from any retaliation by 
should the  Amir  or his officers." 
uham- Thus ended the Cabul Mission. 
Ill; 1 1 1  I i 
to use I t  is not too much to say that England was con- i , I 
asked vulsed by a different version of the interview which i l l  1 
a SUE- anneared in the letter 01 
for the it appear that the English officers had been insulted 
shown, :I and threatened. Later on, the true account came , 
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1 to us, and calmer feeling prevailed. The question 
then reverted to the older pliase of the policy, which 
toolc the form of pushing forward (or " rectifying ") 
our frontier, instead of the more urgent one of 
having an insult to avenge ; unless, as some thinlc, 
the reception of a Russian Mission renclers the refusal 
to  receive an Ei~glish one an insult. On this latter 
point it is of interest to notice that Sir Henry 
. Rawlinson, as  long ago as 1874, contemplated the 
possibility of Russia sending an envoy to Cabul, and 
discussed the probable policy England would pursue. 
H e  said (note on page 366 of "England and Russia in 
the East "), speaking of Prince Gortchaltoff's official 
intiination to Lord Granville, that it was unclesirable 
that Russian agents should go t o  Cabul, "It is quite 
possible, howevel; in the sequel, if matters should 
become a t  all cornplicatcd, that this subject may be 
revived, and Russia may wish to  have a Mission at 
Cabul. DipZumnticaZly, perhaps, we cuz~ld /zal$y 
15-2 
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objct to S S N C ~  nri nn.nrt,o.~~tcrzt, bzrt irug niight, nt nlty 
rate, insist or6 sertditzg ni! the snr~te tir~~e czrc E~zgLlih 
Jlissioli lo Bohhnrn." The italics are ours. We do 
not know yet what communications have passed 
between the Russian Govenlmcnt and our own; nor 
is it certain that the conflict, if there is to be one, 
will be confined to a duel between British Inclia and 
thc barbarous State on her frontiel; or will be 
estendecl to embrace England and Russia, and thus 
do tvhat has been so often t!lreatcned-light up two 
continellts with the torch of war.* T l ~ c  action of the 
English Cabinet in giving the Amir another oppor- 
tunity of retreating from the perilous positi011 in 
\\rhic11 his recent conduct has placed him has been 
mucll criticised. 
But the majority of peoplc will, in the end, we 
think, a t  least, commend the policy of sending a 
final message-an ~1lti7rzntz~r11, as it is termed-before 
l~roceccling to hostilities, whatever may be the 
opinion held as to thc original policy which has led 
up  to the present situation. On the zGt11 of October 
that message was sent by Lord Lytton-not to 
Cabul itself, as that would, i t  was thought, compro- 
mise the safety of a British subject-but to the fort 
of Ali Musjid, in the IChaibar Pass, and was there 
delivered to the Ainir's officer. Its purport is 
geilerally believed to have been in effect a repetition 
* See Publishe~s' Note prefixed. ' 
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of the terms offered by Sir Lewis Pelly, with the 
intiination that an answer must be returned before 
the 20th November, in order to avert a declaration of 
war. 
The following opinion 011 the conduct of Russia 
and of Afghanistan, given by Lord Northbrook in the 
speech before referred to, seetns to deserve attention. 
H e  said :-"It would appear at first sight that b y  
sending a Mission to Cabul they had distiilctIy 
broken through the engagements they had made; 
I but we must be fair in this mattcr, and we must recollect that it is not so long ago-towards the 
11 
I spring of the year-that unfortunately we were on )I the brink of a war with Russia. It  was supposed that Russia would not submit to the terms of the 
1 1  Sat1 Stefano Treaty. We a11 lrnow that the British 
Government took a decided line against Russia. 
Assuming such an attitude, we sent troops to 
, Malta ; and in point of fact it was generally sup- 
posed that the question of peace and war hung at  
that time on a thread. For my own part, I do not 
hesitate to say that if we had the right, as I hold 
that we had the right, to send native troops to 
MaIta, the Russians had the right to take such steps 
a s  they thought necessary to protect Russian 
territory in Asia. This is the explanation which I 
give, and which I conceive to be the natural expla- 
nation of the movement of troops in the spring of 
A fghntzistntz . 
this year, and the sending of the Mission to Afghan- 
istan. I have seen it mentioned in the ne~vspapers 
that this Mission to Cabul was sent after the signa- 
ture of the Treaty of Berlin, and that this sliows 
the animosity of the Russian Government towards 
us. That statement can a t  any  rate be disputed. 
The Russian Mission arrived a t  Cabul on the 22nd 
July. The road from Samarltand consists of 
marches extending over a distance of 620 miles. 
I t  could not have been possible for the Russian 
_C - 
Mission to  march from Samarltand in lcss than a 
month. I t  was therefore i~npossible that a Mission 
starting on the 13th of July could arrive on the ~ 2 n d  
of July. That  issue was disposed of by  the mere 
q~icstion of distance. Now, it seems to me, with 
regard to the question of Russia in this matter, to be 
quite clear that the Government of this country had 
a right, peace being declared, to enter into a diplo- 
matic correspondence with Russia for the purpose 
of aslting what were her intei~tions, and saying that 
we should lilce to know now whether she would 
adhere to the formal arrangements with respect to 
interference with Afghanistan, or what her policy 
was to be. That the Govcrn~nent had a perfect 
right to do, and m y  own i~npression is that that is 
the course which the Government really has pur- 
sued. W e  do not know all that. What we do 
know is that papers were promised the day before 
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I Parliament separated, and I have no doubt that 
I those papers will soon be produced. So far, then, 
I 
as to  the conduct of Russia. Now as regards the 
Amir of Afghanistan. Supposing that Shere Ali 
had, when I was Governor-General of India, 
received a Russian Mission at Cabul without first 
1 consulting the British Government as to  whether 
it should be received, I should say that that was 
an unfair act, in consequeilce of our previous 
I arrangement with him ; but now we must look a t  
the circumstances which went before the case. A s  it 
I has actually arisen, it was impossible for the Ainir 
I to coinmunicate with the British Government, for, 
1 
I1 rightly or wrongly, our agent at  his Court had been 
;I withdrawn. W e  know, howevel; that he tried to 
j prevent the Russian Mission going to Cabul. That 
has appeared several times in the .papers, and 
through other impartial sources, and I believe it to 
be the fact. W e  cannot possibly have any evidence 
that the Amir has entered into any hostile arrange- 
ment with the Russian Embassy after having re- 
ceived them. I have no fear of Russian intrigue in 
Afghanistan. From all that I know or have ever 
heard of that country, the real feeling of the Amir 
of Cabul and Afghanistan is a feeling of indepen- 
dence, a dislike of any interference, either by 
Englaild or by  Russia, in his affairs ; and I will say 
this much, that when I left India, the Amir, though 
A fghn7zisfa)z. 
he would have disliked any interference on the part 
of England, ~vould have resented any shown by 
Russia to a far greater extent. Therefore, if Russia's 
people be in the country they will only arouse more 
feelings of independence, and the longer they remain 
the more influence will they lose. But when we are 
considering the conduct of Shere Ali in this matter, 
I confess that I have observed with the greatest 
regret opinions which have been expressed by the 
Press with regard to it ; and what I regret more is, 
that Sir James Stephen, a Liberal leadei-, has laid 
down a principle with xvl~ich I can in no way agree. 
Sir James Stephen has contended that the principles 
of international law have no reference to our dealings 
with Shere Ali. I l e  says that there is no law by 
which the case between Shere Ali and ourselves can 
be tried. We are exceedingly po~verful and highly 
civilised. He is comparatively weak and half-bar- 
barous. H e  cannot be permitted to follow a course 
of policy which inay expose us to danger, and we are 
to be the judges of the cause, and we are to  decide 
according t o  our ow11 interests. I have given you Sir 
James Stephen's o ~ v n  words, as I do not wish to inis- 
represent him. For where does the doctrine he lays 
down go ? Why it goes this length, that any rlatioil 
-any civilised nation it must be-in dealing with 
another wealr nation, and one thcy conceive to bc 
uncivilised, may act on no other principle than their 
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might. This principle would j~~s t i fy  the partition of 
Poland, and would justify every act of Russia against 
which this country has been crying O L I ~  for some 
time. I feel sure that Sir James Stephen cannot 
know the meaning of what he has said, and that 
such a doctrine as this must shock the moral sense 
of all rightly-feeling people of this country. Sir 
James Stephen has coilfounded the conventional 
law of nations, and the law of nations which depends 
on the practice of the Western States, with those 
f~~ndamental  principles of the law of nations that are 
founded 011 the first principles of morals, and are 
-indiples 1 derived from what Bacon calls the Fountains of 1 
dealings I Justice, and which have been recogilised not only by 
law by Christian lawyers and statesmen, but by heathen 
ves can lawyers and statesmen, from long time past." 
I highly Lord Northbrook further pointed out that such a 
lalf-bar- lax view of iilterilational law is especially dangerous 
1 course in India, where we have treaty engagements with 
A we are many semi-civilised States. H e  protested strongly 
o decide against such doctrines, and expressed an opinion 
I you Sir that, if propounded in Parliament, they would be 
1 to inis- instantly repudiated. 
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APPENDIX A. 
N E W  R O U T E  T O  I N D I A .  
TI-IE following note on the proposed new route to 
India may be of interest at this time :- 
" Consul-General Nixon, sending to the Foreign 
Office'the Bagdad trade returns for the Turlrish official 
year ending in.March, 1878, observes that the country 
is capable of unlimited development, and one of t l ~ e  
first steps to this end would be the construction of a 
railway between Bagdad and the foot of the Persian 
hills, and another from Bagdad to Alexandretta vid 
Mosul. This would give an alternative route to 
India, and be more expeditious than viR the Suez 
Canal. Swift steamers from ICurrachee would reach 
Busre11 (1,547 miles) in six days ; from Busreh to 
Bagdad river steamers would run with ease in 72 
hours, and a t  the outside another 60 hours by rail 
would land passenger-s on the shores of the Mediter- 
ranean ; and this period of I I +  days is capable of 
acceleration. A railway from Busreh to Bagdad 
might be an after consideration, as the river Tigris 
affords a highway which, if traversed by steamers of 
higher power than those now used, would much 
reduce the time occupied in the transit. The Consul 
considers that a railway from Bagdad to Alex- 
andretta woGld pay exceedingly well, and British 
Aflendtk A. 
commerce mould benefit greatly, as Bagdad would 
become tlle great mart, and drive Russian goods out 
of the Pcrsian and Southcrn Asian markets, owing 
to the expeilsive land carriage those goods would 
have to defray. The cost of a railway from Busreh, 
at  the head of the Persian Gulf, to Alexandretta on 
the Mediterranean has been estimated at £7,z25,0001 
but this is at tbc rate of f;8,500 per mile, a high rate 
considering that there is water carriage from London 
to Bagdad for railway material. Deductii-lg the 
distance from Uusreh to Bagdad, which is 250 miles 
as the crow flies, the first espenditure would be 
reduced to £~,roo,ooo on tlie Goo miles from Bagdad 
to Alexandretta. The country between Bagdad and 
Mosul is a dead level. The expenditure on bridges 
would be inconsiderable. Bridging the Tigris, 
indeed, rniglit be avoided, if the terminus were made 
on the right bank of the river at  Bagdad, and from 
thence ran straight to Aleppo, the line being flanked 
on one side by the Tigris and on the other by the 
Euphrates, and ilcarly the wlzole route a flat. Tlze 
Consul suggests that the civilisiilg influences which 
a railway tlu-ough Arabia would initiate are consider- 
able, and that the developmeilt of the country, with 
its vast resources and its eilormous ancient system of 
canal irrigation, is well worthy the attention of 
statesmen. The privilege of navigating the Tigris 
from Busre11 to Bagdad would have to be acquired 
from the Turltish Government ; at  present they have 
a few steamers of their own on the river, and are 
jealous of other nations entering into competition." 
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APPENDIX B. 
RUSSIA AlVD ENGLAND IN ASIA. 
THE following estimate of the relative positiolls of 
Russia and England in the East is from the pen of 
Major-General Sir John Adye, in a reply to a letter 
by Sir James Stephen, and a better exposition of 
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Central Asia. Sir James Stephen in his re~narlcs 
cornpares it with that which we held in India 
in 1803 under Lord Wellesley, and, although he 
does not ignore the isolated and precarious posi- 
tion of the Russian troops in the Central Asian 
deserts, h e  still appears to thinlc that by i.aising 
arrnies and by forming alliances they may gradually 
develop into a great Power there, and thus become a 
danger to us in India. But the circumstances are 
alrnost entirely different. India and Central Asia do 
not compare with each other. The  former is a 
fertile country, and rich in military resources-that 
is, in warlike races, in food, forage, fuel, and, nowa- 
days, in its roads and cominunications. I t  contains 
about 200,000,000 people, of different races and 
religions, of which the il4uhammadans are a minority. 
By conquering India we have, in short, obtained a 
magnificent empire ; one which under our rule is 
Ajjcr~di-r 3, 
daily rising in prosperity. Civil government is firmly 
cstnblishcd, and the nlilitary position is far stronger 
illan cver. Our troops, both English and Native, are 
n ~ l l  armed and trained ; the arscnals are fixed a t  
stratcgical points ; while our intcr~lal communica- 
tions by river, road, and rail are comparatively easy, 
the three great Principalities of Rhiva, Bol;hara, and 
-- 1Chol;and. This is not very difficult, as their forces 
arc mere armed rabble, and if the power of Russia 
in that part of the world were measured by mere 
gcograpl~ical extent, it would be formidable ; but, in 
truth, this very exlent is the cause of great wealrness. 
There is a general deficiency tliroughout the wllole 
vast region of food, water, fi:el, forage, and roads. 
The few rivers arc dificult of navigation, and the 
transport is almost entirely carried on by means of 
This latter point at  once indicates the 
desert nature of the country, and greatly aggravates 
the clificulty of massing troops and stores a t  their 
outposts. The  wholc population of Central Asia in 
Russian possession does not, it is said, exceed four 
lnillions and a-half, consisting chiefly of predatory 
tribes thinly scattered over a vast area. They are 
fanatical Muhanln~adans, and bitterly hostile, and I 
have never heard that Russia has ventured to raise a 
single battalion on the spot. Civil goverllment is in 
its infancy, and financially the country is a perpet~~al  
drain. The  nearest sailway-station is a t  Orenburg, 
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about 1,000 miles from Samarkand, and the country 
between the Caspian and Tashlrend is for the most 
part a hopeless desert. I t  is possible that Russia 
may in time, to some extent, consolidate her con- 
quests, but the geographical features and permanent 
condition of the couiitry are against her. 
" I call see no analogy betwceiz the precarious 
position of General Kaufmann, amid barren steppes, 
and that of Lord Wellesley in 1803, standing in the 
fertile plains of Bengal. A consicleratioi~ of all the 
circumstances would appear to prove that the present 
position of Russia in Central Asia is not one calcu- 
latcd to afford her a favourable base of operations 
against our dominion in Iizdia. I t  is very iinportaiit 
to have a clear conception on these vital points of 
the comparative power of Russia and Englaiid in 
the East. 
"For  many years past that policy has beell con- 
sistent, and may be described as one of conciliation, 
of mediation, and of subsidies. Aclcnowledging the 
strategical importance of Afghanjstan, our object 
has been to gain the coilfidence and friendship of 
the Afghan and Belooch rulers, and also of the 
independent fi-ontier tribes, in tlie hope that s11ouId 
external danger ever arise they would be on our side, 
and be ready to become the joint defenders with us 
of their mouiitain ranges. I always contemplate 
the possibility of our having to enter the country for 
our own defence, and it should be prepared for by 
conciliating and not by attaclcing our neighbours. 
Masterly inactivity ' is the expression commonly 
.-- -- 
Appatd2:r 6. 
used to denote the policy ~ v l ~ i c l ~  for many years has 
prevailed. I t  is a misleading term, as it coilveys 
the idea that we have washed our hands of our 
neighbours' concerns, whereas the real circurnsta~lces 
are very different. I t  is true we have refrained from 
interference in their internal feuds and battles. 
Unless invited to mediate, we have left them to 
scttlc their own affairs, being only anxious to see 
strong and quiet Governments established 011 our 
borders. With half-savage, fanatical people like the 
Afghans and Beloochcs, great clifficulties have 
naturally arisen, but on the whole we have bee11 
successful. For instance, so long ago as January, 
1857, Sir John, now Lord, Lawrence, made a treaty 
with Dost Muhammad, Shere Ali's fathel; and by a 
large subsidy and present of ~nuslcets iilduced Ilim to 
drive the Persians from H e ~ x t ;  b u t  another result 
illdirectly followcd from this successful effort at con- 
ciliation. The  great Mutiny broke out in May, 1857; 
but altllough we were in dire extremity, and 
altllough the Punjab was considerably denuded of 
troops for the siege of Delhi, Dost Muhammad, though 
much pressed by his people, refused to allow a 
single Afghan to attack US in our hour of danger. 
That, to illy judgment, is a very pregnant instance 
that conciliation and lrindness are as likely to be 
s~~ccessful with Afghans as with other people. 
Again, i11 1869, the late Lord Mayo received Sllere 
Ali with l~oilour at Umballa, and by gifts of money 
and arms gave practical proofs of our friendship ; 
a i d  although Sllere Ali may not be as reliable or as 
great a ma 
tha t  Lord 
successf~~l. 
correspond 
t o  accept 
Afghanis tc 
secured to 
our  friendl, 
spondence 
t h a t  Shere 
a n d  bey0118 
t h e  BeIoo~ 
general po 
with consi 
its length . 
Occasiollal 
as matters 
Afghan t r  
service, an( 
of trust, ar 
tnaintain t 
g rea t  mea. 
to the obje 
a n d  forbe 
become pa 
to discuss 
o u r  recent 
military OF 
m a i n  diffic 
the supplie 
fi-ontier PI 
great  a man as his father, thereis no reason to believe 
tha t  Lord Mayo's policy was other than prudent and 
successful. Again, in 1873, after a long cIiplomatic 
con-espondence, Lord Granville iilduced the Russians 
to  accept our view of the northern boundaries of 
Afghanistan, by  which Radakshan and IVakhan were 
secured to Shere Ali. This was a f ~ ~ r t h e r  p oof of 
our friendly intervention, and throughout the corre- 
spondence Prince Gortchakoff fully acknowledged 
tha t  ,'Shere Ali was legitimately under our influence, 
a n d  beyond that of Russia. I n  all our dealings ~vitli i, 
the  ~ i l o o c h  and Afghan frontier tribes, the same 
general policy has been followed for years past, and 
with considerable success. T h e  border thro~igl~out 
its length is far quieter now than in years gone by. 
Occasional acts of outrage and robbery are treated 
as matters of police. Many of the men of the 
Afghan tribes beyond the border now enter our 
service, and do their duty well. Some hold positions 
of trust, ancl settle inside our territory. . Therefore I 
maintain that a conci1iatoi-y policy has been in a . 
great  measure successful, and was leading straight 
t o  the object we had in view, although time, patience, 
a n d  forbearance are required before the results 
become palpable and confirmed. I do not propose 
t o  discuss the exceptional causes which have led to 
our  recent rupture with Shere Ali. A s  regards the 
military operations which now appear imminent, the 
main  difficulties lie in the necessity for collecting 
t h e  supplies of food, munitions, and transport at our 
frontier posts before we can enter the country. 
I 6 
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Whether ~ v c  advance by the Ichaibar or the Bolan, 
our lines of communication will lie through rocky 
defiles, and over stony, desert tracts, deficient in food, 
forage, fuel, and often in water. Sir John Iceane, in 
1838, is said to have lost 20,000 camels between the 
Indus and Candahar, although his march mas vir- 
tually unopposcd. Lookii~g a t  the flceting nature of 
Afghan internal politics, to thc perpetual discords 
which arise between the ruler a t  Cabul and his 
insubordinate chiefs, I think it very possible that 
Shere Ali may find he is not baclrcd by  his people, 
-- and that 11e may still make such concessions as will 
save him from the incvitable ruin which his prcsent 
C O I I ~ I I C ~  will othenvise bring upoil him. S110111d we, 
however, be co~npcllcd to advance in force, and 
enter on a campaign, its cost will be excessive, and 
the worst feature is that our chief clificqlties will 
arise when xve find ourselves in possession of the 
country with the feelings of thc people roused 
against us." 
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APPENDIX C. 
RUSSIA'S ADVANCE COMPARED WlTH THAT 
O F  ALEXANDER THE GREAT. 
TI-IE follo~ving is an  extract from a letter by General 
M. McMurdo in the Tines of November 5 th :- 
.. I " Although 2,000 years have passccl since the f, 
Macedoiliail Greeks brolce through the passes of 
Afghanistan and overthrew POI-us on the Jelum, the 
operations of war are not less practicablc under the 
conditions of the nineteenth century than they were 
in the days of the Phalanx. I do not mean for one 
lnomeilt to assert that Russia would meet with the 
same ultimate success as the Greeks ; what I desire 
t o  show is, that u p  to a certain point she has already 
gained the same strategical advantages as her pre- 
decessor. T h e  progress of the Greelcs through Asia 
was, as that of a regular ariny, perfect in its admini- 
stration and drill, and talcing along with them the 
highest civilisatioil and culture, long afterwards 
maintained b y  their colonies. I have no boolcs here, 
but I am satisfied that Arrian gives ample cvidence 
of the principles on wl~ich their advance was con- 
ducted. Thus (as an examplc of administration) a t  
Babylon, where the army rested on the coilclusion of 
the operations that succeeded the victory of Arbela, 
A$pc?ldi.r C. 
Alexander sent home (by Aleppo, I think) the men 
whose tcrm of service hacl expired, and the officcrs 
who conducted them brought back, in due caul-sc, 
the recruits to replace them. Babylon became, in 
short, a secondaiy base for his furtller advance ; and 
thus, by a systcm of successive dephts, some of whicll 
became colonies, he effected his ultimate object of 
reaching India. Thc last of these dep6t-colonies 
was in India itself. The  site of ancicnt Taxila was 
determi~led some years ago to be about I4 miles 
north-west of Rawul Pindce ; and these is still a 
small racc or clan (now dying out) in the neigl~bour- 
ing hills that claims descent from these Greelcs, and 
whose priclc on this accouilt revolts a t  service of any 
"Now, the Russian advance through Asia has 
bccn conductcd llitllerto upon similar principles, the 
chief (and perhaps only) difference being in the time 
occupied. There are several sufficient reasons for 
the more deliberate action of Russia, with ~vhich I 
will not occupy your space; but as Earl Grcy 
challenges her capability of advancing because of the 
difficulties of transport and supplies, I may state 
briefly that thcse doubtless formed one of the chief 
reasons. The  difference in thc itjlpccli?)ze7zta of a. 
modern army in Asia compared with the Greelcs 
under Xenophon or Alexander coiisists in tlle trains 
of artillery and ammunition. Russia had, therefore, 
good reason to wait till modern science in the form 
of a railway would compensate for that difference. I 
believe I have said sufficient to show that tvitll 
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Orenburg  and t h e  Caspian as a secondary base, and 
amply  furnished magazines at Tashlcend and Sarnar- 
kand (atld, it s e e m s  probable, Merv also), the strate- 
good as was t h a t  of the Greeks previous to their 
a t tack  on the p a s s e s  of Afgl~anistan. But if Greelc 
c had met Greek in the  Khaibal; history might possibly 
. . have told a different tale. With this observation, 
therefore, the para l le l  necessarily terminates." 
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APPENDIX D. 
LORD LA rrq.nycE onr TJIE PRESENT CRISIS. 
T I I ~  lollowing letter of Lold Lawrencc appeared 
in tlie Dai@ A'tws of October ~ S t h ,  and gives v c ~ y  
succinctly his view of the justness, or  otlierw~sc, a l  
-- \ an invasion of Afghanistan :- 
"AFGHANISTAN. 
" T O  'THC 1:UITOK OB THE IIAILY NEWS. 
" SII*,-I~ tlic lctter signcd 'Pacc Tua,' which 
a p 1 ~ w c d  in tllc iPil12cs of tllc aGtll inst., will bc 
found this passage :-'I vcnture to dmw attcntio~i 
to circumstances ~vhich p o i ~ ~ t  to thc probability that 
tlic Amir's l~ostility is by no means of such recclll: 
datc as that ascribed to it by Lord Lawrcncc, but 
can bc traccd a t  lcast as far back as tllc datc of tlic 
U~uballah Conlerencc, when t l ~ c  Ainir sought in 
vain for an assurallcc from the Indian Govcmmcnt 
that it would gaarantee thc independence of Afgllan- 
istnn, and Tor thc aclanowlcclgnient of tlic son as his 
successor whom lle had sclectctl as his heir;  wllilc 
tlie paymcnt of the annual donation of money a l~d  
arms whicli Lord Lawrence had u i~for tunate l~  com- 
mc~lced was a t  the same time discontinued.' That 
a change of policy sucli as is hcre indicated was 
_---' 
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then made has more than once been asserted 011 the 
o n e  hand, and d e ~ ~ i e d  on the other. I mill endea- 
"our to show that i n  point of fact no suci~ change 
then took place, and that the p a l  change i n  the con- 
duct  of the Government of India towards the Amir, 
i n  all essential poit~ts, dates back so far as April, 
1876, when Lord Nortllbrook resig~iecl the Govern- 
ment  illto thc hands of the present Viceroy. I 
would not a t  this time press the consideration of the 
change of policy on the poblic, except that on a 
d u e  appreciatio~l of it depends whether the people 
of Englalld are in a position to form a just csti- 
mate of the conduct of Shere Ali in refusing 
to receive Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission. If 
xvc wait until it plcases the Ministry to give the 
pnblic all the information which they can slipply 
o n  all points connected ~vith the rebuK we have 
received, we ]nay wait, as I have formerly 
said, until it can be of no practical value to 
obtain it. 
I' I desire to prevent war between England and 
Afghanistall, and I can have no hope of doing so 
unless I can show to the minds of impartial lnen 
that  such a war ~vould be unjust ; and this I have 
no hope of doing unless thcse papers are produced. 
In the meantime, I am restricted to arguing 011 the 
probabilities of the case. To refer, then, to the 
statements of 'Pace Tua,' above quoted. I reply 
that  though the Amir may have bee11 disappointed 
in  regard to a refusal to comply with these pro- 
posals, 11e could not have anticipated success, for he 
must 11avc been well aware tliat so far baclc as  
1854-55, when our treaty wit11 the .4fgliao Govern- 
ment was signed by his full brother, Sirdar Hydur 
ICIian, and myself, the Government of India had 
rcruscd to make an offensive and defensive treaty 
wit11 Argl~anistan. 
" I n  the secolld place, Atnir Shere Ali may pos- 
sibly 11ave bclicvcd that we should givc him a formal 
guarantee recognising liis ravouritc son as ltis suc- 
cessor. I know not what actually took placc a t  the 
Durbar a t  Umballah in 1869; but, a s sumi~~g  that 
Lord Mayo did rcfusc to gual.autce tlic succcssiot~, 11e 
did so no doubt by authority rcccivccl from England; 
ancl that there was reason ill sucl~ a rcf~~sal  o i ~ g l ~ t  to 
be obvious to every man conversant wit11 Oriental 
customs and habits of thougllt. Evcn to recognise, 
let alone to guarantee, tlie s~icccssion of a particular 
soti is, in tlic eyes of at1 Asiatic ruler, to bind a 
Government to maintain that wl~ich tllcy have re- 
cognisecl. Thus we should in this case have been 
compelled, if necessary, to sustain tlic ant1101-ity of 
tlic Amir's son by forcc of arlns ; ancl we \\-oulcl not 
have clone this witliout being prepared to act against 
the wishes of tlic majority of the people of Afghan- 
istan-a line of policy ~ v l ~ i c l ~  the Amir linew well we 
l ~ a d  sound reasons for not pursuing, and wl~icli ]>is 
own fatl~cr 11ad dcprecatctl in earnest terms 'o ine in 
1857. There still rctnains tlic qocstion whetlier 
Lord Mayo's ref~~sal  of liis request caused serious 
oKence Lo tlie Atnir. I do not tl~ililc so ; first, 
bccause I belicvc-I writc under correction-that 
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he never expressed an opinion of this kind, and 
assuredly 1 1 ~  is a chief ivho is not particularly reticent 
by natllrc; and, secondly, because a t  the time lle 
left Umballah to vctur~i to Cabul, the newspapers in 
India were full of statements of the satisfaction 
which the A ~ n i r  had felt and expressed at llis 
receptioti. 
"Then comcs the point whether my gift o l  arms 
and money to Shere Ali i n  1867 ivas unfortunate, 
that is to say, impolitic. I believe that it was 
not so. Thc ai.rangcmcnt was approved of by the 
Secretary or State fol. lodia at the timc. l'eople 
1vho [corn their lcno~vledge of the Afgl~nn question 
had cvcn thougllt that thc Government of India 
was ~vrong in not suppo~.ting Shere Ali in the con- 
test betwcen IlimsclT and his brothers for the throne 
of Cabul, and ivho may gcneraliy bc considered the 
advocates [or an active and interfering policy, cannot 
really object to  our having thus assisted him. .And 
these gifts werc not volunteered, but granted on his 
especialapplication; showing that the stmgglethrough 
~vhicli lic had passed had bercrt him of resources, and 
had lcft hirn no clioice but to apply to us for hclp. 
Again, as a mattcr of fact, I did not grant the Alnir 
'a11 a n ~ u ~ a l  subsidy-it was a single gift which I rnade 
on the part of the 13ritisl1 Govern~ncnt, and its re- 
newal from time to tirnc was to be dependent on the 
Government of India's satisfaction with his conduct. 
This arrangement was considered more lilcely to ivorlc 
well tllnri if wc llad gmnted Shere Ali an annual 
subsidy-a subsidy ivliich wc could not justly intermit 
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without sliowing spccific rcasolis for so doing. I t  
scelns unrcasonablc to supposc that this grant of 
inoney and arms 11ad an unfortunate influence on thc 
Amir's mind. No moncy has, since tlie Uii~ballah 
Confcrcncc, becl~ givcn to him, csccpt solnc two lacs 
of ri111ccs by  Lord Nort l~brool~,  and tc11 lacs which 
tllis Viceroy offcrecl, slid w l ~ i c l ~  tlic Amir rcf~~scd. 
" I t  is truc tflnt prcvious to tlic arrival of tlic prc- 
scnt Viccroy t l ~ c  Amir nppcavs to l~avc talxn offc~~cc 
011 accoiuit of tlic dccision in tllc Scistan boundary 
disputc, wllich h c  is said to havc considered vcry 
:tdvcrsc to his rights mid il~tcrcsts ; ailcl it was on 
tha t  account that Lorcl Nortlibl.oolc proposcd to givc 
11i1n a grant of moncy-riot that it was tliouglit that 
his intcrcsts llad not bccn duly regnrdcd in thc abovc 
dccisiol~, but simply ~\*itli tlic gcncrous intention of 
s o f t c t ~ i ~ ~ g  his mind, whicli nl~pcarctl to bc brooding 
ovcr tlie subjcct. 
"The Aniir was also said to llavc fclt aggricvcd at 
3 rcqucst tilaclc to him, that  so111c or  thc English 
oficcrs rctnrning from thc Yarlcalld Mission might 
bc pcnnittctl t o  journcy to India by way of Walclian 
and  Cabul. Anot l~cr  allcgucl gricvancc was that tlic 
Viccroy had sent tlic Govcrnor of Walcllan a slnall 
prcscnt in r ecog i i t i o~~  of liis politc11css to tlic oficcrs 
abovc ~nclitioocd. Hot tlicse two cnscs wcrc in thcir 
naturc trivial and i~niml~ortant ,  and cannot rcolly bc 
supposed to liavc irritatctl t l ~ c  i\mir, morc parti- 
cularly as in ncitl~cr casc wcrc tlic wishcs of thc 
Viccroy prcsscd 011 him. 
" 'Pace T u a '  asks wliat otlicr coursc was to bc 
i 
l > u r ~ ~ ~ e d  than ' tha t  of seiidi~ig a Mission to Cabul, 
unless me were prepared to leave Russia in undis- 
turbed possession or the field.' Considering the 
. .~ 
: . l ~ ] ! U  wayward and jealous disposition of Shere Ali, ready 
to take offence a t  trifles light as air, the best coursc 
was  to leavc him alone for a time. I t  did not follo~v, 
. , 
, 
what  Russia might be doing in Afghanistan. 
- . .r,.cz 
:<..:..jlq "The Amir's real grievance arose from several 
': ..: yej) causes wllich I have stated in former letters, sucl~ as 
. . .. 
the occupation of Quettah, the pressiilg on him of a 
. - .I, 0) 
. ' >>!. 
. ,j;r agent  from that city, and our not sending any one of 
..:?;;tI t h e  same character to take 11;s place, the arming of 
: :<.<4:q t h e  I<ashmere t ~ o o p s  with arms or precision, and the 
directions given to their chiers to watch tlie passes 
.'.."hl 
. a , . , .  
leading t o  Chitral, and the embargo laid OII tlle 
:.i;:4 
: &.t 
export  of arms, &c., from llidia to Cabul. 
- .!!.$01 
.... 
"I t  has been latelystatcd that the Conference a t  
<,, I!~:O Pesha~var between Sir Lewis Pelly and tlle Amir's 
-fi!L! Agent  toolc place solnewhere about six months 
.: 2 i?.i: before the occupation of Quettah, aud that it could 
:c:.idi n o t  therefore have been one of the causes of the 
..r-f~(: failure of that Conference. But if the readers of the 
. . . ?  L, 
/ I .  Dnib Nezus will refer to the Blue-Book 'Bilucllistan,' 
No .  a, page 324, they will fit~d by comparison of 
dates that the occupation of Quettah preceded and 
d i d  not follow that  Conference. Froin a letter of 
Captain Scott, commanding the detachment of the 
4th Sikh Infantry, it is sliowvn that he arrived a t  
Quc t t a l~  on tlie 2nd November, 1876, and began 
marking out barracks for his men on the 5th of that 
~nontli ,  wliereas tlie Conference at Pcsliawar began 
towards tlie encl of December of that year, atid is 
stated it1 the Times of the ~ 1 s t  i ist, as taki~ig place 
in January, 1877. 
" In  what I havc now said I by no means intend 
t o  place tlie rupture of our amicable relations with 
tlie Afglians solely on the shoulders of tlie presetit 
Viceroy of India. What I desire to convey is that 
thc causes which led to that ruphire really arose 
after his assumption of the Gover~ime~it, and that 
our previous relations wit11 the cliiefs of tlint country 
werc 011 the whole of a frie~idly nature. 
" I n  what proportion tlic responsibility of the state 
of  things in Afglia~iistan is to be divided betweeti 
thc  Viccroy and the Ministry of tltc day, time 
atid the prodoction of the corresponde~ice call 
alone show. 
" Yours faithfully, 
" LAIVRENCE. 
" Sfolre fI07tse, S t .  Pefe~'s ,  
" TsLc of T h n e f ,  Ocf. 25." 
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APPENDIX E. 
SALE'S DEFENCE 01; JALALABAD. 
TIIE following account of Gencral Sale's gallant 
defe~lce  of Jalalabad is talcen from the Dnih N e w  
of 30th September, 1878, and is quoted here as a 
very complete summary of that noble achieve- 
m e n t  :- 
"Few of the lnany gallant feats of British soldiers 
can  compare wit11 General Sale's gallant and success- 
ful defence o i  Jalalabacl. After the deeply dis- 
heartening tiews had reached him that the Cab111 
force, under General Elphinstone, had been cut to 
pieces in the defiles, Sale, throughout that terrible 
winter, bated no jot of heart or hope, and liis example 
is  tlie more remarkable since it establishes the tlxth 
t h a t  tlie calamity wliicl~ had beiallen our soldiers 
might  have been avoided if wiser counsels and a 
m o r e  resolute policy had been adopted. During our 
t w o  years' occupation oi  Afghanistan, nothing had 
been  more clearly proved than the fact that the 
native races were unable to withstand a resolute 
a t tack either from British troops or Sepoys lcd by 
British officers. Treachery and ambush, intrigue 
a n d  assassination, were still their chosen modes of 
offence ; and, thougli they had hovered about our 
f;~misllecl and enfeebled solcliers and catnp-followers, 
ant1 assailccl thcm cautiously in momctits of clificulty 
and cmbarrasstncnt with only too tnucli effect, tlic 
very Inst remnant of our forces hacl again and again 
put thcir assailants to fligllt. In  tlic facc of tlicsc 
circumstances, i t  is i~npossiblc not to concur in Sir  
John Icayc's opinion that thc truc policy of Gcncral 
Elphinstonc was not to  capitulate ancl retreat, but 
to  strengthen his positions in Cabul, and endeavour 
t o  obtain supplies by  hold sorties and incursions into 
thc surrounding country. Such, in fact, were tllc 
tactics of Gcncral Salc, by which, cvcn after receipt 
of intelligcticc of thc clisastcrs of thc I<oorcl Cabul, 
hc  was c~iablccl to tnaintain hirnsclf ancl protect his 
army agaitist all thc efforts of Alcbar I<han to obtai~l 
possessioll of the fortress. 
" A lcss cautious c o ~ n ~ n a ~ i d c r  miglit casily havc 
bccn hctraycd into a step which mould have becn no 
lcss fatal than tlic cvacuatio~l of Cabul. Only a fcw 
clays bcfore tliat event, a i c l  while as yct thcrc was 110 
token of thc calamity tliat cnsucd, a band of strange 
Ilorscmcn hacl suddenly prcscntcd li~cmsclves nt thc 
gntcs of the ~OIVII.  Thcy  carriccl a flag of truce, 
nncl tlcscribcd themsclvcs as the bearers o l  a letter 
from Cnhul. Conducted into t l ~ e  prcscnceof Gcncral 
Salc, thc strangers prcscntcd tlicir missivc, whicll 
provcd to  be n dcspateh written in English, and 
signctl by Gencml Elpllinstone hi~nsclf. I t s  contcnls 
lvcrc startling atid cxtmordinary; but of tlic gclloinc- 
ncss of thc document thcrc could bc no qocstion. 
I t  convcyccl thc intelligence o l  the convention that 
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had been entered into mith Alcbar, and directed 
General Sale forthrvith to march with arms, stores, 
ancl a~nmunitio~l for Peshawar. I11 brief, General 
Sale's superior orclercd an iinmediate retreat in thc 
depth of winter by the ominous IChaibar Pass, accon- 
panying his instructions with the assurance that 
' our troops would not be molested on the way.' I t  
is needless to say that the writer had no sufficient 
grounds for such an assurance. The evacuation of 
Jalalabad had simply becn wrung froin him as one 
of the conclitions of tlie protection which was pro- 
mised, but was ncver intended to be accorcled ; ancl, 
though General Elpbinstone proved his faith in the 
word of his foe, and suffered the penalty of his 
confidence, the order was not the Icss remarkable for 
the wealcness and infatuation that it displayecl. 
Peremptory as the directions were, and serious ns 
was tlie responsibility of neglecting to  obey, Sale 
nevertheless wisely toolc the latter course. A council 
of war was held, at which it was formally rcsolvecl 
that ' i t  would not bc prudent to act upon suc11 a 
document, ancl that the garrison would, therefore, 
remain where it was until further orders.' This 
timely act of disobedience unquestionably saved the 
army unclcr Sale from certain destruction. A t  the 
very moment when the cou~icil was deliberating the 
deep snows of the ICoorcl Cabul were crimson with 
the blood of the struggling Inass who were vainly 
endeavotlring to make their way through, to rejoin 
their more fortunate co~nl.acIes a t  less than a Iiunclrccl 
1 
I miles distance. There can be no question that thc 
I 
dcspatcli tliat had been extorted Tram tlie siclc and 
feeble commander-in-cliier formed part of a cunning 
scheme, the aim of \\~hicli was to give to the destruc- 
tion oC tlie Feriogliees a degree of completeness, and 
all a ir  of sudden and overwlicltning retribution, 
~ v h i c l ~  could not but affect pa\verfifirlly the imagination 
of any  future expedition to be despatched for the 
invasion or  the Afghan territory. Instead of capitu- 
lating, Sale set  t o  work to dig trenches round the 
bastiotis of tlie town, and to drill every camp 
follower capable of bearing arms. Only thrcc days 
after this bold and energetic determination was 
takcn, a sentry upon the walls on  tlie side towards 
Gtwdamaclc called aloud tliat he saw ' a  mounted 
man in the clistance.' Glassesn~ere out in a moment ; 
and there was clearly to be seen, sitting upon a half- 
starved pony, a rider who appeared to be a European, 
and  was  manifestly faint or wounded. Long before 
the stranger reacl~ecl the walls a foreboding of liis 
melancholy story was in the liearts of tlie defenders. 
I t  was Dr. Bryclon-not tllc only survivor of tlie 
final liorrors of the Jagdullah, but certainly tlie only 
one who had escaped to convey tlie news. H e  was 
bleeding, faint, and covered 1vit11 ~vounds, but still 
grasping in his riglit hand liis only weapon of 
defence-a small fragment of a sword. 
"Nothing  could now seem more rorlorn than the 
position of tlie defctiders of Jalalabad, surrounded 
b y  t h e  triumphant ATgIians and entirely cut OK from 
communication with Pesliawar. That their late 
comrades were destroyed they well knew. On tlie 
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first news of their fate, Sale ordered the cavalry to 
mount forthwith, and to patrol along the Cabul road 
to the farthest reach which might seem to be com- 
patible with their own safety. Many officers accom- 
panied them. I n  the striking words of Mr. Gleig, 
I 
! ' They had not ridden above four miles from the 
town ere they came upon the mutilated remains of 
the three out of Dr. Rrydon's four ill-fated com- 
panions, of whom he could give no account. Not a 
straggler, however-not a living soul, man, woman, 
or child-appeared either there, or as far as the eye 
turned their horses' heads with sorrow homewards, 
and rejoined their comrades. That night lanterns 
were suspended from poles at different points about 
the ramparts ; while from timc to time the bugles 
sounded the advance, in the hope that one or other 
of these beacons might guide some wanderer to a 
place of rest. But none came; and though on the 
morrow, and for several days and nightssubsequently 
a like course was pursued, not one man, European or 
native, seemed to be alive--certainly none profited 
by it.' On the side of Peshawar no adequate prepa- 
rations had been made in view of troubles so unex- 
pected ; nor did any succour come. The first 
thought was to increase the stock of provisions. 
While the non-combatants trained to handle pikes 
tnanufactured out of old hooks and any other avail- 
able bits of iron thilt could be found, were assigned 
to duty on the ramparts, foraging parties were sent 
forth, who ill two days brought back ~vitli them 170 
head of cattle and bcttvcen Goo and 700 sheep. Thc  
cattle s e r e  s la~~gl i tered immediately, and salted donTii, 
a s  fodder was wanting; tlie slicep mere sent out 
evely morning to  graze in the marshes between tlic 
river and tlie town walls, attcnded by sliephcrds and 
a n  a r ~ n c d  covering-party. Every tree and bush 
which could afford cover for niarLsmen was cut down, 
and  all tlie doors and timber-work from the houses 
outside tlie walls were cal.ried off and laid up as 
winter fuel. About the elid of tlie month numerous 
bodics of tlie enemy were observed inarcliing in vari- 
o u s  directions, and on the morni~ig of thc 15th, 
instead of the melco~nc sight of tlie advanced guard 
o f  General l'ollock's army of relief, they beheld tlie 
white tents of Alcbar IChali on tlie farther side of thc 
river, about six miles distant from the \valls. Still 
t h e  men laboured cheerfully in tlie ditclies and on 
t l ~ c  ramparts. T h e  works were daily becoming 
s t ronger ;  but tlieir labours were destiiied to be 
frustrated by an c l ie~ny Inore swift and destructive 
than a n y  they had yet encountered in Afghanistan. 
On the 19th tlie meti inal.ched out as usual, ~vitli their 
pickaxes and spades ; the guards were a t  the gates, 
t h e  sentries on the walls. Colotiel Monteith, the 
field officer for tlie day, had ascended one of tlie 
bastions, and was scanni~ig tlie horizon with his glass, 
when suddenly the ground trembled, and a noise was 
heard which is described as not so much like thunder 
as the sound of a thousand lieavily-laden waggons 
rolling and jolting over an ill-paved street. The  
C 
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; 70 diggers loolcecl around them with a stare of conster- 
'he nation ; and then, as if actuated by one common 
influence, the parties in the trenches, seizing their S l l ,  
011 t arms, rushed out. I t  was well for tliem that they 
thc  did s o ;  for scarcely had they reached the glacis ere 
~ n d  t h e  wl~olc of the plain hcgan to heave like billows 
1sl1 o n  the surface of the ocean, and walls and houses, 
IVLI, I splitting asunder, came tumbling down upon the 
ses space which but nn instant before had been crowded 
a s  with workmen.' In a moment the earthquake had 
OUS 
ari- 
; th,  parapets \vliich had been with so mucli skill and ' 
a r  d diligence constructed were tlirown down ~vith a fear- 
t h e  fill crash into heaps of ruins. In  the walls, breaches 
t h c  were made, more accessible than any which the 
itill troops found when they first entered the place; and 
011 t h e  entire circuit was more or less shaken. As to the 
i n g  houses in the town, there mas scarcely one of them 
b e  which escaped more or less of damage. Some fell in 
tive altogether;  others had their fronts or flanks de- 
ian. stroyed and the roofs shaken down ; and the cloud 
heir o f  dust which rose immediately on the occurrellce of 
~ t e s ,  t l ie catastrophe is described as having been por- 
the  tentous. Happily, very few lives were lost. By far 
the  t h e  greater number of the troops, being \vitliout the 
ass, walls when the shock came, stood upon the glacis, 
was  o r  lay flat, while it heaved beneath them, to witness 
~ d e r  t h e  overthrow ; and the guards, making for opeci 
:011s spaces, escaped. Some natives were overwhelmed in 
r11e e t h e  ruins of the houses where they sojourned ; and 
I 7-2 
Colonel Monteith, before h e  could escape from the 
rampart, sustainecl some bruises. But, on the whole, 
the cas~~alties were wonderfully rare ; and the stores, 
both of ammunition and salted provisions, sustained 
no damagc.' 
"Nothing could Letter cxliibit thc wliolesome rc- 
spect inspired by the attitude of thc garrison than 
the neglect of Akbar Khan to  seize this moment for 
assaulting the place. The  opportunity ivas so011 
lost. 011 the morrou. the piclcaxcs and spades of 
the indefatigable garrison were again b ~ ~ s i l y  a t work. 
Grass-cutting and foraging parlies still went forth 
daily, sustaining occasionally losses from the attacks 
of thc enemy's cavalry, but always repulsing their 
assailants, and rarely returning empty-Iiandecl. The 
~.ifle was not at that time the trusty friend of the 
1'21iglish soldier wliich it has since bccome, but the 
whole country within long range of Lhc walls had 
bee11 so carefi~lly measured, ancl tf~c practiee had 
been so effective that every shot tllrown where a 
group o l  Afghans asselnblcd told. To such perfec- 
tion, indeed, was the art of  gunnery carried by the 
besieged, t l ~ a t  it is stated tliat on onc occasion Cap- 
tain Uackhouse strudc down a si~iglc horseman more 
than a ~n i l c  distant froin the fort, As  the month 
worc on, the Afghal~ i~~vest rne~i t  bccatne closer, and 
the harassment o l  their fire more galling to the 
working parties and thc lncn 011 thc ramparts. On 
the 2nd of March, towards cvcning, a party of 
sappew sallied forth and dl.ovc thc c11cm~'s skir- 
mishers away. Tllc Afghans more contiuuously re- 
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1 the ceiving reinforcements, but the besieged, tliough. 
co~npelled to husband their failing stock of am- 
tores, munition, made many successful sorties, a ~ i d  the 
ained attempts to interfere with the foraging parties 
were rarely completely successful. On one occasion 
le re- a -  party of cavalry and infantry, suddenly issuing 
from the gates, boldly marched down upon the 
flocks of the enemy, and, before they c o ~ ~ l d  be i~iter- 
soon fered with, actually returned into the town, driving 
es of before them not fewer than $m head of sheep. 
.vorl<. Both food and ammunition, however, begau at  last 
fort11 to fail. For  upwards of four months the arcison 1, 
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had thus maintained itself isolated in the heart of an 
enemy's country; the time had come when more 
decisive steps must be talcen. I t  was now the 7th 
of April, and instead of the deep snows and bitter 
frosts wliich the forces under Genera1 Elphinsto~le 
had to encountel; the weather was fine and favour- 
able for military operations. The  army was, more- 
over, in comparatively good condition-inured to 
]lard worlc and harder fighting, and too well accus- 
tomed t o  take the measure of their enemy to be 
daunted by his greatly superior numbers. On that 
day mas fought the tnemorable battle outside the 
walls of Jalalabad. Some of the most valuable 
officers in the army of the Indus fell in that obsti- 
nately-contested struggle, but the result was a 
victory which could not have been more complete. 
Camp baggage, artillely, standards, horses, and arms 
J of every Bind fell into our hands, together with abundant ammuaition. The redoubtable Akbar 
. fled towards Cabul with tlie wreck of liis army ; and 
in onc day the besicged in  Jalalabad, who had beell 
put on half-rations, round thc~nsclvcs in possession 
or  abundance of provisiolls. Thc tide had already 
turlled ; and i t  is important to obscrve that all this 
w x  achievcd herorc tlie arrival of any succour fro~n 
without. What more co~~clusive vidence could be 
rumislied o l  t l ~ e  melancholy truth that the over- 
~vl~elrning clisasters of thc Icoord Cabul werc literally 
of our owii sculcing? \Vho can reasonably doubt 
that  what Sale hn<l doltc a t  Jalalnhad, Elphinstonc. 
or some com~nandcr less cnfecbled by ill-health, 
could havc acco~nplished at Cabul ! To lnect death 
fighting in tlie cantontnents, or witl~in tlic strong 
walls of the Bala I-Iissar, would a t  lcast havc been 
prclerablc to the tender lnercies of tllc Algl~ans and 
tlie rigours or a winter in tlie rugged and tortoous 
passes of t.11~ White Mountains; but, with unaccount- 
able inratuation, tlic cfrorts to obtain supplics had 
been delayed a t  Cabul until cven the means of 
equipping loraging parties werc wai~ting. 
"011 the morrow o l  that baLLlc a innrl<ct was 
actually opcned outsiclc the gates of Jnlalabad, to 
~vl~icl i  t l ~ c  ountry people Lrougl~t thcit. watts to bc 
exchanged Tor the coin or  tlic Feringhecs. On the 
loth, Pollocl('s army was heard or as llaving reachcd 
the ~niddle of thc I<haibar. Tlie dificulties or the 
Pass, in spitc or the resistance or tlic Afrecdis, who 
11ad seized the fort oT Ali Musjid, had all bee11 sur- 
mounted with the loss or only one ofiecr killed, two 
or threc woonded, atid abolit 135 men Idled and 
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woundeJ. O n  thc 16th, Polloclc's column marched 
into the  &leaguered city, accompanied by the bands 
of the garrison regiments, who had come forth to 
meet them, and \vIlo greeted them, as Mr. Gleig tells 
us, with the old Jacobite melody, 'Oh, but ye've been 
lang a comin'.' The  forward movement up011 Cabul, 
however, was not begun until August. Wave after 
wave of  the troops despatched to Afghanistan arrived, 
until the entire force, consisting of nine or  ten 
thousand well-disciplined troops, attended by five or 
six thousand Silch soldiers, and the enormous number 
of 40,000 camp followers, were ready to  march. In 
the fatal passes of Jugdulluck and the Icoord Cabul 
thpv fnnnd the bleached bones of their unfortunate 
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comrades. Preparations had been made by the 
Ghilzyes to oppose our advance; but our troops 
swept the heights, and their resistance was overcome 
with but trifling losses. In  the valley of the Tezeen, 
where so  many of General Elpllinstone's army had 
fallen, Akbar  I<han made a 1 s t  stand, but was de- 
feated with scarcely more sacrifice of life on 0-ur side. 
Similar successes attended General Nott's advance in 
Western Afghanistan. Ghazni was retaken with 
little dificulty, the march continued triumphantly on 
both sidcs, and 011 the 17th September the combined 
forces re-entered Cabul. I n  brier, the second inva- 
sion of Afghanistan byacomparatively small English 
a r m y  had been accomplished with scarcely more 
difticulty than thc first. Ooly three days later the 
brave Sale had the happiness of regaining his long- 
lost  wife, together with his daughter, Mts. Sturt, 
whose husband had fallen in the disastrous retreat .  
The  prisoners had, OIL the whole, been kindly t reated,  
though their privations, hurried as they had b e e n  
about the country, and frequently removed f rom 
place to place, had necessarily bee11 considerable ; 
and Akbar, embittered by his defeats, had a t  last 
threatened to make presents of them to the cl~iels of 
t h e  barbarous tribes of Turkestan. Their relcasc 
was ultilnately obtained by bribing the ICl~an in  
charge of the fort a t  Bameean, to whose custody 
Akbar  had confided them. The total list of pri- 
soners released on General Polloclc's arrival a t  Cabnl, 
as given in the appendix to Lieutenant Eyrc's 
Journal, comprise thirty-six officers, nine ladies, 
twenty-one children, and fifty-five privates a ~ t d  o ther  
persons." 




